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POLARITY IN THE RIG-VEDA*

By Murray Fowler

The proposal of this paper is that the ontology of the Rig-Veda ascribes polarity to the nature of Pure Being, and that the timeless creation of the phenomenal universe is, accordingly, explained as the mutual interaction of two opposed principles. Since no other doctrine appears to be anterior to this, it is suggested that the concept of polarity is the ultimate basis of all Vedic metaphysics and that the identification of any transcendent principle, however named, with either one of any given pair of contrasted powers, instead of with their union, is a later, erroneous interpretation of the earliest *śruti*.

The question and answer of RV I, 185, 1 and 2 are explicit:[1] (1) "Which one of these two was the former and which the latter? How were the two born, O Sages? Who knows? The two bear all things, that is to say, just *nāma*, by themselves. Day and night move onward as if on a wheel.[2] (2) The two unmoving, footless ones receive the moving, footed germ of multiplicity as if it were their own son in the womb of his two parents." This is metaphysical poetry; only as metaphysics can it be read. Geldner[3] has correctly discerned that "day and night" are not alone addressed in the first stanza; as will be shown more certainly in the course of this paper, even heaven and earth, specifically invoked in every verse, are only the type or, at most, the archetype of many other pairs of polar opposites. Neither day and night nor heaven and earth bear, unaided and alone, all things within themselves; nor is plurality produced from unity by their sole interaction. These are but necessary words, literal symbols of the actually inexpressible ultimate mystery. That they are the careful symbols of theology the word *nāma* is evidence of the clearest sort.

Nāma is, of course, "name," Lat. *nomen*, etc., but it has long been agreed[4] that its Vedic significance is deeper than that of a mere appel-

* I am indebted to the American Council of Learned Societies for a study aid; and to Dr. A. K. Coomaraswamy, of the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, for constant advice and criticism. Since the completion of this paper I am now further indebted to Dr. Coomaraswamy for his kindness in reading it before the meeting of the American Oriental Society of Boston.

1. *Katarā pūrvā katarāparāyoḥ kathā jāte kavayaḥ ko vi veda viśvaṁ tmanā bibhṛto yad dha nāma vi vartete ahanī cakriyeva.*

2. Cf. Heraclitus (Diels, *Fr.* 103): Beginning and end are the same on the periphery of a circle.

3. Cf. the note to his translation.

4. Cf. the St. Pet. Lex, and Grassmann's *Wb s.v.*

lative: the name of something is not only that by which it is known once and then recognized again; it is, in everyday experience, as well as in Vedic theology, the mark or symbol or token of that which makes some thing that which it essentially is. *Nāma* is, then, besides merely "name," the essential or substantive nature: the *quiddity,* not the quality. On this point some emphasis is needed, for, although the argument will not here be pressed, it is possible that the Vedic Viśvarūpa, son of Tvaṣṭṛ (what else would Tvaṣṭṛ's son be called?) is no other than the Nāma-rūpa of later thought—the combination of essential Being and adventitious qualities necessary for the existence of the phenomenal world. Thus, in the present quotation *(viśvaṁ tmanā bibhṛto yad dha nāma)* and in other instances where the word appears in conjunction with the polar opposites, it seems proper to translate *nāma* as "prime (or universal) form," by the Greek word σχῆμα, or by the Latin *forma* in the sense of its use by Boethius: i.e., as that from which all things proceed.[5] *Nāma,* indeed, in its highest use is the Vedic equivalent of the Platonic "idea," divorced of *all* qualities (including that of τὸ καθόλου βέλτιον); or of the Platonic σχῆμα, which, like *nāma,* always goes along with color *(rūpa).*[6]

This concept of *nāma* may be found throughout the Rig-Veda. Thus, in the seventh book we read[7] *samānaṁ nāma bibhrato virūpāḥ,* "bearing the same *nāma,* but of differing color or aspect," an idea which, in the Yami-Yamī hymn of the tenth book,[8] is otherwise expressed: *salakṣmā yad viṣurūpā bhavāti . . .* "as if, by definition the same, she were become of different aspect." *Salakṣman* occurs only in this context, but we are fortunate, for the present purpose, to have a gloss within the same book of the Rig-Veda[9] in the form of another poet's half-true, half-false bewilderment: *"Durmantu,"* he says, " 'hard to understand' is this *amṛtasya nāmasalakṣmā yad viṣurūpā bhavāti."* Hard indeed; but the gloss is important for its union of *amṛta* with *nāma* in the myth of Yama and Yamī, for we are thus better able to see the meaning of RV V, 75, 5: *amṛtaṁ nāma bhejire,* "They [the Maruts] participated in the immortal form"; and of RV I, 68, 4: *bhajanta viśve devatvaṁ nāma,* "All shared

5. *De. Trin.,* II.

6. Cf. *Meno.,* 75c: ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἑπόμενον.

7. RV VII, 103, 6.

8. RV X, 10, 2.

9. RV X, 12, 6.

the divine form." It is in this sense, too, that *nāma* can be "of Agni": not merely as his "name," but as his "form," his *divina substantia sine materia,*[10] as Boethius has it (as, for example, RV X, 45, 2: "We know thy hidden, highest form";[11] or RV III, 20, 3, where *nāma* is distinguished from powers and qualities and housings of Agni).[12] It is also, therefore, understandable that the Soma drop should *carry* the beloved form of Indra *(induḥ bibharti cārv indrasya nāma),*[13] just as in Christian doctrine the soul's potentiality is transmitted in the seed.[14] When Yama and Yamī, then, are said to be of one *nāma* but of different *rūpa,* the language is most precise: they are the progentive pair through whose agency the immortal *nāma* is borne on. Consider RV VI, 18, 7:[15] "He [Indra] with majesty flows out over and beyond the generations of mankind by his immortal form *(amartyena nāmnā)*"; here there can be no reasonable doubt; the thought is of the one spirit constantly striving for actualization, of the continuous flow of life through decay in which all things are made. Here mention should be made, too, of the *tanu* doctrine, in which the phenomenal or sensible world is conceived as clustering around and clinging to the fine, subtle, completely attributeless extension of Indra. For the present purpose one quotation will suffice:[16] "The munificent one transmutes himself into shape after shape, putting on appearances round his own *tanu (māyāḥ kṛṇvānas tanvaṁ pari svām).*" And finally, then, in summation of the whole doctrine thus far expressed, RV III, 38, 4 may be cited:[17] "Him, moving onward, all creatures have compassed about; being clothed in glory, he moves on self-luminous; that is the great form *(nāma)* of the Asuran bull; Viśvarūpa has assumed the separate immortal forms *(nāmāni).*"

The *nāmāni,* or multiples of the one *nāma,* takes us further. In the first place, these hidden forms *(guhyā nāmāni)* placed between the two

10. *De Trin.,* II.

11. *Vidmā te nāma paramaṁ guhā.*

12. The whole hymn (RV III, 20) should be read.

13. RV IX, 109, 14.

14. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Chaps. 88, 89.

15. *Sa majmanā janima mānuṣāṇām amartyena nāmnāti pra sarsre.* Cf. also RV X, 55, 2. This is possibly the explanation of BU 3, 2, 12, where *nāma* alone is said to remain after death.

16. RV III, 53, 8.

17. *Ātiṣṭhantaṁ pari viśve abhūṣañ chriyo vasānaś carati svarociḥ mahat tad vṛṣṇo asurasya nāmā viśvarūpo amṛtāni tasthau.*

great principles[18] are to be distinguished both from the One *Nāma* and from the progentive pair which bear it. Viśvarūpa enduing the several hidden forms becomes the multiplicity of the sensible world, but the nature of Pure Being is neither altered nor diminished thereby. The One remains eternally in tension between the two poles of its own nature, and by the making and breaking of the magnetic pull it and they (the three in one) are at once, and eternally, renewed. Unity in multiplicity is a primary assumption in Vedic metaphysics; not, therefore, to argue that point, but to expound the *means* whereby the One persists through all decay is the sole task of its ontology. It is to this precise problem that the concept of polarity provides the answer.

This whole theory of creation, quite in keeping with the *tanu* and *nāma* doctrines, is summed up in RV III, 38, 5: "First the Bull of old brought forth; these are his multiples; the two sons of heaven . . . took on as kings from ancient time the power of rule."[19] The perplexity of commentators from Sāyaṇa on over the identity of the two sons of heaven is of little moment, since it arises from the attempt to fix under mental concepts the prime duality of Being. The two sons of heaven may here be (as is most usual) the Aśvins, or the sky and earth, or day and night, or the two half-worlds, or any other of the absolutely limitless possibility of polar extension; what the poet had in mind is, certainly, itself important, but of little relevance to our immediate problem: what is fundamental is the structure of Vedic ontology, with which the poet was evidently perfectly familiar. And that structure we have in the verse just cited: first, the primordial One, unique and undifferentiated, from which all things issue; second, the multiplicity of the phenomenal world; third, the polar opposites of plus-minus, odd-even, male-female—the two kings who eternally dispute between themselves the dominion which they share.

But at this point (and only, be it said, when this point really has been reached) a nice distinction must be drawn. In denying the validity of the naturalistic view of Vedic thought, which ascribes ultimate reality to the sky and earth or to the night and day, and in asserting the supremacy of metaphysics, we reach inevitably the crux of the theologi-

18. Cf. III, 38, 3, 4, 5; V, 5, 10, and, as similar in meaning, X, 70, 5. Cf. also II, 3, 7; VII, 87, 2.

19. *Asūta pūrvo vṛṣa bho jyāyān imā asya śurudhaḥ santi pūrvīḥ divo napātā vidathasya dhībhiḥ kṣatraṁ rājānā pradivo dadhāthe.*

cal or metaphysical argument itself, to wit, whether the paired opposites are assumed to be existent or, as has been already suggested, to inhere in Pure Being: whether, in short, we have (in scholastic terms) to deal with realism or with nominalism. Lest, however, it should appear that a Western mode of thought were to be forced on Eastern speculation, the problem may be re-stated in this way: If polarity be needed for existence, did the earliest Indian thought posit a really existent limitless extension in number of this potential otherness, or is the divine bi-unity alone itself existent, the separate forms which the polar extremities appear to take being, then, no more than illusory manifestations of that polarity which is uniquely ascribed to the One, changeless, eternal, and alone? No more than a partial answer can be given to the question in the remainder of this paper. Here evidence will be presented only for the presence of the latter view as an underlying assumption in the Rig-Veda; the possibility of different modes of thought likewise based upon polarity, themselves the origins of still other Indian *darśanas* is, for the moment, neither affirmed nor denied. To re-state the final thesis, then, more certainly: the Vedic concept of Being includes that of two opposed principles, devoid of all quality, being in essence neither light nor dark, not male or female, not negative or positive, not plus or minus, but only the unknown, undefined possibilities of polar extension, whose actualization is the condition of all phenomenal existence.

It should, first, be observed that, although the exemplification of polarity is theoretically unlimited, the essential polar relationship remains always and completely unchanged. Thus the connection of Indra and Dyāvāpṛthivī ("Two well-made repositories hast thou, O Indra, the heavens filled with majesty and the earth with shaping power")[20] may also be posited of Agni. In one and the same verse Agni is addressed as "son of heaven and of strength," and as "the unkindled power and apathy[21] of the two virgins." The two virgins, moreover, are Agni's own daughters *(aruṣasya duhitarā virūpe)* while, at the same time, they are sun and moon. The pair is also said to press or clash together and to move again apart,[22] an action which, while doubtless characteristic of two heavenly bodies in conjunction, is even more exactly descriptive of the bi-polar nature of ultimate reality. It is, in other terms, the opposi-

20. X, 29, 6. *Dve matre nu te sumite indra pūrvī dyaur majmanā pṛthivī kāvyena.*
21. VI, 49, 2. The translation of *arati* is doubtful.
22. RV VI, 49, 3: *mithasturā vicarantī.*

tion of antinomies, the conflict necessary for life and the endurance of form. And this two and one, or triune, arrangement of divinity is fundamental to Vedic theology.

In keeping with this doctrine is the expression *tṛtīyam nāma,* the third form or essence. "The son *(putra),*" it is said, "assumes the upper and the lower and also the third form of the father in the luminous vault of heaven";[23] or, again, "The son assumes his parents' hidden third form" *(pitror apīciaṁ nāma tṛtīyam).*[24] The significance of *nāma* itself has already been discussed; the importance of the third *nāma* is clear in the immediately following verse: "Flashing, it roars down to the repositories, being restrained by men within the golden sheath." Here is the proper *saṁsāra:* it is the third, hidden, secret form which returns and once again takes shape on earth through the requisite agency of the two parents, the offspring assuming the forms of both and yet, at the same time, taking on that of the *third* and hidden form, for, in the words of a hymn already quoted, "He flows out over and beyond the generations of mankind through his immortal *nāma.*" It is in this positive and even, as it were, optimistic view that the Rig-Veda's "wholeness" consists—a "wholeness" which finds its characteristic expression in the constantly recurring prayer for offspring, for in the Rig-Veda the begetting of children is in the truest and most normal sense the release of the spirit from its earthly restraints and bonds and its freeing for the putting on of other forms. It is the *tṛtīyam,* or third, *nāma* which endures.

With the *tṛtīyam nāma* is to be associated the mysterious figure of Trita, whom Bloomfield[25] rightly, as I think, discerned to be the demiurgos, a predecessor, perhaps, of Indra. His very name defines him as the third; and we are elsewhere told that he occupies three places, or, even more certainly explicit, that there are two fetters or snares or traps *(pāśye)* in which he is caught or bound.[26] (In the same hymn reference is made to the separated halves of the universe. Trita, therefore, is the

23. RV IX, 75, 2: *dadhāti putraḥ pitror apīciam nāma tṛtīyam adhi rocane divaḥ.* Cf. also RV I, 155, 3 and Macdonell, *JRAS* (1893), p. 436.

24. To Bergaigne's interpretation of this and other passages as referring only to Agni no objection can be made, for Agni is many things (cf. RV II, 1, 1). It may be suggested, however, that such an identification is neither fundamental nor all-inclusive, for Trita is itself a truly basic name or theological term.

25. *JAOS,* 16, cxxi (*Proc. AOS,* March, 1894). *Cf.* also L. v. Schroeder, *Herakles u. Indra,* p. 8; Macdonnell, *JRAS* (1893), p. 488; Max Muller, SBE, xxxii, 305.

26. Cf. RV IX, 102, 2.

precise person of the trinity who should bear, and who does bear, Varuna in the primordial sea *(samudre);* and who, finally, "standing firm in his own housings, placed himself, covered over, within the womb, whence, having reintegrated all several personalities, he, the light of creatures, in new re-distribution and quite without restraints, goes forth again to men."[27]

We return then, finally, and with less need for comment, to other passages in which the polar tension of existence is less concretely stated. Thus, of the Aśvins it is said, "Severally born, of one immaculate body but with their own forms, *(arepasā tanvā nāmabhiḥ svaiḥ)* the two desired one another."[28] No study of Vedic polarity, however brief, could be complete without mention of the Aśvins. The Protean figures of the two horsemen are unusually difficult to fix, for the very reason that they, unlike the heaven and earth or sun and moon, exist almost wholly in the realm of fantasy; and though we may think to get from the Swedish rock-paintings a glimpse or two of the meaning of the horse in a certainly related theology, yet language is at a loss to name the riders more precisely than as the two horsemen who have their being throughout the universe and within the body of man.[29] But of the words *arepasā tanvā nāmabhiḥ svaiḥ,* if ever, one is permitted a superlative. Words have never been more carefully chosen. The *tanu* is the thread of himself around which Indra puts on appearances, transmuting himself into one aspect after another *(māyāḥ kṛṇvānas tanvam pari svām).*[30] *Arepas* (from the root *lip)* indicates that the divine thread of Being is literally unattached: that there is nothing adventitious or adscititious which is in any way a part of it; it is, like the *puruṣa* of the Upaniṣads, *asaṅga,* "unattached." The two opposed principles then, in this text, are of one body, but are separate persons (and it is precisely in the One Body but

27. RV X, 46, 6: *Ni pastyāsu trita stabhūyan parivīto yonau sīdad antaḥ ataḥ saṁgṛbhyā viśām damūnā vidharmanāyantrair īyate nṛn.* This difficult passage I take to mean that Trita, "the third," resumes in each incarnation the whole of experience, so that every human creature is, as Aquinas says, *quodammodo omnia.*

28. RV I, 181, 4. Cf. also RV V, 73, 4.

29. It is also worthy of mention that the *haris* of Indra, although driven in a team together, travel on separate courses. From the point of view of polarity, the figure is nearly perfect. (Cf. RV X, 23, 1, where Indra is addressed as *harīṇāṁ rathyaṁ vivratānām.*)

30. RV III, 53, 8. Cf. R. N. Dandekar, *Der Vedische Mensch* (Heidelberg, 1938), p. 39.

in their separate persons that their mysterious productive union is consummated).[31] "For his [Indra's] sake the two, united, pour out the heavenly flow; supporting the prolific form, he goes on, surpassing both his dwellings; in all the conflicts both sides are good to him."[32] He is it, too, called by whatever name,[33] who, "bright and shining, like the lover of the dawn, filled the two when close embraced, like the light of the sky; and who, existent, is encompassed round with power, becoming the father of the gods, being their son."[34] He also is the one who is "dear as if existent, although being one who winds through[35] it all." Nor is it at all contradictory, therefore, that Indrāgni should elsewhere[36] be spoken of as mounting the same vehicle and as having made for themselves an accompanying form *(nāma)* with which they united, for the eternal regeneration of the Triad within Being is the essence of the mystery. The son not only assumes his parents' hidden form, but he indeed creates the pair themselves by his own powers *(svadhābhiḥ*[37]*)*, and by the eternal joining and sundering of these poles of Being, the son, or third, is by the power of his own pervasive being eternally brought forth. The mimesis is exact in the fire-ceremony, for the latent fire bursts out only from the friction and attrition—one might, indeed, say from the strife of the two implements.

The subject leads one on, but an end can be made with a very brief treatment of the opposed concepts of *yoga* and *kṣema,* action and inaction, or war and peace. If of these two ideas it may be said that they differ in no essential way from any other pair of polar opposites necessary to existence in any mode, it is, nevertheless, true, and most fundamentally so, that *yoga* and *kṣema,* as distinct from any other pair of opposable forces, name the essential inner activity which underlies the very idea of contrariety and otherness itself. Clarity may perhaps be served by citing the admittedly inexact parallel of the Hegelian synthesis, the result of the negation of the negation. In Vedic terms, the opposed pairs themselves alternately act and rest, strive with one an-

31. *Cf.* the phrase of St. Thomas Aquinas, *a principio vivente conjuncto, Summa Theol.,* I, 27, 2.

32. RV II, 27, 15.

33. Cf. RV X, 114, 5; III, 5, 4; V, 3, 1; V, 44, 6.

34. RV. I, 69, 1.

35. RV. I, 69, 2.

36. Cf. RV. I, 108, 1 and 3.

37. Cf. RV. I, 95, 4.

other and remain inert: the action is *yoga,* the inertia *kṣema.* But, be it at once added, whatever meaning *yoga* may later have assumed, care must be taken to let no subjective ethical judgment of "better" or "worse" creep into an interpretation of the early Vedic word. It is no *better* to be in *yoga;* it is only *different.* Tension and release are both eternally necessary for every possible antagonistic pair; neither war nor peace endures forever; neither war nor peace alone is an absolute ideal of Vedic metaphysics. At a time when the name of Indra was the highest one in use, the poet sang:[38] "Let him flourish in their rest *(kṣeme),* and may he survive their strife *(yoge);* let him shatter both containers at once when they have met together." This is the polar doctrine of the Veda. Heraclitus of Ephesus, who, like the Indian seers, looked for the truth within himself, found the same principle behind phenomena and wrote it thus: "It is necessary to know that war is universal and that justice is strife and that all creatures come into being through strife." Or (to end with a Vedic phrase) "to Him in all conflicts both sides are good."

38. Cf. RV. V, 37, 5; and also TU V, 2, 1, 7 and KU. II. 2.

THE GOD OF ANAXAGORAS*

By Felix M. L. Cleve

I

THE DIVINE MECHANICIAN

Anaxagoras maintains that there is nothing equal to Nous in power, saying: "He is the most powerful" (ἰσχύει μέγιστον, Simpl. *Phys.* 156, 13 ff.). But whence does Nous get his motive power, his own motivity? This power is just an ingredient of his sovereign nature; it belongs to him, never lost and from all eternity. For Nous is a being that rules out of an original plenitude of power of his own. He is "an autocratic being" (αὐτοκρατές).

Yet Nous is not omnipotent, but only "the most powerful." His power is not boundless, in that he can by no means deal with the ruled elements at arbitrary will, for they have the cause of their existence in themselves, exactly as he has the cause of his existence in himself. If they were not from all eternity, he would not be able to create them *(creare)*; since they exist already, he cannot annihilate them *(ad nihilum redigere)*: "For no element comes into existence nor is annihilated" (οὐδὲν γὰρ χρῆμα γίνεται οὐδὲ ἀπόλλυται, Simpl. *Phys.* 163, 18). Consequently, Nous cannot make out of the elements whatever he pleases, for not even the possibilities of their development are created by him. (There is no genuine creationism in the biblical sense in Greek thought.) And whatever is discordant with these mechanical possibilities which lie in the elements is unaccomplishable.

But Nous is *cognizant* of all these possibilities of development. Long before he starts ordering the world, he knows the different sequences of development to result from his interferences, *and so can act accordingly.* For every particle of the other elements knows only of itself (being a grain of sensation!) and, at most, perhaps, knows of the other *moirai* joined with it in a *mereia.* Nous, however, has a knowledge not only of himself, but of all the other things as well: "He has all knowledge about all" (γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει, Simpl. *Phys.* 156, 13 ff.), and there is, in the whole world, no occurrence unknown to him, noth-

* The following article is taken from Chapter II, "Nous, the Ruler Element and Construction Engineer," of a book entitled, *"All Has Been Arranged by Mind." The Philosophy of Anaxagoras: An Attempt at Reconstruction,* now in preparation.

ing that he has not known from all eternity: "Nous has known all" (πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς). Hence his power is a function of his knowledge of the given possibilities.

But all the same, his will is not hindered by that fact. For—and this is the most characteristic feature of this divine mechanician—*he can do whatever he wills, because he does not will anything except exactly what can be done, exactly what he knows he can do.*

II

WITHOUT RENUNCIATION OR IDEAL

It is usual to take the Nous of Anaxagoras for a deity "setting purposes," and Anaxagoreanism for a teleological doctrine. It is true that Nous is a being who works consciously, and so is the omnipotent God of the Bible, who creates the world out of nothingness to be subservient to his ends. But there is a difference. Nous, not being a Creator, is only cognizant of what will result from his interferences. He knows all the mechanical possibilities lying in the elements and, out of those various possible courses of a world, chooses the most beautiful and most variegated (not "the best," which is much too hazy). But that is all, and those possibilities are not dependent on him, as explained above.

A deity, however, able to accomplish only that which "can be done," a deity that has to take into account those independent possibilities, a deity that would have to renounce the realization of any wishes not accommodated to those possibilities—such a deity cannot be said to "set purposes," without depriving this term of its proper sense. The world of Anaxagoras, to be sure, is no blind mechanism; it is a seeing mechanism, but—a mechanism.

The Anaxagoric doctrine is labelled "teleological" mostly in reference to these words: *"Und alles ordnete der Geist an, wie es in Zukunft werden soll* und wie es vordem war (was jetzt nicht mehr vorhanden ist) und wie es gegenwärtig ist" (H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,* 46 B 12).

Anaxagoras himself, however—provided we may give some credence to the texts handed down—has written: καὶ ὁποῖα ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὁποῖα ἦν, ἅσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὁποῖα ἔστι, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς, Simpl. *Phys.* 156, 13 ff. And, unfortunately, this sentence consisting of Greek words, and that sentence consisting of German words, are by no means

to one another as Greek text to German translation. For, ὁποῖα ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι does not mean *wie es in Zukunft werden soll* ("how it shall come to be in the future") any more than διεκόσμησε means *er ordnete an* ("he gave orders, he gave commands").

Διακοσμεῖν is a designation for the Nous's world-molding, world-forming activity. Διεκόσμησε means *er ordnete* ("he put in order, he organized"), but not *er ordnete an* ("he gave orders, he gave commands"). And μέλλειν has never had the meaning of "shall" used imperatively.

Therefore, ὁποῖα ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι *does not mean the purport of a command,* but only denotes the totality of what had been impending, what had been future at the moment immediately preceding *cosmopoeia.* The preterit value in the word διεκόσμησε ("he arranged in order") is obviously meant from the viewpoint of the actual reader at any given time. Thus the meaning of the whole sentence might be: "Whatever had been future [i.e., taken from the last moment before the beginning of the formation of the world], that is, the totality of all actually past, as well as the totality of all actually present, has been the work of the Nous's organizing activity."

The "totality of all actually future" is not explicitly mentioned, first, because, in regard to the matter, it is implicitly denoted in those two other determinations, and then for quite an obvious reason regarding style: It could not have been said of it διεκόσμησε ("he *has* organized").

Thus, anyone who had not gathered it already from the whole character of the system, ought to have grasped, just from this single sentence, the fact that the doctrine of Anaxagoras is not teleological, strictly speaking, since ὁποῖα ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι means merely the world process as it was going to result if, and when, and as long as Nous works in the correct way.

However, despite the aseity and autonomy of the molded material, this universe is not a defective reproduction of a pattern, enticing and elusive. Thoroughly unlike the cosmos of the Platonic Demiurge, this orderly running of the world of Anaxagoras was intended and is operated by Nous just as it is, without renunciation or ideal.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NOTION OF REVELATION FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

By Robert Leet Patterson

The question which I propose to discuss in this paper is one which is of vital importance to all thinkers who are not prepared to deny the claim to validity of the religious experience, and to dismiss all credence in it as superstition or delusion. The criticism has, indeed, been made in the past that American students of religion have been so absorbed in the problem of mysticism that they have given less than due attention to the notion of revelation as the self-disclosure of the Divine. Doubtless the recent change of emphasis from immanence to transcendence has rendered this assertion less true than formerly. But, in any case, philosophers cannot afford to forget that religion in the historic sense of the word—at least throughout the Christian, Jewish, and Moslem world—has been continuously linked to this same idea of revelation. The fact has been, at times, thrown up at them as though it were a reproach. Philosophers, we are reminded, have never founded a religion. Such a task has been invariably the work of saints and prophets. The story is told that once Talleyrand was approached by a Frenchman who announced that he had worked out the complete and perfect religion, and desired only advice as to how to propagate it. Talleyrand is said to have replied, "I recommend that you be crucified and rise the third day." It is not only to the miraculous, as this satirical remark suggests, that religion has appealed. To great personalities, who have seemed to live, speak, and act as though under the compulsion of some power greater than themselves, religion has attributed a unique significance. And we can readily understand why. It is hardly possible, I think, for a sympathetic reader to close Miss Sackville-West's fascinating life of St. Joan and not feel himself in a mood in which he might well echo the exclamation of Pascal, "God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of philosophers and scholars."

Yet, if philosophers have founded no religion, they have elevated and transmuted every religion with which they have come in contact. Remove the philosophical elements from Christianity, and you are left with a Greek mystery religion or a Jewish messianic cult. The gap is even greater between the intellectual outlook of Al-Farabi or Avicenna and the crudities of primitive Islam. And in the case of Hinduism, or

in that of Buddhism, the debt to philosophy is surely no less. Moreover, in times of mental tumult and religious uncertainty philosophers have carried on. Thus, during the period between the death of Greco-Roman paganism and the triumph of Christianity, philosophy, under the guidance of the Neoplatonists, provided a refuge for those who had been intellectually disinherited. And to many of us, as we view the powerlessness of traditional religion in the present distress, it seems clear that a similar task confronts us today.

The problem before us, then, can be stated as follows: So far as it survives, the civilization of the western world in which we live bears the impress of Christianity, and Christianity is a revealed religion. If philosophers, without bartering their intellectual integrity, can make their own the notion of revelation, they may hope to preserve the continuity of the Christian tradition. If they cannot do so, the strand of continuity will not, indeed, be wholly broken, but many of its strands will be severed. The future may turn out to be better or worse than the past, but in any case it will be radically dissimilar to it. We may be standing on the verge of a chasm wider and deeper than that which sunders the twentieth century Protestant Christian from his medieval ancestors. Of the importance of our problem, therefore, there can be no question.

What, however, do we mean by revelation? In the widest sense, I take it, we mean the impartation of truth by God to man. But what kind of truth? St. Paul tells us that he went up to Jerusalem "by revelation." We should not, I believe, when speaking with precision, refer to such an admonition—even if it be understood to be a divine admonition—as revelation. By revelation in the strict sense we mean, I presume, the impartation of truth which is of universal import—as, for instance, the doctrine of the Incarnation.

We must be careful to distinguish this notion of revelation from one readily confused with it—namely, that of religious intuition. By intuition I do not mean an act of awareness totally divorced from such intellectual activities as discrimination, comparison, and recollection, for I do not believe that any act of adult apprehension is so divorced. What I have in mind is the view which we find in Hīnayāna Buddhism, in Jainism, and in the teachings of Plotinus, that the human intellect, unaided by any divine agent, is capable of coming into direct contact with supersensible reality. Such a theory is obviously neither self-contradictory nor absurd. The philosopher is, therefore, compelled to take ac-

count of it. We may say, then, that in the case of revelation the human mind is passive and the Divinity active, whereas in that of intuition the human mind is active and unaided. The two views are clearly not incompatible. Conceivably they may both be true. There remains, however, a third possibility, that both the human mind and the Deity may be simultaneously active and in mutual co-operation. There is no technical term, so far as I am aware, consecrated to such a view. I shall, accordingly, refer to it as the second sense in which the word *revelation* may be used. Between the first and second sense of revelation orthodox Christianity does not seem to distinguish sharply, yet the emphasis upon infallibility would indicate that it inclines rather to the former than to the latter.

What is the purpose of revelation? Is it to communicate to us truths which we could not otherwise grasp, or to point out the goal toward which human reason should tend and at which we may hope to arrive by a process of argumentation? According to St. Thomas Aquinas, it performs both functions. Certain truths, which because of their profundity are attainable only with difficulty and by the wise, have been revealed and so made the property of all men. Others, however, there are which transcend human reason, and, therefore, cannot be proved. Here, it would seem, we must draw a further distinction. A doctrine such as that of the Last Judgment could obviously be known only through revelation, yet in itself it does not appear especially mysterious. Some doctrines, on the other hand, such as that of the Trinity, are frankly admitted to be incomprehensible even after they have been revealed. This is, indeed, to present the divine economy in an extraordinary light! The result of revelations is not clarity, but mystery.

Ever since Christians began to philosophize they have philosophized with the doctrine of revelation in the background. What effect has it had upon their thinking? According to Professor Gilson, who has discussed the subject at length in his *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale,* the influence of revealed dogma has been both extensive and beneficial. In particular this holds true, he maintains, of the identification of God with pure Being, wherein essence and existence are identical,[1] and also of the cognate doctrine of creation. That both these doctrines have played an important role in philosophic speculation cannot be denied, nevertheless, one may question whether their influence has not been a

1. As suggested by *Exodus,* 3:14.

misfortune. From the identification of God with Being it follows that only God really is. The universe, therefore, can be prevented from lapsing into nonentity only by the introduction of the theory of degrees of being, which to many thinkers constitutes an appeal to the unintelligible. Furthermore, how is the world of change and time to be brought into relation with a God who is changeless, eternal, self-sufficient, *actus purus?* Will not the Deity be thereby inevitably involved in the temporal process? The doctrine of creation, again, is admitted by its best defenders, Roman Catholic and Protestant,[2] to be shrouded in ultimate mystery. It involves the production of entire entities *ex nihilo* and *de novo,* a thing which is utterly removed from our experience. Does the introduction into philosophy of so obscure and incomprehensible a notion effect anything except the darkening of counsel by words without knowledge?

What I wish chiefly to touch upon, however, is the relation which, upon the Thomist theory, subsists between revelation and philosophy. Professor Gilson has contended that, by establishing a clear-cut distinction between theology, which is concerned with truths of faith, and philosophy, which is the affair of human reason, St. Thomas has liberated philosophy and protected the philosopher from constant bullying by the theologian. We can readily see, I feel sure, that the freedom thus accorded the philosopher is largely illusory. Since truth cannot contradict itself, and since revelation is infallible, the theologian is always right. In theory he cannot tell the philosopher what to think, but he can tell him what not to think, and by telling him often enough he can, in effect, practically control his speculations.

To the modern mind the status offered the philosopher by Professor Gilson will seem one of pitiful slavery. But it is worth while asking ourselves why we could never bring ourselves to accept it. Is it because we should thereby forfeit our intellectual independence? In part, no doubt, it is, yet this is scarcely a sufficient reason. St. Thomas' view may be most improbable, but it is not self-contradictory. Conceivably it might be true. And, if there be any infallible revelation, we ought surely to adjust ourselves to it. Is not our real reason, then, that we do not believe that there is any such infallible revelation? And why do we not believe so? Is it because we think that the so-called revelation is hopelessly at variance with the facts of physical science?

2. Cf. F. R. Tennant's *Philosophical Theology,* Vol. II., p. 125.

So much harping has been done on this theme that even philosophers may very easily have been influenced by it. Yet it seems clear that the difficulty in question has been greatly exaggerated. There is, indeed, a type of thinking which accepts the presuppositions and hypotheses of contemporary science with a minimum of criticism—almost as theologians have accepted the dogmas of the Church—and which holds that the task of philosophy is limited to co-ordinating and interpreting these. This is not science, however, but philosophy, and philosophy of no very profound sort. There is nothing here for the orthodox religionist to be afraid of. If we ask for an instance of actual discrepancy between orthodoxy and natural science, we shall, no doubt, be referred to the first chapters of Genesis. How is the fact of evolution, we shall be asked, to be reconciled with the doctrine of creation? The conservative thinker, however, is by no means so helpless before this sort of attack as is sometimes supposed. The doctrine of seminal reasons, for instance, lies ready for his use. Here is a theory of unblemished antecedents which seems to provide an excellent line of defense, enabling him to represent creation itself as involving the principle of growth. And there are other devices to which he may resort. I do not say that the principle of allegory will not be strained, or that no difficulties remain, but I would urge that they are less formidable than is commonly believed. If what I have said be true, such popular performances as the famous trial in Tennessee constitute a very thorough missing of the point by both parties involved.

Even though orthodoxy, however, be less vulnerable in this respect than is generally supposed, it is none the less exposed to four crushing attacks directed upon it from other quarters. Two of these proceed from the closely related standpoints of textual criticism and of the history of doctrine. It is a notorious fact that certain doctrines essential to orthodoxy, as understood by Thomists and Calvinists alike, are not explicitly stated in the New Testament. Consequently, if it can be shown, as the liberal thinks it can, that these doctrines do not represent—that they in fact contradict—the faith of the early Church, the game is up. The apostolic basis of orthodoxy is destroyed, and it is left floating in the air. Arguments of this kind are familiar to every student of the subject, and I shall cite but one of them as indicative of what I have in mind. The various forms of Dynamistic Monarchianism, asserting as they did the full humanity of Christ, claimed to be statements of the ancient, Catholic faith. They were, of course, condemned as heresy. This was

accomplished by the democratic process of voting them down. Questions of historicity, however, are not susceptible of being dealt with in so cavalier a fashion. Accordingly the conservative finds it necessary to discredit these movements as relapses into Judaism. This is easy to assert, but is it psychologically credible? The antipathy between the two religions being so great, is it conceivable that Christians would thus have Judaized their faith? Might not one with almost equal plausibility explain New England Unitarianism as due to the influence of Islam? And is not the liberal's view that Dynamistic Monarchianism was, as it claimed to be, the primitive type—or at least one of the primitive types —of Christianity inherently more probable? Assaults of this sort are far less spectacular than those initiated with so much fanfare from the vantage ground of the physical sciences, but they are far more deadly.

There remain the other two lines of attack of which I have spoken, and these also are intimately connected, and are both of a philosophical character. Of these, one is based upon the study of comparative religion. When the great world-faiths reveal to us so much that is strikingly similar can we really believe that the Christian revelation, the Christian Scriptures, the Christian experience, are somehow wholly unique? Does not such a point of view argue an intellectual parochialism? Is not the case of art analogous? If religion be valid at all, should we not expect to discover genuine manifestations of it everywhere? Is not this what we find empirically, and what a priori we should anticipate? No, replies the conservative, for the historic facts upon which Christianity is based are unique. But are they so? Do we not encounter similar facts elsewhere? No, answers the conservative, for these historical facts are also metaphysical facts, and in this lies their uniqueness. There is only one Incarnation, and only one Atonement. But at this point he is subjected to the fourth attack delivered by the human conscience which has been so strangely, so subtly, yet so unquestionably sensitized and quickened during the last three centuries. To the conscience of today the traditional doctrines of the Fall, inherited guilt, the Substitutionary Atonement, and above all the doctrine of *extra ecclesiam nulla salus,* seem appallingly unethical. No doubt judgments respecting moral values, even as those which have to do with sense perception, are ultimate, and therefore not susceptible of demonstration. Nevertheless, to vast numbers of our contemporaries, orthodoxy has become ethically untenable.

Is it not true, moreover, that the conservatives have oversimplified their problem? In the judgment of Thomists and Neothomists, Calvin-

istic followers of M. Lecerf, and Neocalvinistic disciples of Professors Barth and Brunner, all that is required is a clear statement, or restatement, of the traditional point of view. Ought they not to ask themselves, however, whether the very simplicity of their program does not betray its insufficiency? Doubtless successive generations differ in moral earnestness, but is it possible to explain the present widespread indifference to, and defection from, orthodox Christianity as the mere fruit of human wickedness? Have not the intellectual and ethical deficiencies of orthodoxy been in great measure responsible for this state of affairs?

If, therefore, we turn from the traditional to the so-called "liberal" position, how does the matter stand? We have now to do with a very different conception of revelation. It is presented to us as a divine activity everywhere operative, and manifesting itself in the course of human struggle and amidst human errors. Clearly it is revelation in the second sense with which we are here concerned. How, then, is our problem to be envisaged? Upon what principle is the new intellectual synthesis to be established? In this connection it is natural to recall the joint effort of certain liberal theologians and religiously-minded philosophers in the last century to show that Christianity is the Absolute Religion, reconciling in itself all that is good and true in the other so-called "world-faiths." This attempt, unquestionably of Hegelian inspiration, may well appeal to our sympathies. But is the thing feasible? Dare we say of any historic religion that it is final and unsurpassable? Will not its present deficiencies give us pause? May not future events give us the lie? How are we to know the Absolute Religion when we see it? Some criterion we must have, and what shall supply it if not philosophy? If we acquiesce in this suggestion, do we not thereby give philosophy the primacy? Must we not, then, concur in McTaggart's judgment that "the use of philosophy lies not in being deeper than science, but in being truer than theology."[3]

If this be our conclusion, we must deny to theology the possession of any territory external to the domain of philosophy. There are the facts of religious history and the data of religious experience which philosophy is compelled to interpret, but there are no revealed dogmas which it is bound to revere, and no conclusions which it need accept save those which it can itself substantiate. The problems which have beset the theologian now become its own with which it must deal as best it can.

3. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 196.

Shall we, then, say that philosophy vindicates the Absolute Religion by giving birth to it, that in some sense philosophy *is* religion? But in what sense? One might affirm that the function of philosophy is to provide from its own resources an adequate *Weltanschauung*, and that religion comprises its practical conclusions together with the appropriate emotional and volitional responses called forth thereby. The Absolute Religion, even as the true philosophy, will thus become a goal toward which we strive. This solution is not without a certain attractiveness, yet is it wholly satisfactory? Or has religion some positive contribution to make to the intellectual synthesis? If so, where is this element to be found? In religious experience undoubtedly. If in religion man comes into touch with objective reality as truly as in aesthetics or ethics, it constitutes a genuine field of investigation.

Our synthesis, therefore, must include a philosophy of mysticism. This is, indeed, a baffling subject, of which we have only begun to scratch the surface, yet we can be sure that any interpretation of it which does not dismiss the mystical experience as an illusion will make use either of theory of intellectual intuition or of that of revelation—in the second sense, of course, not in the first, since this last inevitably subordinates philosophy to theology. Our old problem has thus cropped up again. Have we, then, got nowhere? No, we have got somewhere, for we have seen that revelation cannot provide a starting point for our thinking. It is not something which can be imposed upon philosophy *ab extra*. The very notion of it cannot profitably be raised until we have found out a great deal about the universe, until we have proved the existence of God, and until we have plumbed the religious experience deeper than anyone has plumbed it yet. And we have seen that to abandon the traditional position means putting all to the hazard, that no half measures are possible, that philosophy must be given a free hand, and that we must abide the result.

Does this involve a breach of continuity with the past? Certainly it does, for the civilization of the past was built up under the influence of Christianity, and Christianity is a revealed religion. How deep or wide the gap may be we cannot tell in advance. In any case the breach will be partial. And when we have crossed it, it may prove smaller than we think. Breaches of continuity, however partial, are always to be regretted; yet the gain may be greater than the loss if what comes after is better than what went before.

COMMUNICATIONS

CHRISTIANITY AND PHILOSOPHY

By Frederick deW. Bolman, Jr.*

Fellow of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education

Faithful response to a particular, historic revelation of divine love and reasonable human love of wisdom have crossed paths in a variety of ways in our Western culture, but at no previous time has their fruitful intercourse been more important or yet more precarious. The problem of finding culturally satisfying answers to the question of the relation between a Christian faith and new positive and speculative knowledge has, of course, always been present. Usually an active rapport has been accomplished either by an implicit transformation and development of the meaning of Christian faith or a conscious reduction of its historic assumptions. But the Protestant Reformation, an attempt to stem the tide of such adjustment as much as a revolt in favor of the primitive Christian conscience, placed the subsequent problem of adjustment on a seemingly insoluble basis. "Pride and vanity are discovered," said Calvin, "when miserable men, in seeking after God, rise not, as they ought, above their own level, but judge of him according to their carnal stupidity, and leave the proper path of investigation in pursuit of speculations as vain as they are curious." Equally exclusive terms were offered by the dominant, scientific character of modern philosophy. "To generate and superinduce a new nature or new natures, upon a given body," said Francis Bacon, "is the labor and aim of human power."

These two statements characterize not only the diversity of aims of Protestant Christianity and the most important contribution of modern philosophy, but also methods of acquiring knowledge which have been in open conflict throughout modern religious history. Philosophers before and since have had a Christian faith, and Christians their philosophies; but whenever the dangers of transformation and reduction have arisen, some Protestant Christians have withdrawn their plea that philosophy be an aid and faithful tool, as, contrariwise, the dangers of obliterating the higher simian virtues of complete self-reliance and resourcefulness have led many a modern philosopher to reject the yoke of an

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historical religion. The extremes of this problem have for some time been denoted by the overworked terms "neo-orthodoxy" and "humanism." The number of intermediate possibilities is limited only by human experience and imagination; yet, from the present cultural point of view the tendencies toward the extremes are, apparently, at least as significant, if not more significant, than the finely balanced individual views straining to give both claims their due. An active and widely influential rapprochement of Christianity and philosophy in these terms, then, is not to be accomplished simply by discovering the functional relation between "faith" and "reason," since the Christian faith is historic, by which is meant that it claims a specific revelation within history as its prime datum and ultimate content, a revelation to which subsequent individual and social experience can in some measure—but not completely—testify. Nor are the chance agreements or disagreements between the implications of historical Christian faith and the conclusions of scientific philosophy significant, so long as the two are dominated by fundamentally diverse methods of interpreting the objectives of human life which can never be correlative.

At a recent meeting of the Philosophical Group of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education some of the relations between Christianity and philosophy were discussed in a way which clearly limns this modern problem. Throughout a series of six papers and discussions the persistent issue at stake might be phrased thus: either Christianity must retain its historic concept of faith, in which case it must ultimately claim some form of epistemological superiority to both speculative and positivistic philosophy—a superiority which entails the definite restriction of the humanistic élan; or else, for an effective rapprochement of religious and philosophic methods, the claims of Christianity must not only be transformed but consciously reduced by the demand that the two methods coincide, or, at least, co-operate, a co-operation demanded by the identity of subject matters. While the group did not formulate the precise alternative just given, it may be clarifying to use this distinction for heuristic purposes. Broadly speaking, three of the papers intended to follow the first alternative, two others the second, while the sixth paper considered that no rapprochement between Christianity and philosophy was possible or needed.

The autonomy and kind of superiority claimed by Christian faith were illustrated by the various answers given to the familiar question:

What is the active or functional relation between faith and reason? From the historical point of view Professor George Thomas considered some results subsequent to what Archbishop Temple once called "the Cartesian faux-pas." His thesis was that "the dominance of positivism and radical (reductive) naturalism is the last stage of modern philosophy which, from the beginning, rests upon the substitution of the autonomy of reason for the earlier emphasis upon the alliance of reason with faith." The divorce of reason and faith has impoverished both philosophy and Christianity: philosophy, in that both rationalistic and empiricistic views have witnessed an increasing limitation of vision and practical wisdom; Christianity, in that faith has become, by contrast, increasingly "irrational" and, as such, increasingly irrelevant as an aid in the removal of the philosophic limitations. "The answer," Dr. Thomas claimed, "lies in part in a re-examination of the relation of faith and reason, which would show that the former need not be regarded as irrational or the latter narrowed to exclude intuition, imagination, and synoptic vision." Thus far we may notice that the general intention is to discover the integration of faith and reason in the pursuit of theoretic and practical wisdom. But this is not the end; Christian philosophy for Dr. Thomas is not pragmatic or instrumental. Primacy attaches to the intuitions of Christian faith; philosophy is the pursuit of cogent reasons why "the primary intuitions of Christian faith" are "true." Thus the philosophic enterprise ought, in an influential way, to serve to bring confirming evidence from other experiences, first rendering the intuitions of Christian faith increasingly probable (though never certain, since there is "an arational factor in faith") and extending the sphere of the implications of faith. This statement of the autonomy of Christian faith had to be elaborated at two points which were dealt with in two other papers.

In the first place, can there be a complete, objective vindication of the historic revelation claimed by the Christian faith? If the answer to this is yes, the reduction of Christianity would be complete; but if the answer is no, then, among others, there is the problem as to whether faith gives knowledge and, if so, what kind and for what purpose. Professor David E. Roberts dealt with these issues. Within the liberal Protestant tradition philosophical theism has been grounded upon an assumed affinity between God and man and a disregard for the fruitful distinction between revelation and reason. Countering this—primarily

in the interest of the historic character of Christian faith—Dr. Roberts claimed a "gap between revelation and an idea of God which is reached by inference from the world," a gap which no analogy drawn from science, ethics, or metaphysics can successfully bridge. The assurance that "revelation" does not conflict with "reason" is given in faith, whose uniformity and universality derives from "a universal human situation"; this is the ultimate reason why nature and history may be interpreted in the light of the divine revelation in Christ, whereas the latter cannot be conceived exclusively in terms of the former. This autonomy of revelation was illustrated, first, in a reversal of the moral argument for God, in that "there is no direct path from human to divine goodness; but there is a direct path from the grace of God to an understanding of the function and significance of conscience," and, second, in the dynamic relation of the temporal and eternal, wherein the divine purpose alone bridges the "gap" between God and man.

A second major problem arising from the claim that Christian faith is autonomous was this: if faith and reason cannot contest with one another within historic Christianity, can they be functionally related in such a way as to guarantee the relevence of faith to reason? Professor Nels F. S. Ferré addressed this issue. Arising through dissatisfaction with the actual and desire to transform it in ideal directions, "faith as a personal decision, existential judgment, and determinative perspective, affirms its highest ideal to be more real than the aggregative actual, while reason is primarily grounded in that actual." This superior reality of faith cannot be proved in terms of the actual, yet faith is not arbitrary, since the ideal arises out of a special selection from the actual and displays the power to transform the actual. Despite such a functional, Jamesian view of "faith" and "reason," Dr. Ferré concluded that neither "faith" nor "reason" can prove or finally test one another; at best they are a challenge to one another and "make for a creative tension needful to both the individual spirit and the social patterns of changing civilizations." Apparently here, as in the case of the previously discussed papers, a latent desire remained to adhere to the autonomous character of the historic Christian faith; a postulate based upon the coherence of the actual was not allowable as satisfying the needs of the existential situation, principally because the faithful man considers that he is judged, not that he judges.

This was the issue of those who sought a rapprochement of Christian-

ity and philosophy which would not allow the former to suffer a reduction of its historic content; the primacy of faith, variously interpreted, was defended. As can readily be gathered from this brief review, the defenders were far from unaware of the challenges of more positivistic views. Another group of papers, however, stressed the difficulties of what we may laconically call this unregenerate faith.

Dr. Loyd D. Easton considered that co-operation of science and religion which could bring to man his fullest sense of well-being. Discarding attempts to harmonize the two by making scientific inferences "prove" the general contentions of Western religion, he held that "in the relation between knowledge and value lies the vital area of co-operation between science and religion." Indeed, science can aid in the realization of religious ends. But are "religious ends" accumulated through habit and authority autonomous in any sense? Dr. Easton is sure that such a question could only arise in terms of a mistaken notion of religious values. "The real question," he said, "is whether desires and values so acquired should remain uncriticized and sacrosanct. We do not know what it is that we value until we have examined its conditions and consequences. Only with the help of science or precise knowledge can we formulate ideals and determine what is desi*rable* and valu*able*." Despite Dr. Easton's claim that scientific knowledge cannot replace the practical aim of religion to achieve man's enduring and all-sided well-being, the subsequent discussion was critical of his attempt to make any relevant distinction between the two.

Such a distinction between the methods of scientific knowledge and religious knowledge was discussed by Professor Edwin R. Walker. Adopting the title, "rational-empiricism," for a comprehensive method of acquiring knowledge, Dr. Walker distinguished its two general phases: reflective analysis and reflective synthesis. The former does not add new (positive) knowledge, but yields clarification of the meanings of and relations between propositions by means of the rules of formal logic, language analysis, and the forms of sociology of knowledge. Reflective synthesis aims at acquiring new positive knowledge by scientific method. While, in both science and philosophy, the two phases interpenetrate, in science reflective synthesis is stressed, whereas philosophy stresses reflective analysis. Now religious beliefs, he claimed, are concerned with the nature, source, and probable survival of values, and "the method employed in testing religious beliefs will be a general philo-

sophic method," i.e., rational-empiricism. It would appear that scientific and religious knowledge are related as part to whole, reflective synthesis being but one phase of a comprehensive method. In this sense, the testing of the validity and adequacy of beliefs rests not upon scientific method alone, although the latter has a continuing, corrective share in such testing.

A final paper, presented by Dr. Hillis Kaiser, suggested that the natural and inevitable opposition of religion and philosophy could be removed, not by an ultimate reduction of the former to the latter but by a clear statement of diversity of interests and methods which do not conflict. The grounds for asserting that science and religion are in any way "continuous" are insufficient, if one only observes the intrinsic diversity of their aims. Again, to attempt to relate religion and science by deducing a metaphysics from the latter and then deducing a theology from metaphysics must fail, Dr. Kaiser held, since a metaphysics cannot be deduced from any body of scientific statements. A significant trend in neo-Thomism has attempted to avoid this impossibility by sharply distinguishing positivism, on the one hand, from metaphysics and its support of theology, on the other; this does remove the opposition between science and religion, provided the physical sciences can become wholly nonmetaphysical. Yet Dr. Kaiser favored a further distinction, namely, "an independence of science, religion, and metaphysics in the sense that science is dependent on sense-verification, metaphysics on an intrinsic intelligibility of its postulates, and religion on the immediate evidence of feeling." This separation of science, religion, and metaphysics which he proposed was, however, purely theoretic so far as many of his listeners were concerned; the difficulties of segregating these enterprises and still holding each to be of some valid use were as great as, if not greater than, those connected with the modern rapprochement of Christianity and philosophy.

In effect, the three papers just summarized did not attempt to treat of such a rapprochement. By omission rather than commission they regarded the traditional Protestant dilemma as otiose and favored a reduction of the historic claims of Christianity in a way quite opposed to the other papers presented.

We may gather from all sides evidence that the old problem of "the reasonableness of Christianity" has been re-coined in terms of "the practicality of Christianity," where the issue of so-called subjectivism

raised by the pragmatic view is at the fore. Theoretically, at least, Roman Catholicism has solved the issue; what dominant and culturally effective road Protestant philosophies can take is an issue which no Protestant Christian can ignore without renouncing either the richer possibilities of his culture or the power for reconstruction potential within the realm of his historic faith. One may say, "This is no new problem." The point is that it is still a problem—certainly more complex, probably more consequential, and, if so, then more demanding of us than before.

The foregoing digest reports six papers and six discussions devoted to this subject in one section of the annual conference, or "Week of Work," of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education, meeting at Swarthmore College from September 2 to 8, 1942: "Faith and Reason—Some Existential and Theoretical Aspects," by Professor Nels F. Ferré, of Andover Newton Theological School; "The Point of Co-operation between Science and Religion," by Dr. Loyd D. Easton; "Religion and Modern Physics," by Professor Charles Hillis Kaiser, of Middlebury College; "Toward a Theory of Religious Knowledge," by Professor Edwin R. Walker, of the University of Colorado; "Philosophical Theism," by Professor David E. Roberts, of Union Theological Seminary, New York; "Christianity and Modern Philosophy," by Professor George F. Thomas, of Princeton University.

In the section on the History and Literature of Religion, with Mr. Kenneth W. Morgan as chairman, papers addressed to the topic, "The Historical Approach to Religion in Higher Education," were presented by Professor Amos N. Wilder, of Andover Newton Theological School, Professor James Muilenburg, of the Pacific School of Religion, Professor Virginia Corwin, of Smith College, Professor Albert Cook Outler, of Duke University, Professor John M. Moore, of Hamilton College, and Professor John Knox, of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago.

The section on Psychology, under the chairmanship of Dr. Martha Jaeger Glickman, of New York City, discussed "The Faith of the Future: Psychological Approach to the Contemporary Religious Situation." Papers were presented by Mr. Rollo May, of New York City, Mrs. Walter Kotschnig, of Northampton, Mass., Mr. Seward Hiltner, of the Commission on Religion and Health of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, President Thomas E. Jones, of Fisk University, and Professor J. Howard Howson, of Vassar College.

A fourth group, on the Social Sciences, discussed "Religious Values and the Social Sciences," under the chairmanship of Dr. Dorothy Fosdick, of Smith College, with Dr. Arnold Nash of Toronto University serving as Consultant. Papers were presented by Dr. Nash, Professor John A. Hutchison, of Wooster College, and Mr. Patrick Murphy Malin, President of the National Council and executive in the Office of Price Administration.

"How Can We Educate our Children to Religious Values?" was the topic con-

sidered in the fifth section, on The Family, under the leadership of Mrs. Elizabeth Wray Taylor, of Kingsport, Tenn., chairman, and Mrs. Grace Loucks Elliott, of Union Theological Seminary, New York City. Papers were presented by Mrs. Taylor, Mr. Rollo May, Mrs. Caroline Malin, of Swarthmore, Penna., and Miss Helen R. H. Nichol, head of the department of Bible, The Masters School, Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.

During the general evening sessions of the Conference addresses were given by Dr. Gustav Stolper, Economist of New York City, President Edmund E. Day, of Cornell University, and Dr. Harry Bone, consulting psychologist of New York City. On the final evening a panel discussed "How Can Parents Help their Children to an Adequate Religious Experience?"

BOOK REVIEWS

Philosophical Fragments. By JOHANNES CLIMACUS (SØREN KIERKEGAARD). Translated by DAVID F. SWENSON. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1936. pp. xxx + 105. $2.00.

Concluding Unscientific Postscript. By JOHANNES CLIMACUS (SØREN KIERKEGAARD). Translated by DAVID F. SWENSON and WALTER LOWRIE. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1941. pp. xxi + 579. $6.00.

The translation of the works of Søren Kierkegaard into English is an event of major importance for American and British theology. The German edition of his writings has long been available, but few libraries in this country possess it, and ability to study him in the original Danish has been confined to a small group. Much of the interest in his thought has been due to the fact that Barthians and existential philosophers in Germany frequently refer to it; but this has resulted in some distortion, because Kierkegaard calls for an understanding in his own right and in his own setting. Moreover, many students (and their teachers) have been content to satisfy their curiosity by means of second-hand accounts, and no point of view resists neat summarization more fiercely than does Kierkegaard's.

Now nothing can prevent a widespread direct acquaintance with his thought in this country; henceforth he will be a permanent and a disturbing factor in our theology. The debt which we owe in consequence to his translators is incalculable. The story of how the translations came to be undertaken and of how they have been carried through to near-completion has been told by Dr. Walter Lowrie in an appendix to *Repetition*; there one can also find a list of the books which have appeared in English about Kierkegaard.

Dr. Lowrie's long biography provides an indispensable starting point for studying the translations; although it is certainly desirable to go directly to Kierkegaard himself as soon as possible, it is necessary to know the history of his spiritual career first. The significance of many passages in his writings will be missed entirely unless one is familiar with the circumstances which surround them: a childhood made sombre by his father's sense of guilt; the misfortunes which befell the family; a struggle in young manhood between sensuality and an inescapable religious seriousness; the economic independence which permitted him to follow

his own peculiar inclinations as a writer; his reasons for resorting to pseudonyms; the broken engagement with Regina Olsen, which profoundly accentuated his feeling of being "heterogeneous"; the ordeal of being held up to ridicule in the pages of *The Corsair*; his conversion; his ultimate attack on the church, after holding his fire through a tormenting period of indecision.

Each book must be understood in the light of the place it occupies in Kierkegaard's spiritual development ("away from the aesthetic," "away from speculation," through the ethical and through a religion of immanence, toward Christian faith), and in the light of its relationship to the whole body of his writings. S. K. himself has furnished an introduction of a sort to his entire work in *The Point of View*; and the appendix entitled "A Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature" in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* shows the relationship between several of the most important books. Alexander Dru's translation of selections from the *Journals* also contains valuable interpretative material. But Dr. Lowrie's biography weaves all of the sources, including references to the *Papers* (which will probably never be translated), into a consecutive account. Professor Swenson's *Something About Kierkegaard* and Professor Eduard Geismar's *Lectures on the Religious Thought of Søren Kierkegaard* provide brief introductions to his main ideas. A comprehensive study of his thought, as distinct from his life, has yet to appear in English.

Since introductions to the *Fragments* and the *Postscript* provide ample orientation for the reader, showing how the two books mark a turning point in Kierkegaard's understanding of Christianity, I shall not repeat that information here. My main concern is to set forth his arguments in such a way that their importance can readily be grasped. Even so, anyone who tries to write about Kierkegaard will do well to take seriously his dreadful comments (in the *Postscript*, p. 245 n.) upon a review of the *Fragments*:

> in spite of the accuracy of the abstract, everyone who reads that only is bound to get an entirely false impression of the book. To be sure, this misfortune is not so terrible; but on the other hand, when a book is reviewed especially on account of its peculiarity, it becomes a little unfortunate not to give any impression of this. The abstract is doctrinizing, pure and unadulterated doctrination; the reader will get the impression that the book is also doctrinizing. Now this is in my view the most distorted impression of the book it is possible to have. The contrast of the form; the challenging opposition between the experiment

and the content; the impudence of the invention (which even invents Christianity), . . . the unwearied incessant activity of the irony; the parody on speculative philosophy involved in the entire plan of the work; the satirical in making exertions as if *"was ganz Ausserordentliches und zwar Neues"* were to issue, and then coming out with nothing but old-fashioned orthodoxy in a suitable degree of severity: of all this the reader of the review gets not the slightest intimation.

The study offered here is not exempt from the distortions which result when close attention to the details of his life and the traits of his style have to be left out of account; but if used in connection with a reading of the *Fragments* and the *Postscript* themselves, it may furnish convenient guidance through the fertile, variegated, and sometimes confusing territory of Kierkegaard's thought. His main themes are (1) the nature of Christian faith, as distinct from every form of "knowledge"; (2) the difference between "subjective" (interested, individual, existential) thinking, and "objective" (disinterested, abstract, speculative) thinking; (3) the importance of the historical factor in Christianity; (4) the need for awakening Christendom out of the complacent assurance that it understands Christianity; (5) the individual privacy and incommunicability of genuine faith. These themes are all intertwined, and they recur in both books; yet the two books will be discussed consecutively, with the hope that some repetition may make for greater clarity.

Ostensibly the theme of the *Fragments* is a comparison of the Socratic view concerning how one may learn the truth, with a paradoxical hypothesis which the author (Johannes Climacus) wishes to examine experimentally. Actually, it is a study of the contrast between the highest type of religious immanentism and Christianity. As such it is relevant to contemporary theological thinking, because the problem of the relationship of Christian faith to the "historical Jesus" is, if anything, more perplexing than when Kierkegaard wrote; and because it still remains true that much of what passes for Christianity is really inferior to Socrates instead of marking an advance beyond him. In the *Fragments*, Johannes Climacus states the problem; in the *Postscript* (which turns out to be several times longer), he furnishes the "historical costume," showing in concrete detail how Christianity faces and meets the problem which he first examines hypothetically.

The author begins by declaring that inquiry after the truth seems to be a contradictory enterprise, since one cannot seek either for what he knows or for what he does not know. Socrates overcame the contradiction by regarding discovery of the truth as rediscovery (recollection); the truth is not introduced into the individual from without; it is immanent in him all along, and therefore latent and recoverable. Consequently, Socrates held that no man can bestow truth upon another; at most he can only help to evoke it maieutically. Since the soul possesses truth eternally, every point of departure in time, including the teacher, is merely accidental. Socrates disclaimed having any pupils; he knew that no human being can be an authority for another, though by posing as an authority a man can gain the success which occurs when one fool, in going astray, takes several others with him.

The alternative hypothesis is one in which the individual does not latently possess the eternal truth; he has lost his relationship to it and cannot recover it by a deepening of self-knowledge; and the relationship can be restored only in an historical moment. Here, therefore, the historical moment is not accidental, but decisive. Moreover, the problem of learning the truth is intensified enormously, because if the individual is fundamentally alienated from it, a mere presentation of it by a teacher will not suffice. An inner condition must be fulfilled, a transformation of character must take place before the individual can receive the truth —even though it may be staring him in the face. Every human teacher is subject to the limitation that neither he, nor the learner himself, can recreate the individual before beginning to teach him; God alone can do this.

How does a man ever fall into error in the first place? Not through an act of God, nor through accident, but through his own free act; and he remains in error by a continuous forfeiting of the condition which would enable him to be in the truth. One might suppose that since the difficulty originated through man's free act, the individual could correct it by the same means; but this supposition overlooks the decisive character of action. A knight may choose to fight on either side in a battle, but if he fights on the losing side and is taken prisoner, he cannot then volunteer his services to the winning side. Bondage to error cannot be broken by the individual himself, for to be able to will (not "wish") liberation is to be liberated. One who restores the lost relationship to the truth, then, is not merely a teacher, but a Savior. The con-

version of the individual, with its inner qualitative change in relationship to the truth, is a rebirth, and only one who has been born again can grasp the significance of the change.

Since God needs nothing, what could move him to take on the role of teacher and savior? His aims must be to win the learner by giving him the condition which brings him back into a positive relationship with the truth and with blessedness. This aim embodies the eternal resolve of divine love, which does not stand in a reciprocal relationship with anything temporal; yet, when realized in time, it constitutes "the moment" (the fulness of time). The eternal resolve and the temporal occasion are thus incommensurable, and yet joined—paradoxically. God comes to man, as Savior, in the form of a servant; He desires equality with those whom He loves, and therefore comes as the equal of the lowliest man. To sustain the heavens and the earth by fiat is a light task in comparison with bearing the burden of mankind's error, guilt, and offense. Paganism, which assumes that the condition for recovering the truth is immanent in man, cannot understand the necessity whereby God bestows the condition.

Before proceeding further with our discussion of the *Fragments,* we should remind ourselves that Kierkegaard's understanding of the relationship between "original sin" and alienation from truth is virtually unique in the nineteenth century. His language may seem questionable when it concentrates upon whether the resources of rebirth come from "within" or "outside" the individual; but the main point is that they are not within the reach of conscious, voluntary effort, and they come to the individual as something which he did not previously possess. The resources are there, waiting to be tapped, but only a change of will, not a fresh effort of will, can tap them. Psychoanalysts are thoroughly familiar with what Kierkegaard is talking about, for they deal every day with persons to whom the truth seems to be nonsensical until inner conflicts have been resolved; they also know, "socratically," that no human being can save another except as the individual is somehow enabled to make the transition within *himself* from bondage to freedom. And contemporary theologians might well take a leaf from Kierkegaard's book in fixing attention upon this saving power, instead of devising various schemes for patching together an objective metaphysical entity called "God."

The alternative to Socrates, which Johannes Climacus proposes to

investigate, cannot be demonstrated by reason, because it is based on a paradoxical union of the eternal and the temporal, the divine and the human. God remains the Unknown for reason, standing beyond the boundary of its comprehension, and all attempts to prove God's existence are fruitless. Indeed, one can say quite generally that if a thing exists, it is folly to try to prove it, for the "proof" will merely develop the consequences which follow from assuming that the object in question exists. One must always reason *from* existence, not toward it. But God's existence is not given in any direct empirical way; His action in nature and history is not an immediately discernible fact. Discernment of it involves ideal interpretation, and in that case one does not reason from God's works to His existence; rather, one develops presuppositions concerning an ideal essence which no assortment of facts can shake. Therefore, neither an empirical nor a rational theistic proof can succeed. The former, starting with facts alone, can never prove God from them. The latter is a tautology which deduces one ideal consequence from another and never really makes the transition to existence. Hence, one who tries to prove the existence of God, except in the sense of clarifying the concept, demonstrates something quite different, namely, his own stupidity. Socrates used the idea of God, not as a proof, but as an illuminating guide in organizing the evidence for teleology, since nature herself is so ambiguous on this score.[1]

Reason cannot advance beyond this collision with the Unknown, because God is absolutely different,[2] and reason can only deal with unlikenesses which it can conceive by means of itself. Therefore, unless the idea of God can remain a merely limiting concept,[3] confusion will result, and men will read any positive content into the idea which imagination may suggest—the monstrous, the ludicrous, or, one may add in the twentieth century, the fetishes of neo-paganism. This absolute difference between God and man must consist in what man derives from himself or in what he has brought upon himself; it cannot consist in what man derives from God, since to that extent they are akin. This man-initiated unlikeness is sin. Hence, when God makes Himself like the individual man, so that He may be fully understood, the event is

1. Kierkegaard perceived the difference between the Socrates who speaks in the *Phaedo* and Plato's theology in the *Timaeus* and *Laws X*.

2. Compare Rudolph Otto's doctrine concerning the "wholly other."

3. Compare Kant's distinction between a regulative and a constitutive employment of the idea of God.

not comprehensible to reason because it is doubly paradoxical; negatively, it reveals the absolute unlikeness between God and man, and positively, it proposes to do away with sin in absolute likeness (the God-man).

> When the Reason takes pity on the Paradox, and wishes to help it to an explanation, the Paradox does not indeed acquiesce, but nevertheless it finds it quite natural that the Reason should do this; for why do we have our philosophers, if not to make supernatural things trivial and commonplace? (*Philosophical Fragments*, p. 42).

It is characteristic of Kierkegaard's method that he proceeds to develop the principles of his Christology without even calling it that, and without speculating about how two natures could be united in one Person. Instead, he asks how one becomes a disciple. For a disciple, the Teacher is in time, like other men, and yet his concern for the Teacher's existence is not merely historical, since it is decisive for the eternal happiness of the individual. One becomes a disciple, then, when reason sets itself aside and the individual accepts the paradox of faith as a gift from outside himself. Faith, whereby the disciple is recreated, is not a form of knowledge, and the object of faith is not a doctrine, but a Person. One may have knowledge of the eternal (essence) or of the historical (existence), but not of the paradox that the eternal has become historical.

Anyone who is familiar with the manner in which modern Christology has alternated between interpreting the Deity of Christ as an historical fact and interpreting it as an eternal truth, will appreciate the importance of the author's protests at this point. Kierkegaard's anticipation of the problems which arose later in connection with the "historical Jesus" is especially remarkable and incisive. Since no amount of historical knowledge, even on the part of an eye-witness, necessarily makes him a disciple, the contemporary of Jesus Christ has no advantage. Every believer must receive the condition of eternal happiness from God in the same manner, and cannot receive it at second hand. The only advantage the contemporary possesses is that he does not have to bother with the accumulated gossip and foolish chatter about Christianity which now form such an obstacle to genuine faith.

The author bolsters these principles by an interlude concerning the relationship between the necessary and the historical, and his careful examination of the latter concept (which is notoriously ambiguous) de-

serves especial attention. He declares that nothing ever comes into being with necessity. It is false to regard the past as necessary and the future as open; either both are contingent, or both are necessary. Actually, both are contingent despite the fact that the past is immutable. Consequently, the historical presents to the mind a mixture of certainty and uncertainty; the past has certainly happened, but it does not become necessary or logically certain by someone's apprehension of it. Many thinkers fall into the mistake of assuming that, because they can perceive a structural pattern in history, they have grasped its "necessity" ex post facto. What has actually taken place is that they have substituted one object of apprehension (a logical construct) for another (the historical past). The uncertainty and freedom which attach to even the most certain of past events can be grasped only in the passion of wonder. Both sensebound empiricism and rationalistic determinism (Hegel) are inadequate, because the free becoming which constitutes the historical cannot be sensorily perceived, and the certainties of logic are not historical. Sympathetic *belief* alone is adequate, and such belief is not arbitrary so long as one does not appeal to it in areas where perceptual data or rational certainties are available. Strictly speaking, one does not "believe" what he sees or what he grasps by logical necessity. Belief involves a free act, an exertion of will, and it is best understood in contrast with its opposite, doubt—the kind of doubt which *wills* to maintain suspended judgment.[4] Belief of course cannot alter the factual aspects of history; but if it overcomes doubt in dealing with the *significance* of the historical, it does so not through knowledge, but through a resolution of will. Similarly, the testimony of witnesses concerning past events is immediate and immutable as a fact; but the significance of that to which they testify is subject to the uncertainty of becoming, and can only be doubted or believed. Hence both a contemporary witness and a later person come into a proper relationship with the historical in the same way, i.e., by the individual assent which makes the event historical *for him.*

God's "coming into being" must be grasped by faith, not only in the ordinary sense that the historical must be believed, but in an eminent sense which reflects God's uniqueness. Belief in the historical generally involves a reinstatement within free becoming. Faith in the Incarnation

4. This sounds like the "will to believe," but Kierkegaard repudiates the notion that the validity of faith can be tested by its "results."

involves a reinstatement within the unique act wherein God entered time. This means that God's bestowal of the condition, instead of being a past fact which can be viewed externally, is an activity with which the individual concerned is contemporary. Except for non-essential differences, all disciples, from the contemporaries of Christ to the present day, stand on the same level. The history of the church intervenes, to be sure, but no appeal to this history can effect the transition to faith. The fact that countless men through the centuries have espoused faith does not make the paradox more "probable." Indeed, Christianity's long history has tended to naturalize it—to domesticate it in this world—so that people have come to regard it as something reasonable and innocuous which they can accept as a matter of course. One of the gravest obstacles to Christian faith is the assumption that a man can be born in it, instead of having to come to it through a second birth. Actually each generation and each individual must come into relationship with the paradox afresh. If modern Christians are puzzled as to why the first disciples took the Gospel so hard, they might do well to ask whether what they take for granted today really is faith.

What, then, can a contemporary of Christ do for a successor? He can declare his own faith, and this may provide the occasion for faith on the part of another; but it leaves the latter to make the decision in the same way that the contemporary did. The eye-witness can also tell how the historical events looked to a *believer*. This is just what the Gospels do. They are the witness of believers to believers, instead of being mere collections of biographical information. They call men to a faith based on God's authority alone, and not upon the authority of any man.

In the *Fragments*, Johannes Climacus retains the purely hypothetical mode of stating the problem up until the very last, when he points out that Christianity alone combines the historical and the eternal in the paradoxical fashion which he has described. The hypothetical form stands in sharp contrast with the content, which calls for decision throughout; but it is impossible to do justice to this contrast in an exposition, and I have not hesitated to use "Christ" at points where the author merely says "Teacher." In the *Postscript* (p. 252), Kierkegaard explains that he refrained from mentioning the name of Christ because "in an age of knowledge, when all men are Christians and know what Christianity is, it is only too easy to use the sacred names without attaching any thought to them, to recite the Christian truth by rote without having the slightest impression of it."

The *Postscript* presents a greatly expanded, and in some ways an entirely fresh treatment, of the same problem. One is not surprised to learn that Professor Swenson stayed up all night reading it when he first came across it as a college student; for if the *Postscript* is right, then most of what is called "the philosophy of religion" is following a radically unsound method. In fact, the book opens with a description of how pedantry, rhetoric, and—above all—speculation are prevailingly employed to *avoid* facing the problem of individual decision before God. The metaphysician[5] habitually declares that the final truth cannot be understood until he reaches the end of his exposition; so one reads him through, only to discover that the problem has not even been stated, let alone solved. Over against all objective, disinterested approaches to Christianity, Johannes Climacus proposes to adopt the "dialectical" point of view, which is one of personal concern. Instead of asking "What is Christianity?" as though it were some timeless essence accessible to research and speculation, he proposes to ask "How can I become a Christian?" He declares that the problem concerns him alone, but that if it is properly posed, it will concern everyone else in the same manner; and this declaration is a suitable reply to those who are inclined to dismiss Kierkegaard's interpretation of Christianity as so eccentric that it cannot possibly be important for Christian thinking generally. It is indeed perverse to try to consider his point of view apart from its validity for him as an individual; but his insistence upon a "subjective" instead of an "objective" approach to Christianity, which ties the question of validity quite inextricably to the individual, can be valid in its own way for every individual.

The *Postscript* examines the objective approach under two headings, for objective truth may be (1) historical or (2) philosophical. Historical knowledge (as distinct from belief) can never be more than approximate. So far as the Bible is concerned, this means that there is no way of settling the problem of its authority and inspiration by means of critical scholarship. Even if scholarship vindicated the Bible to the hilt, no one would thereby be brought nearer to faith, and believers might be tempted to confuse the passionate concern of faith with historical probability. But, even if scholarship destroyed the Bible, Christianity would not be abolished. The church and the confessions, as objective phenomena, fare no better than the Bible. Inward truth is not achieved

5. Kierkegaard refers specifically to the Hegelian system.

by assenting to doctrinal propositions, even when such assent is called "faith." And since every disciple is contemporary with God's saving activity in Christ (as was shown in the *Fragments*), appeals to tradition are fruitless. Someone may be inclined to reply that the church exists in the present, and that therefore its existence does not have to be proved by historical argument; then, since the church today professes Christianity, one may learn from it directly what Christianity is. This rejoinder really evades the problem, however, when it makes the large assumption that what the church today professes is Christianity; and if one defends the assumption by maintaining that the church has enjoyed an unbroken existence for centuries, then problems of historical probability arise in proving continuity between the church today and the original church. Actually, faith involves constant reaffirmation in the face of uncertainty; the first Christians came by it this way, and later Christians can do no other. The only "secure" relationship to God is free and spiritual; it cannot be guaranteed by externals such as baptism, circumcision, descent from Abraham—or membership in an institution. Besides the Bible and the church, the objective approach frequently appeals to "the proof of the centuries." Admittedly an hypothesis may become more probable by maintaining itself successfully against objections for a long period of time, but it does not thereby become an eternal truth. The fact that people have believed in Christianity for centuries is irrelevant to the individual who fails to accept it for himself, and since Christianity is concerned solely with the individual, it is unchristian to try to browbeat a person with the weight of almost two thousand years of witnesses. So much for the historical approach.

The point of view of speculative disinterestedness fails even more dismally to bring one nearer to the truth of Christianity. Faith is individual, passionate, and seeks a point of departure within historical existence for eternal happiness. But the speculative philosopher tries to become purely eternal (while he is still in time), and he abstracts from himself in trying to get at universal truth.

The subjective approach, which asks "How can I become a Christian?" encounters the problem of communicability. Objective thinking and direct communication are possible in science and philosophy, but they are out of place in religion, where truth consists in the *way* the individual appropriates it. All direct communication must be mediated by concepts (universals), whereas the subjective mode of appropriation

is strictly first person singular and private. Positive knowledge in connection with sense-data, historical fact or philosophical speculation fails to express this existential situation of the subject, which involves constant striving in time toward an infinite goal. Hence, as Lessing has said, accidental historical truths can never serve as proofs for eternal truths of the reason. The transition by which it is proposed to base an eternal truth upon historical testimony is therefore a leap—a decision in time concerning the eternal happiness or the eternal unhappiness of the individual.

The task of entering into the subjective standpoint must be understood, first of all, in its bearing upon the ethical. In ethics, the individual is always the center of importance. Everything else follows from that. One cannot approach the ethical problem by surveying the history of mankind, for unless one has grasped the ethical in his own life, he will not be able to discern it aright in history generally. For example, the historical importance of a "great" man is often merely accidental, and it is incommensurate with his ethical importance. Moreover, an ethical demand can be valid even when it concerns one individual alone in all the world. As an ethical being, the individual stands solitary before God, and all ethical development consists in becoming apparent before God: it consists, in other words, in the deepening of inner sincerity. When one tries to discern a moral structure running through human history first, and then attempts to allow that structure to be determinative for him as an individual, he runs into insuperable difficulties. For one thing, he can only understand the ethical problem as it affects the race *through* his understanding of how it affects him as an individual. Secondly, the moral evolution of the race, when viewed objectively, seems to be wasteful and full of instances where personal values are destroyed or frustrated; but if the task of becoming subjective is the highest, then no individual is wasted. Finally, the problems of death and immortality are intensely individual, not general. It is entirely futile to try to decide whether I can or cannot be immortal by reviewing the various theories concerning the immortality of the human soul in general which have been advanced in the history of thought.

From the Socratic standpoint, the eternal truth is not paradoxical in its own nature, but only in its relationship to an existing individual; the paradox arises because the relationship is between something eternal and something temporal. But from the author's standpoint, existence

involves an essential alteration, not merely a juxtaposition with eternal truth. No resources immanent in the individual (such as "recollection") can transform him from being in error to being in right relationship to eternal truth. But if the eternal truth is itself a paradox, having come into being in time, then the fact that sin prevents the individual from taking himself back (or up) into the eternal does not matter. The eternal truth can be laid hold of existentially. The paradox means that, from the standpoint of objective thinking, the existence of God is not only uncertain, but absurd. Some will resist facing this absurdity by claiming that the historical life and teachings of Jesus are well attested; but their claim does not come to grips with the point at issue, namely, that *God* entered time. Others will resist the paradox by claiming that it arises from the limitations of our human standpoint, whereas from the divine standpoint all contradictions are resolved. Johannes Climacus does not propose to dispute this assertion, since he is just a finite human being, and cannot occupy the divine standpoint. Still, the speculative philosopher is somewhat comical when he professes to think like God, but continues to exist like an absent-minded nincompoop. And when he has succeeded in organizing doctrinal propositions into a neat system, he thinks that he has understood Christianity—even though he has never once asked himself whether he has faith.

The God-manhood of Christ has nothing to do with the relative distinctions which mark some men off as possessing genius or remarkable religious insight; for there is an absolute difference between God and man, while all men exist in the same sense. To destroy the paradox in order to "understand" it is to misunderstand it completely. And to declare that one can accept everything in Christianity except its unintelligible faith in the God-man is fantastic, since what one ought to say under the circumstances is that he cannot accept Christianity at all. But even if one renounced all historical and speculative proofs, and gave verbal assent to the paradox, that would not guarantee the presence of faith. It might merely mean that a new kind of dogmatism was being employed to avoid inner decision. To defend the doctrine of the Incarnation by rote is just as pagan as to try to resolve it into a set of speculative truths. In short, no man can claim special prerogatives in connection with Christian truth by reason of his superior wisdom or his superior doctrinal precision. The only important difference between a wise man and a simple man, in this connection, is that the former sees *why* he cannot

understand the paradox; the latter is merely aware that he cannot understand it. More specifically, the wise man sees why the forgiveness of sins can only be believed, not proved; the simple man merely believes.

At this point in the argument, Kierkegaard introduces a survey of his work ("A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature"), which sheds much light upon his methods and his intentions. It also provides a setting for the remainder of the *Postscript* by indicating the "stages" or "leaps" which mark out the path on the way to becoming a Christian. The childlikeness of Christianity is never reached directly. First comes a break with aesthetic immediacy, when the subject discovers the isolation of his individual existence in ethical despair. This is an advance toward the religious; and yet, if one seeks to make the ethical self-sufficient, it is a hindrance to religion. For one must go on to a realization of the most radical breach of all—sin—before the religious solution (divine assistance from "outside" the individual) is possible; and sin is heterogenous with ethics, instead of being mere moral failure.

The real subject is not the abstract thinker, but the ethical agent. Hegel is right in identifying thought and being so far as abstract thought is concerned; but for that reason what he says about "becoming" is illusory, and his system cannot properly provide a place for ethics. From the ethical standpoint, the inner reality of the individual is higher than all ideal possibilities; a recognition of the actual spiritual situation of the subject, however discouraging, is of far more value than lofty contemplation of good intentions or of the noble deeds of others. The difference between the ethical and the religious stages is that the former is concerned solely with the individual's own reality, while the latter is infinitely concerned with a reality which is not one's own. The object of religious faith is not a doctrine, but the reality of the teacher. So long as one concentrates on doctrine, the reality of the teacher has, at most, an accidental significance.

In modern thinking all of these fundamental distinctions have gotten mixed up. Philosophers concentrate upon the spiritual evolution of the race—as though collective progress could guarantee individual development; in so doing they overlook the fact that spiritual achievement cannot be bequeathed to one generation by another. Moreover, once a conceptual unification of goodness, truth, and beauty has been brought about, the philosopher claims that his world-view is complete and all-inclusive, whereas actually he has confused a one-sidedly intellectual

grasp of everything with fully rounded development. Even admiration for the great achievements of the race or of other individuals is unavailing unless it presents a possibility for *me* as an ethical requirement. No one is helped to do the good by the fact that someone else actually did it, if the latter's performance was based upon special capacities which one does not possess oneself. Therefore the universal ethical "ideal" can never be merely ideal; it must be within every individual's capacity qua human.

The speculative attempt to deal with the ethico-religious problem has resulted in a hopeless confusion where "Christian" categories are indistinguishable from pagan. That is why the *Fragments* went to so much trouble in differentiating sharply between paganism at its highest and Christianity. In fact, it is now more difficult for a citizen of "Christendom" to become a real Christian than for a heathen to be converted, because the latter at least realizes the need for a radical decision. Philosophy has begged the question by identifying Christianity with a doctrine which calls for understanding, instead of with a Teacher who calls for discipleship. When someone goes through an elaborate performance in "reconciling" Christianity and philosophy, then, the whole thing is a sham. If Christianity is doctrine, there can be no conflict; and if it is not doctrine, no intellectual process can resolve the conflict. The philosopher may assume, of course, that nothing can legitimately stand in opposition to his way of getting at the truth, but he cannot possibly mediate between his assumption and the point of view of the subjective thinker. And if the philosopher's initial assumption is wrong, then his argument—no matter how consistent it may be internally—is like a bridge across a chasm which several men have formed by grasping each other's legs; just as one is about to reach the other side safely, the man at the end, needing a better grip, lets go to spit on his hands.

Let us grant, then, that Christianity cannot be speculatively understood, because the eternal happiness of the individual is decided in time through a relationship to "something historical" which becomes historical by virtue of an absurdity. How can I become a Christian? If eternal happiness is the highest good, all finite satisfactions may have to be renounced in favor of it, and eternal happiness cannot be included in a list as one good among others. Resignation is therefore the test of one's relationship to this eternal happiness,[6] resignation, not as an occasional

6. Cf. *Fear and Trembling.*

act but as a constant attitude. This sounds like a sort of other-worldliness which can find suitable expression only in monasticism, yet the only factor in common, actually, is a passionate earnestness. Monasticism involves a retreat from existence, whereas Christian resignation involves something much harder, namely, remaining in the world in the midst of relative ends without allowing them to become absolute. Furthermore, while monasticism relinquishes the world, its renunciation is not absolute, because it expects a reward and employs the category of merit. It seeks inwardness by an external arrangement (withdrawal from the world), whereas true inwardness is achievable while remaining in the world. Nevertheless, monasticism is certainly preferable to that indulgent and worldly sort of Protestantism which begins by representing pleasure and virtue as divergent, but ends by making virtue advantageous and pragmatically successful. Ordinarily one trembles for oneself in a Protestant church, not because the preacher is too severe, but because he is so polite and complimentary to the congregation. Resignation is neither ascetic nor complacent; it brings a certain serenity amidst constant striving, while the attempt to make relative ends absolute leads to frustration and misery, because the worldly man always exaggerates the importance of his finite gains and losses.

If someone wants to know how it is possible to be sure that there is such a *summum bonum* as eternal happiness, the answer is that this happiness is definable solely in terms of the mode of its acquisition, which involves risk, decision, and trust. If one demands the absence of risk, he will never strive for it. The way to Christian faith is made doubly difficult, however, by the fact that it demands absolute venture *against* the understanding. At first glance it might seem a very easy solution for the individual to get everything by means of the Gospel and the grace of God; but acceptance of the Gospel, which is an offense and a stumbling-block, and acknowledgement of one's own impotence, are precisely the most difficult matters of all. Unless this difficulty is kept clearly in view, Christianity becomes a magical way of escaping the consequences of one's own folly by shifting the load onto Christ.

How is it possible to relinquish one's absolute attachment to relative ends? The "immediate" (unreflective) man views his life in terms of fortune and misfortune. If he cannot evade the latter, he despairs in the face of it, and through despair a transition to another understanding of

suffering is possible. Good fortune is irrelevant to the religious man, since he shares the sufferings of others and is therefore always a sufferer, no matter how favorable his own external circumstances may be. Most preaching fails to take a proper attitude toward misfortune; it offers the specious comfort that many others are even worse off, or that God will probably bring everything right in the end, or that character develops through hardship. Such sentiments are merely a sop to people who want to receive a bogus assurance that their misfortunes will pass, and who thereby want to evade the religious. The religious man does not long to escape from suffering; he realizes that he must exist in it, and he is therefore free from aesthetic sentimentality about it. He comes to eternal happiness (paradoxically) through suffering, just as he comes to faith (paradoxically) through uncertainty. He comes to the realization that he can do nothing before God (paradoxically) through strenuous spiritual exertion.

Thus the religious life and preaching should concentrate upon one absolute goal, while remaining immersed in the worldly scene of relative values and ordinary pursuits. The man of faith is not outwardly different from worldlings, and the sermon can take the most commonplace things, as well as the most exalted, for its theme. God is not honored by ostentatious religiosity. In short, genuine piety is absolutely private and incommunicable; yet the man of faith participates in corporate worship, joining with all others who acknowledge and express their need for God.

One might suppose that guilt meant that the relationship to eternal happiness had been lost; but this is not the case. The two go together. The individual must *maintain* consciousness of guilt instead of talking childishly about how he was guilty for a while, and then a week went by when he was innocent, and then something went wrong again. Nothing is required to maintain this sense of guilt except inner sincerity; one cannot escape it by saying that others are just as bad, since others are not here concerned. The sense of guilt accompanies the individual's self-consciousness when he stands alone and transparent in the sight of God. When the preacher tries to stir it up by harping on comparative details of virtue and vice, he is neglecting his proper task and becoming a sort of assistant policeman. Most conceptions of guilt and satisfactions fall far below the eternal recollection of guilt; they fix upon accomplishments and defects which depend on differential talents, rank, and intelli-

gence; and they conceive of satisfaction in terms of civil punishment, nemesis, or self-inflicted penance. Eternal recollection of guilt accepts no external satisfaction, because the recollection itself is the hardest punishment of all.

Finally, we must observe that there are two different types of religion, which stand related to eternal happiness in different ways. The first (Religion A) is conditioned only by the inwardness of the appropriation. Speculative philosophy regards it as the higher because it is the religiousness of immanence. Basically it is pagan, having human nature in general as its presupposition. The second type (Religion B—Christianity) defines the eternal happiness itself more repellently. It is equally difficult for all, the simple and the wise alike, because it involves relinquishing thinking and fixing the soul on the paradox. In Religion A, God is immanent in the individual; in Christianity, the individual stands related to something outside himself,—God in time. The paradox of Christianity is not one which can be "comprehended" after it has been accepted; *it remains.* (So much for *credo ut intelligam.*) Many merely pretend to accept it; they renounce personal vanity . . . and want to be admired for doing so; they relinquish understanding in favor of faith . . . and regard themselves as incomparably clever seers who have penetrated more deeply into the secret than anyone else.

Yet belief in the paradox is very different from believing nonsense. A Christian depends on understanding ("reason") in all other connections, and uses it in his dealings with men, just as does everyone else. He does not retreat behind his "faith" as an excuse for failing to weigh every objection against it. He does not try to settle questions by appealing to "faith," where sense-perception, or science, or historical research, or logical consistency are equipped to furnish the answers. He does not put it down to lack of understanding if another person is not a Christian, and he does not believe nonsense against the understanding. In short, he uses his reason so critically that he learns to differentiate between (a) nonsense, which can be dispelled by knowledge and straight thinking, and (b) the incomprehensible, which can only be believed through a decision of the will, and then only when the individual himself has been converted in his inward relationship to God.

The historical fact on which Christianity is based is not a simple historical fact, for it is constituted only when God becomes historical by

virtue of the absurd. Hence, while Religion A is potentially universal on the basis of human nature generally, Christianity demands a specific condition. It calls for a relation (discipleship) between one existing individual in time and another; and yet this relationship, instead of being accidental, like all other temporal relationships, is the individual's eternal relationship to God.

Because the childlikeness of Christianity lies on the other side of innocence, the other side of ethical despair and isolation, it must not be understood in a sentimental, immediate sense. Strictly speaking, a child's religion should be idyllic mythology. If it were literally true that a child can get into the Kingdom when an adult cannot, then it would follow that the sooner the child dies, the better. The seriousness of genuine Christian categories, if imposed on the mind of a child, will make him morbid.

Christian faith is difficult, and only a mature man can reach the decisive point with respect to it; but essentially it is equally difficult for all, although pretensions to culture, profundity, and detachment may lead a man down so many blind alleys that he never reaches the point of posing the problem of faith aright. Hence people contine to dispute over the nature of Christianity, putting forward definitions and counter-definitions, all of which are calculated to safeguard it as their peculiar possession, because these long-winded disputes are such a convenient way of avoiding the question of one's own individual faith.[7]

The *Postscript* concludes with a statement in which Kierkegaard accepts responsibility for the authorship of all the pseudonymous writings, and explains why he resorted to this device. A fruitful subject for investigation on the part of Kierkegaard scholars, present and future, will be the manner in which S.K. himself sought to be both existential and spectatorial by means of writing through these "personae." Once the problems which arise in connection with the pecularities of his methods

7. In this connection it is noteworthy how many naturalists, humanists, moralists, and philosophical idealists today take pride in their objective and emancipated attitude toward Christianity, and maintain a sympathetic (or unsympathetic) detachment toward it, until someone like Barth or Kierkegaard comes along and declares in unequivocal terms what Christian faith includes and *excludes*. Then these same writers are very much annoyed at having a circle drawn which leaves them outside, and they suddenly begin to talk quite passionately, like "subjective" thinkers, about how Christianity rests upon inner personal qualities instead of upon parrot-like assent to dogmas and creeds.

have been worked through, however, his interpretation of Christianity stands as a violent and insistent protest against every modern attempt to dissolve it into scientific, metaphysical, moralistic, or historico-pragmatic terms.

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Voltaire, Pascal and Human Destiny. By Mina Waterman. New York: King's Crown Press, 1942. xvi + 130 pp. $1.75.

The *Pensées* of Pascal were first published by his friends of Port-Royal in 1670. In 1734, Voltaire in the twenty-fifth letter of his *Lettres philosophiques,* published a number of *Remarques* which were critical of Pascal's arguments in favor of the Christian religion. Voltaire subsequently returned to the attack in 1742, and again on the eve of his death thirty-six years later in 1778. For no other man over such a long period of time did he show such insistent and consistent aversion. The reasons are of course clear. In the importance he gives to intuition and revelation as sources of knowledge, in his appeal to supernatural sanctions for evidence of "unknowable" truths, in his belief in the doctrine of original sin as explaining man's inherent corruption, and in his distortion of history to prove the truths of the Christian religion, Pascal was the archenemy of the Enlightenment, which was above all humanistic, rationalistic, naturalistic, antichristian and a believer in the goodness of man. For one who felt so deeply that Pascal "eloquently insulted the human race," it was inevitable that the great leader of the Age of Reason should arise in defense of that humanity and its knowledge which had been so cruelly and unjustly debased by the sublime *misanthrope.* He became for Voltaire a symbol of "eloquent obscurantism," the most redoubtable representative of fanaticism in modern times, and as such must be destroyed at all costs. Against him Voltaire used all the weapons at his command, wit, irony, sarcasm, and an extraordinarily keen intelligence enriched by a fund of universal knowledge. To this day it may be said that Voltaire is probably the best and strongest opponent among large numbers who have entered the lists against this modern St. Michael. This is not to imply that he or they are devils. Heaven may be defended on earth as well as from the ethereal regions of infinite space

whose silence is often frightening. Both men have become symbols of the mystic and the rationalist at grips with each other.

Miss Waterman's book is the best guide to an understanding of that epic struggle. If I shall later differ with her, it is not because she has failed to fulfill her purpose. With a fine intelligence and a deep sincerity she has examined all the texts in question, and has given us a complete and careful study of the problems posed by Pascal, the validity of which were denied by Voltaire.

The Preface and Introduction orient the reader in the controversy. The one is an *état présent* of the question, and the other a detailed account of Voltaire's interest and concern with the *Pensées* in his correspondence and written works. In subsequent chapters she penetrates the labyrinth, follows through many of its ramifications and lightens the way for us. Voltaire's *Remarques* she arranges under three principal headings which bear on Pascal's attitude toward man, toward reason, and toward the supernatural. She gives us or refers to, the important *Pensées* dealing with these questions and the Voltairean reaction thereto. The moral and intellectual milieu of both men is identified. The result is a mosaic, each stone in its place, the design of which is clear and ordered.

It does not seem necessary to treat in detail Miss Waterman's findings and interpretations of each *Pensée* and *Remarque*. All the Pascalian problems that aroused Voltaire's interest throughout his life are presented, analyzed, elucidated, and illumined by the light of reason and history in excellent scholarly fashion. The psychological, historical, and philosophical background is given; the depth and the breadth of the attack is measured. Her book is indispensable to students of the quarrel that still rages in the two camps. It is *not* indispensable, however, to those who would understand Pascal. And with that remark as a point of departure, I take the liberty of expressing a few "subjective" thoughts that seem to bear on the problem, and which occurred to me as I read her book. They are not intended as carping criticism.

I find in Wiss Waterman a lack of apprehension of the depths of Pascal's genius. Her arguments are based for the most part on textual criticism, placing one Pascal text against another by Voltaire and then implying or showing the ineptitude of Pascal as against the power of Voltaire. A reader who approaches the thought of both men for the first time as analyzed and summarized by Miss Waterman would have, I believe, a

distorted picture of Pascal when he had finished the book. A great deal has been left unsaid that would have been meaningful in her book. The brilliant, not to say revolutionary, insights of Kierkegaard, Poincaré, Bergson, and Blondel are not discussed. They bear on the problems of the intuition and the validity of the paradox as a means to understanding, and reveal much concerning Pacal's methods for penetrating the regions where the reason does not function.

To penetrate the mysteries of the universe is like trying "to drain the ocean through a tiny reed." In this figure the reed is our mind and *all* of its faculties, and the ocean, the eternal mystery. There are thinkers of the latter day who are showing with increasing insight that the occasional drops of water that come through the reed are evidence of the deepening of the creative imagination and of the spiritual consciousness. These give knowledge that transcend the powers of the reason to attain. Richard Kroner, professor of philosophy at McGill University, recently wrote that " religious imagination . . . is more akin to the ultimate essence of life and reality than are thought and speculation." Miss Waterman might have shown greater awareness of the richness of this literature, a literature which is showing more and more the profound truth of Pascal's antinomies and paradoxes, in comparison to which the *Remarques* of Voltaire are but surface ripples.

Miss Waterman lives completely in Voltaire's world. As far as she is concerned the evidence so brilliantly garnered by the method of rational and historical criticism in the eighteenth century is final. I am aware that my psychological or intuitional evidence denying the final validity of the other is meagre and unacceptable to the rational mind, but I am no longer under the illusion that the argument can be limited by "either or." A bridge is gradually being built between the two regions. My criticism of Miss Waterman is the seal of finality which she puts on the Voltairean arguments.

The distinctions between Pascal and Voltaire are narrowed if we penetrate through their terminology to the essence of the problem. Both are agreed that they are born, live, and die surrounded by mystery. Both admit a dichotomy in man, the reasons for which are profoundly mysterious. The mystery is not cleared away by giving mythological or "natural" reasons. The one is poetical or intuitional; the other scientific. Both are sinners against the integrity of man's spirit if they are dogmatically exclusive. The inner light of the Quaker is as much a reality as the

Michelson experiments on light. The light of both is known, is used, is true. To regulate all intuitional (or metaphysical) knowledge to the realm of illusion is as absurd as it is to deny the validity of scientific knowledge. Both are continually tested and proven in experience. The symbols that Pascal employs are a representation of the knowledge that flows from the experience of the human race. A field of knowledge that denies its validity is sterile and dead. Voltaire's scientific knowledge is more plausible and facile for one area of our experience. If it is thought of as final, it is devoid of substantial meaning.

The nuances of Pascal's thought are deep and varied in their colorings. Black and white are quite absent. Voltaire's insistence on their blackness is false to the intellectual, moral, and spiritual integrity of Pascal. Pascal was groping toward the integration of truth; in his awareness of the powerlessness of reason before the divine mystery, he sought to find the powers of the heart, not to destroy reason, but to use it and then to transcend it. *Taisez-vous, raison impuissante* is not an abdication of reason, but an exclamation of impatience before the proud faculty which claims all and, in the last analysis, arrives at nothing when it concerns itself with man's deepest instincts and needs. The quest of man for a truth that transcends himself cannot be stopped merely by pointing out that it is fruitless. Too many in the experience of the race know otherwise. And that experience which formed and wove the pattern of Pascal's thought is always at hand to give meaning to the claim that the highest truths are begotten by the marriage of the heart and the reason. And of the two the heart takes precedence, for it leads to the knowledge that the highest truth culminates in the knowledge and the love of God fulfilled in man.

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Johann Conrad Beissel, Mystic and Martinet, 1690-1768. By WALTER C. KLEIN. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942. ix + 218 pp. $2.25.

This volume is the fifth in the current series of *Pennsylvania Lives.* In it Dr. Klein has told in a very readable way the story of an intriguing experiment in Protestant monasticism in America, for Conrad Beissel's name and fame are closely linked with the origin of the cloisters at

Ephrata, Pennsylvania. The reader gathers that the orders of the "virgins" inhabiting them, anomalous though they were in the setting of Colonial Pennsylvania, were far less remarkable than the personality of their founder. Dr. Klein deals in detail with "Wisdom's Household"—monks and nuns and seculars alike—following to their respective ends the checkered careers of some of this "fortuitous aggregation of fallible and angular human beings." Sharon, once the home of the seculars, is the only conventual building which time has spared; its present peaceful air belies the stormy record of its past.

In his treatment of his leading character, the author certainly must be absolved of undue partiality or veneration. The Johann Conrad Beissel his pen has drawn is a religious fanatic, with more than a little eccentricity, cunning rather than wise, a narrow-minded man who was guilty of flagrant plagiarism while remaining unconscious of the act, a stubborn, opinionated autocrat who would tolerate no peer in his little Zion, who luxuriated in controversy and thrived upon strife. "Of magnanimity and understanding Beissel had not the slightest touch. . . . He was a trainer [of souls] rather than a physician. . . . If it were necessary to describe his character and career in a single sentence, one might say with accuracy and justice that he was an insignificant man who made a lifelong effort to feel impressive." Yet Dr. Klein allows Beissel to have been singlehearted in his devotion to his calling and admits that this queer fanatic strongly attracted people of the most varied character, while inspiring unbounded loyalty in a small group of followers. He was a prophet of ascetisism, celibacy, and sabbatarianism. And in his writings the patient reader discovers, among much that is unintelligible and vapid, aphorisms which are "neatly put and profoundly true."

Conrad Beissel was the founder of the *Seventh Day German Baptists* or *Seventh Day Dunkers,* one of the numerous sects which sprang up under the hospitable shadow of Penn's holy experiment. The chief value of Dr. Klein's study lies in the skill with which he has traced the sources of that pattern of religious thought and life of which Beissel gradually became a prominent exponent in the new world. The reader will find thumbnail sketches of many European forms of mysticism, pietism, and separatism, together with succinct accounts of their lesser known American counterparts. Many students, however, will take issue with the author's rather cavalier treatment of these movements. Stylistically, too, the discussion of so many related religious phenomena and of the life

stories of Beissel's contemporaries—valuable though they are intrinsically—creates awkward digressions from the main study.

The summaries of Beissel's extant writings are concise and excellent; the review of his early tract on the Sabbath, the *Mystyrion Anomias,* in particular, is an unusually fine piece of work. On the other hand, the chapter entitled *A Contest of Wills* credits Beissel with a skill in manipulating popular sentiment within his little community which does not seem apparent from the evidence adduced. Throughout the whole book, indeed, the author offers a disturbing amount of conjecture and supposition. It should be added, however, that he is often consciously compelled to resort to probabilities because of the prejudiced character of most of the contemporary sources available for his study. Beissel was a man who made either very ardent friends or very bitter foes.

Dr. Klein devotes his concluding chapter, *Philosopholus Teutonicus,* to a systematization of Beissel's theological ideas. This is no mean undertaking, for Beissel preferred to follow the free play of the inspiration of the moment in writing rather than to subject his mind to the discipline of exact thought. Boehme's influence upon Beissel is apparent and far reaching. But, as Dr. Klein points out, the latter had neither the interest nor the ability necessary to master the metaphysical system in which Boehme's mysticism found expression. Rather, Beissel adopted certain of Boehme's ideas because he could make them serve as a framework for that type of asceticism which rested primarily upon convictions growing out of his own experience and predispositions. Thus Beissel appropriated Boehme's concepts of the nature of God, of the warring worlds which struggle within man for mastery, of the Sabbath as the reflection of God's essential nature and the type of the soul's ultimate repose in the divine. Out of them he created a practical manual for a life pleasing to God, having for its primary postulate the thesis that sexual intercourse is an offense in God's sight. "Loyalty to Christ is equated with unflinching self-denial. Beissel's devotion to Christ was fidelity to a symbol of abnegation: there are few, if any traces of the warm, sensuous affection that appears so prominently in the spirituality of the Catholic mystics. Beissel's theology ended in a rigorous quietism." Individuals practising the severe form of self-denial demanded by Beissel became priests after the order of Melchizedek; they alone were fitted to labor for the salvation of the unenlightened men and women about them.

Dr. Klein also discusses at some length in this chapter the question of the channels by means of which Beissel may have obtained his knowledge of Boehme's teachings and concludes that Johann Georg Gichtel was the chief intermediary rather than Gottfried Arnold.

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The Catholic Revival in England. By JOHN J. O'CONNOR. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. viii + 102 pp. $1.00.

This book covers the development of Catholic life and the struggle to secure for Catholics due recognition and legal equality which took place in England between 1770 and 1892. Prior to the former date, Catholics in England were a small and obscure minority. Not permitted to vote or to sit in Parliament, and subject to all sorts of indignities in the ordinary intercourse of social life, they were regarded by other Englishmen almost as members of a subject race. In contrast, by 1892 the total Catholic population was almost two million, most of their legal disabilities had been removed, the restrictions still remaining were for the most part ignored, and so changed was the public attitude toward Catholics that Englishmen spoke with pride of Newman and Manning, former Anglicans, who had risen to the College of Cardinals. Professor O'Connor has written an excellent short history of this period, setting forth clearly the stages by which English Catholics secured emancipation and evaluating judiciously the parts played by the leading figures.

It is no criticism of the book to say that it is primarily addressed to lay readers; the aim of the Christendom Series, under whose editorial supervision the work has been published, is to provide informative reading for Catholic lay groups and parochial study clubs, and collateral material for preparatory schools and colleges. Professor O'Connor's study is admirable for this purpose. Few, if any, events of concern to Catholicism which occurred in England between 1770 and 1892 have been omitted, yet the book is only one hundred pages in length, with a two page bibliographical note. The author accomplishes this brevity by rigorously keeping within the limited scope he has set for the study. "The attempt has been made," he states in his preface, "to present the

Revival in a Catholic setting, to see it, so to speak, from the inside, rather than to chronicle the effect of the Revival upon the English attitude toward the Church." Because of this restriction of scope, the book suffers in comparison with such a work as Brilioth's *The Anglican Revival,* which interprets the contemporaneous movement in the Church of England both from within and without. But Brilioth's classic study is probably not read by many laymen, while O'Connor's book should do much toward producing that "intelligent well-instructed laity" which Cardinal Newman earnestly desired, "men who know their religion . . . who know their creed so well that they can give an account of it, and who know enough of history to defend it."

Excellent though his survey is, the author has erred on two points. Certainly he is incorrect in asserting that the High Church party, associated with the Oxford Movement in the Church of England, many of whose members became Roman Catholics, "offered religious 'liberalism' " (p. 32). The Tractarians distrusted all liberalism—religious, political, philosophic—and against it set two principles, faith and authority. They believed their task was to repudiate the secularism, the rationalism, the utilitarianism of the time, all of which were subsumed for them under the general term "Liberalism." Froude, who played so influential a part at the beginning of the movement, condemned "the rationalist spirit," in his opinion introduced at the Reformation, as "the ψεμδο προφήτης of the Revelation." And Newman himself has stated, reviewing this period of his life, "My battle was with Liberalism, by which I mean the anti-dogmatic principle and its development" *(Apologia Pro Vita Sua).* A second error is the attributing of the doctrine of class hatred and class war to England in the early 1870's (p. 92). Admittedly classes existed, and there were struggles between trade unionists and employers, but the class struggle thesis, technically defined, found no expression at this time. Hyndman, a decade later, would seek to have Marxism accepted by the British working classes—and even Hyndman believed that England might be able to achieve peacefully and by orderly process those changes which Continental revolutionists had sought through bloodshed—but one will look in vain for any evidence of class struggle, in the Marxian sense, in the period between the Chartists and Hyndman. Rather, the British working classes were content in the intervening years, particularly from 1848 on, to seek to better

their lot within the existing economic framework, through co-operatives and the bargaining power of trade unions.

An objection might also be made, both on grounds of fact and of causal connection, to Professor O'Connor's statement that, in the *Syllabus of Errors,* Pius IX "condemned only those false and pernicious principles which today, seventy-eight years later, have yielded their full measure of totalitarianism, intolerance, war and death" (p. 78).

Neither of the errors mentioned are serious in relation to the purpose of the book. In that regard, Professor O'Connor has set a high standard for later books in the Christendom Series to maintain.

Cyril K. Gloyn

Pacific University

The Church in the Social Order. By Cyril K. Gloyn. Forest Grove, Oregon: Pacific University, 1942. 201 pp. $1.50.

The great utility of an accurate, descriptive title is again made evident by the lack of it in this extremely able but limited work of research. It is in the subtitle that one learns that it is neither an historical study, in the broad sense, of the Church in the social order nor is it a description of the Church today in the social order. Instead, it is an investigation of Anglican social theory, chiefly in the quarter-century which ended with 1850.

Professor Gloyn has chosen for study two clergymen, Thomas Arnold and J. F. D. Maurice, one group of men, chiefly clergymen, whose activities produced the Oxford Movement, and one layman, Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Of these Arnold, Maurice, and the Tractarians were of the essence of the second quarter-century. Does the inclusion of Coleridge, however, destroy the unity of the study? From one point of view the answer might be in the affirmative. In many ways Coleridge was remote from the nineteenth century, particularly from the quarter-century of the Tractarians. In 1825 he was already past fifty and was hopelessly committed to his unfortunate habit. By the standards of birth, language, pattern of thought, and associations he was of the eighteenth century. It is not by chance that the author, more than once, links him, philosophically, with Edmund Burke.

It is possible, however, to admit that Coleridge had many close ties with the eighteenth century and yet find a place for him in the nine-

teenth. In his thought on social and theological problems he looked to the future, and he was among the first to discern new and disturbing tendencies. Above all he exercised a deep influence on the minds of nineteenth century thinkers. His influence was concentrated to a remarkable degree in the second quarter-century, and Maurice in particular was indebted to him. In the author's words Coleridge has been included "because he unquestionably influenced profoundly the philosophical, theological, and social views of nineteenth-century churchmen." Thus it is that Coleridge, in his familiar role as inspirer of others, may be included in a study of this period without the risk of disunity.

Professor Gloyn believes that his study is important for the present day because he considers that there is an unbroken connection between the problems of the early nineteenth century and those of our own day, and because there are parallels between the two periods which are recognizable and significant. Historical parallels are both illusive and elusive. Therefore it is next to impossible to reach a general agreement concerning their exact nature, and any interpretation of their particular meaning is open to question. Though it may be true, on the other hand, that there is an unbroken connection between earlier problems and those of our day, yet, without careful direction, many readers, lacking the historical knowledge, will be unaware of the fact. To claim too much for this study is to place too great a burden on it. Expecting too much some readers may, in their disappointment, lose sight of the true value of the work.

The book is of value for its own sake. It is of value as a skilfully and intelligently executed piece of research, as an analysis of the thought of selected men of distinction as they wrestled with problems of absorbing interest. Viewed in this light it takes its proper place as an analysis of a part of that vast mosaic of thought and action which is the background of present day life. On this basis it is its own justification and will be welcomed by clergy and laymen alike.

The Anglican Church, between 1825 and 1850, became acutely aware of four problems, namely, a growing indifference toward religion in general and the Establishment in particular, a theory of the State which was secular in essence, social confusion resulting from comparatively new economic problems, and a spirit of nationalism which conservatives hoped to foster for their own purposes. Moreover, during these same years there were present within the Church two movements of quite dif-

ferent character, one wholly new, the other finding new strength and meaning. These were Anglo-Catholicism and the Broad Church movement. It is against the background of these problems and movements that Anglican social theory is to be judged.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge saw the Church as one of two great co-ordinate institutions, the other being the State. Each of these institutions had its own sphere, duties, and high purposes. Between the two there should be no friction, and thus harmoniously they should solve all political, social, and religious problems.

The Tractarians were part and parcel of that turgid second quarter-century which saw Catholic emancipation, the Great Reform Bill, the rise and failure of Chartism, and the repeal of the Corn Laws. After the initial confusion of the Tractarians, it was evident that they were conservative and that to them the Church was Apostolic and Catholic. They assigned to the Church the superior place and made it answerable for the State. This was a heavy responsibility, but the Anglo-Catholics in brilliant terms argued that the Church was adequate.

Thomas Arnold stood with the Broad Church. In general he rejected the ideas of Coleridge and the Tractarians, believing as he did that the solution of social problems lay with the State. His beneficent State should rightly exercise spiritual authority and maintain a national church which would include almost all Christians within the country. Arnold, indeed, went so far as to believe that "the State *was* the Church in its perfected form."

Frederick Maurice, during an active and often stormy life, disagreed with many of his contemporaries. Religious sects and groups, he held, were at fault because each was in possession of partial truths out of which each endeavored to erect a system. He was, however, deeply influenced by Coleridge, who appeared to be very near the whole truth. Yet he went beyond Coleridge at many points. He saw God as infinite charity from whom social reform flowed naturally. The Church was national and catholic, and as such was prepared to assume definite obligations with reference to social problems. His interpretation of these ideas led Maurice into the heart of Christian Socialism. Professor Gloyn's conclusions concerning Maurice's position and influence in this movement are particularly valuable. Above all, Maurice held that the laboring class should be redeemed, not punished, and that Christianity had within its grasp the opportunity to reform the social system.

This effort to suggest the contents of the volume leans heavily on the author's succinct summary in his introduction. The chapters deserve to be read in their entirety, and to do so is a stimulating experience.

JOSEPH D. DOTY

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Timothy Dwight, 1752-1817: A Biography. By CHARLES E. CUNINGHAM. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. viii + 403 pp. $3.75.

Puritanism has always been a bone of contention in the republic of American letters. On the one hand, it has been the subject of a great deal of uncritical praise; and, on the other, it has been the butt of many an ill-founded joke, a whipping-boy for the worst kind of irresponsible debunking. Timothy Dwight has often been considered the very epitome of Puritanism; he was called "The last of the Puritans" by Charles and Mary Beard, while Parrington referred to him as "the most dogmatic of Yankee Puritans." Dwight did not have to wait until his life became the subject matter of an historian's reflections to become the subject of controversy. Genuinely beloved by most of his fellow New Englanders of 1800, he was thoroughly hated by all good Jeffersonians. One of his students at Yale (of which he was president from 1795 until his death in 1816) called him "a father to New England—her moral legislator"; while the Jeffersonians labeled him "Pope Dwight." Both titles bear witness to the power he held in his time, and indicate his importance for the historian.

Most recent historians have mentioned Dwight, and some have given him considerable space; but there has been no full length study of the man until the publication of Mr. Cuningham's biography. A well-balanced full length study has been badly needed. For the most part, the historians have been such ardent Jeffersonians or so anti-Puritan that they have failed to analyze and properly to judge Dwight, especially in the light of the esteem in which he was held by his contemporary New Englanders. Part of the difficulty results from the fact that most attempted analyses have been conducted in terms of politics; many have been guided by a far too rigid economic theory of history. Mr. Cuningham's study has the virtue of dealing with Dwight primarily as a parish minister, an educator, and as a man who knew how to win friends and influence people.

It is difficult to determine whether or not this is Mr. Cuningham's method of redressing the injustice rendered to Dwight in the recent past. Certainly, estimates such as Parrington's are badly out of balance and needed redressing; but Mr. Cuningham does not mention Parrington or any other recent historian. In fact, the adulating praise which he pours over his subject makes the book more like a memoir by one of Dwight's clerical friends than a modern critical biography. No doubt Mr. Cuningham has his tongue in his cheek in many places, even though he has a sincere admiration and deep regard for Dwight. But these attempts to be slyly humorous—if such they be—are saccharine to the point of being nauseating. At times the uncritical praise is serious enough and, as a result, it sounds like Benjamin Sillman's eulogy on Dwight delivered in New Haven, February 12, 1817. Mr. Cuningham seems to accept without question the judgment of Jedidiah Morse that "the death of our invaluable friend Dr. Dwight is indeed a public loss, which will probably be more extensively felt than that of the death of any other man in our country would be. His sun has set in its full glory." The book closes with this sentence, "In his life Timothy Dwight embodied all he had taught. To the end he did his part—for God, for country, and for Yale."

Dwight was at the center of almost every storm that swept over America from 1775 to 1815. He was an ardent rebel at first, writing poetry to proclaim the "Rights of Man," and he was a chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. Later he favored the ratification of the Constitution. He was a dyed-in-the-wool Federalist, Anglophile, Francophobe, and Jefferson-hater. He fought infidelity and Deism with vigor if without insight. In theology, he considered himself a follower of his grandfather, Jonathan Edwards. In this field he deplored controversy, preferring to be "practical"; but he had great influence on the religious thinking of his time, even though he may have had slight theological acumen.

In most of these areas Mr. Cuningham patently fails to give a tempered estimate of his subject. In regard to Infidelity, Deism, and Atheism (which Dwight lumped all together) Mr. Cuningham seems to accept quite uncritically Dwight's contention that all free-thinkers were irrational; he says nothing which indicates that Dwight's judgment was warped. Dwight assumed that all such doctrines were absurd and would be easily vanquished by "the Truth." No doubt Dwight achieved a notable success in rescuing many Yale undergraduates from the clutches of these vicious absurdities; but he never met the arguments squarely, al-

though he insisted that all Deists refused to meet a man of genuine learning in fair debate. Furthermore, he insisted that all this vicious free-thinking sprang from a depraved desire for licentiousness. Cuningham sums up Dwight's opinion:

> Their doctrines delighted men seeking justification for a vicious course of life. Philosophy of this kind provided new courage for bolder perpetrations. It gratified lesser creatures, conscious of their own intellectual inferiority, by making them feel suddenly wiser than those who had spent a lifetime laboriously investigating the authenticity of the Scriptures. Human beings, already inclined to vice, rejoiced at escaping from the shackles of conscience and the terrors of Revelation. Some were charmed by the novelty and spirit of the doctrines themselves; others by the sense of boldness with which sinning filled them. All found comfort in principles which eased the way to an immoral life. The purpose of such philosophy and its authors presented no enigma to Dwight.

Apparently neither such philosophy nor Dwight's reasoning about it presents any enigma to Cuningham. He neither comments upon this nor attempts to explain why Dwight thought as he did. He does point out that Dwight was concerned about the social consequences of such a philosophy; but he never says anything concerning the social aims of certain free-thinkers as compared to Dwight's own views.

With the advent of Illuminism Dwight said it was clear that

> a plan was formed, and to an alarming degree executed, for exterminating Christianity, Natural Religion, the belief in a God, of that immortality of the soul, and of moral obligation; for rooting out of the world civil and domestic government, the right of property, marriage, natural affection, chastity and decency; and in a word for destroying whatever is virtuous, refined or desirable, and introducing again universal savageness and brutism.

This illuminating tidbit is quoted by Koch in his *Republican Religion*, but it is not quoted by Cuningham. From this sentence it is not difficult to see that Dwight made frightfully simple analyses of religion and social problems, despite the fact that he certainly was no fool. One would like to know why this happened. No doubt there were many contributing factors. The problem is indeed a knotty one, but one can justly demand some light on the subject. True enough, such thinking was fairly common, but was not universal; others managed to rise further above the ideological compulsion of their culture. The controversy was certainly not a purely religious one. The fact that John Adams shared almost

identically Jefferson's religious views is full indication that it was not simply a matter of religious belief. As Morais has said, in his *Deism in Eighteenth Century America,* "In spite of contemporary accounts Liberalism, not Religion, was at stake in 1800." Furthermore, many dissenters who were not free-thinkers but as sincere in their Christian professions as Dwight, completely disagreed with his judgment on this matter as on others, such as the relation of Church and State.

On this latter point Dwight argued characteristically, in a letter on "The Vindication of the Establishment of the Public Worship by Law," that without religion public morals would collapse and society would soon crumble in ruins. Cuningham seems merely to echo Dwight, implying that Dwight could not possibly have thought otherwise (even though Cuningham himself may—although at times that seems doubtful). For all Cuningham tells us one might assume that Jefferson, Madison, and the dissenters of New England, such as stout Isaac Backus, were benighted fools. Perhaps a remark by Pierrepont Edwards (Jonathan's youngest son and Dwight's uncle, a staunch opponent of the Standing Orders, an ardent Republican and a friend of Jefferson) sums up the situation best: "As well attempt to revolutionize the Kingdom of Heaven as the State of Connecticut." Even so, some examination of the total culture which produced such thinking is called for. Cuningham is strangely silent.

In partial explanation of his political and economic beliefs, Cuningham points out that one of Dwight's greatest fears was a depreciated currency, because he had seen how much misery had been caused by that during and following the Revolution. Dwight turned the policy of a stable currency into a theological dogma, and it appears that Cuningham agrees with him. It was chiefly because of this conviction, Cuningham declares, that Dwight was such a devoted Federalist and a follower of Hamilton, but he never so much as mentions the fact that Hamilton had sold most of his bank stock in New England and that the clergy themselves were not free from financial ties. Beard points this out in *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy,* and Purcell deals with it in *Connecticut in Transition, 1775-1818.* Beard adds that the clergy with financial ties were clearly the exception rather than the rule. Most of them were not wealthy. Dwight was an exception; his salary of $2000 was twice that of the governor. It is chiefly to him that Beard is referring. This does not mean that Dwight or other clergymen were merely mer-

cenary—even Hamilton was not personally so. However, the clergy were allied with "the rich, the well-born, and the able." Theodore Dwight, Timothy's brother, was an intimate friend of Fisher Ames, Timothy Pickering, Oliver Wolcott, *et al.*; and President Dwight thought highly of these men.

All this came to a head in the election of 1800, in which the New England clergy fought in the vanguard. Henry Adams, in his authentic and monumental *History of the United States* covering that period, shows clearly the power the clergy had, and that they preached the doctrine that "every dissolute intriguer, loose-liver, forger, and prison-bird; every hare-brained, loud-talking demagogue; every speculator, scoffer and Atheist,—was a follower of Jefferson; and Jefferson was himself the incarnation of their theories." Claude Bowers, in *Jefferson and Hamilton,* says, "The game of the politicians to picture Jefferson as an atheist, a scoffer at religion who despised the Church and laughed at the Bible, was entrusted to the ministerial corps which did the best it could." And he adds that ministers preached "politics with an intemperance of denunciation and recklessness of truth that seems incredible today." Timothy Dwight certainly was no exception to this. His famous (or infamous) *Oration of the Duty of Americans on the Present Crisis* proves this beyond peradventure of doubt.

> For what end shall we be connected with men of whom this is the character and the conduct? . . . Is it that we change our holy worship into a dance of Jacobin frenzy and that we may behold a strumpet personating a Goddess on the Altars of Jehovah? . . . Is it that we may see our wives and daughters the victims of legal prostitution; soberly dishonoured; speciously polluted; the outcasts of delicacy and virtue, the loathing of God and man? . . . Shall our sons become disciples of Voltaire, and the dragoons of Marat; or our daughters the concubines of the Illuminati?

This speech is rarely missed by an historian; for example, a cursory examination discloses that it is included in Beard's *Jeffersonian Democracy* and his *The Rise of American Civilization; The Growth of the American Republic* by Morison and Commager; Morison's *History of the United States*; and J. T. Adams' *The Epic of America.* These are general histories, not detailed studies of the period in which Dwight lived. Perhaps these historians have indulged in a little sensationalism by including the speech in their works; perhaps its importance has been ex-

aggerated. But Cuningham ignores the speech entirely, apparently choosing not to lower himself by discussing it.

No one could reasonably ask that a biographer attend to every misconception or perverted picture of his subject that has been perpetrated by the general historian; that would mean losing one's self in a morass of insignificant detail. But the picture of Timothy Dwight given by many recent students of this specific period is much the same as that given by the general historians, and it is most certainly incumbent on the serious biographer to rectify that distortion if such it be. He need not do this directly, but he cannot do it by ignoring the problem completely.

This problem is closely connected with the general research problem of getting a proper estimate of the whole religio-cultural pattern of America. Cuningham seems to be blissfully unaware that such a general problem exists. He lists few works on this subject, and practically no recent ones; he gives no evidence that he is aware of their existence. For example, he does not list R. H. Niebuhr's *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* nor his *The Kingdom of God in America*; nor Mecklin's *The Story of American Dissent,* which has a good deal to say about Dwight; nor T. C. Hall's *The Religious Backgrounds of American Culture.* He does not seem to be aware that Weber, Troeltsch, and Tawney ever wrote anything about the relation of Calvinism to capitalism. Among books dealing specifically with Dwight's time, he does not list Koch's *Republican Religion* nor Morais' *Deism in Eighteenth Century America,* quoted above, nor Stauffer's *New England and the Bavarian Illuminati,* nor Humphrey's *Nationalism and Religion.* He does not even list old Isaac Backus' *A History of New England with Particular Reference to the Denomination of Christians Called Baptist*—a thorough reading of which would have given him a different slant on the general religio-cultural pattern of New England.

In fairness, it should be added that Cuningham has performed minute research to gather the details of Dwight's personal life. No slur on his ability as a research scholar in this area is intended. But his lack of acquaintance with other fields disqualifies him, in the opinion of this reviewer, to be Dwight's biographer. Not only is he apparently ignorant of the religio-cultural problem, but also his knowledge of theology appears to be severely limited and his judgments on the subject superficial.

The importance of Timothy Dwight in the development of New

England Theology is indicated by the fact that he is mentioned only in passing by Frank H. Foster in *A Genetic History of New England Theology,* and by Haroutunian in *Piety Versus Moralism: The Passing of New England Theology.* G. P. Fisher, in his important *Discussions in History and Theology,* mentions him as reflecting the views of others. (Incidentally, neither Haroutunian's nor Fisher's book is listed in the bibliography.) True enough, Dwight made no pretentions of being an original theologian or subtle metaphysician; his aim was to be "practical." Just what "practical" meant to Dwight, Cuningham does not make clear; and even if he were as "practical" as Cuningham implies, his use of metaphysics would still be a proper matter for discussion. Dwight assumed that "The Truth" supported Theism and Christianity beyond cavil. Many of his arguments are simple-minded while others are specious and sophistical—this in comparison to other thinkers of his day. His confident use of the principle of causality might lead one to believe that David Hume had never existed. Cuningham seems to commend Dwight's position on the foremost theological question of his time: regeneration. He points out that Dwight did not claim to know what the precise nature of the agency was, in a metaphysical sense: "The important thing was the undeniable fact that it existed. Knowing this much Dwight was satisfied." Dwight might well be pardoned this naïve empiricism; but it is downright silly for Cuningham to applaud him by adding emphatically, "He stuck to the facts." One would like to recommend the works of William James, especially *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* for Mr. Cuningham's edification on the problem of factuality and regeneration.

Even though Dwight may have laid no claim to profound metaphysical insight, the fact remains that theory affects practice, willy-nilly. The upshot was that his first principles were bogged down by uncriticized prejudices which in turn influenced his ethical and social views. While he was examining the deistical writings, which he set himself to combat, Dwight also looked into the "loose moral principles of Kant"—a little fact which gives some inkling of Dwight's prejudicial method of thinking and which passes unnoticed by Cuningham. His own contribution to New England theology was a "system of duties," a complete system of practical ethics. They are based on the two great commandments upon which all others are dependent. He found "that virtue is founded in utility," and he proceeded to treat the effects of the second command-

ment upon personal happiness and public welfare: "a tendency to produce happiness constitutes the excellence and value of virtue." Happiness is the only "ultimate good"; and the only "original cause" of happiness is virtue. As anyone familiar with the subject knows this is a complete travesty of Edwardean theology; and Dwight claimed to be a follower of his illustrious grandfather. Haroutunian has shown that it was this kind of thinking which led to the complete breakdown of a vital Calvinistic and Edwardean piety, ending up in Unitarian moralism. But Unitarian moralism at least was liberating, whereas Dwight's type was not. Utility and practice may have been his standard; but his conception of utility was rigidly preconceived and, as far as he was concerned, beyond criticism. Certainly he had little use for experimentalism, the only way to test utility. The upshot was that a whole social ethos was foisted on a people by means of a theological dogmatism which was for the most part accepted without question.

The fact that this last sentence is not an exaggeration is testified to by Cuningham himself. He compares Dwight to his grandfather as a theologian saying that Edwards died without having worked out a complete theological system, whereas Dwight, if less original as a theologian, "formed a complete system of theology, so clearly stated and so practical in its approach to complicated issues that it long remained a standard here and abroad." He quotes Leonard Bacon who said, in 1859, that Dwight had left to all evangelical churches using the English language "the only System of Theology that ever has become in two hemispheres a popular religious classic." And Cuningham concludes, "Altogether, in the breadth and effectiveness of his influence, Dwight may be credited fairly with having surpassed the record of his theological grandfather." One might as well compare Dale Carnegie and Alfred North Whitehead. Qualitatively considered, the fact is that Edwards' pages live and breathe even today, whereas Dwight's *Theology: Explained and Defended* is dull except for maddening passages of arrogant stupidity, and this is not to be attributed entirely to the fact that Dwight's medium was the spoken rather than the written work.

However, Cuningham is correct in making a quantitative comparison, even though he fails to see its true significance. Dwight did have tremendous influence, and it was his type of thinking that contributed to the generally held social views which identified Christianity, capital-

ism, and American bourgeois mores. Many buttressing quotations could be easily gleaned from Dwight's writings by the most casual reader. And it was partly because he was such a "good upright man," so much beloved and so enthusiastically received as a popular speaker and writer, that he had such an effect upon the thinking of a large section of American Christianity. While it may be more accurate to say that Dwight represents a type than was himself a cause, there is no doubt he had great influence in perpetuating the type. In either case he is important. Dr. W. W. Rockwell, the recently retired librarian of Union Theological Seminary, said within the hearing of this reviewer that Timothy Dwight's sermons were precisely the kind he heard in his boyhood throughout New England. It was this type of thinking that the original Social Gospel advocates set themselves to combat. It still prevails in many parts of our country. Liston Pope, in his recently published *Millhands and Preachers: A Study of Gastonia,* shows that the ministers of Gaston County still think in this manner. He says of the ministers in regard to their siding with the millowners in a strike situation,

> None of them, apparently, suspected that they might be instruments used for ulterior purposes—nor did the superintendent of the mill recognize any such implication. The cultural context in which executives and minsters alike live and work bluntly decrees that making good tire fabrics and good Christians are correlative processes, and the directors of each process have learned that cooperation is profitable to them all.

No doubt Dwight did much to further education as well as his type of religion, and this reviewer has no intention of exaggerating his importance in the latter function at the expense of his contribution to the former. As Cuningham points out, he did much to liberalize the Yale curriculum. Among other interesting details, the author tells a fascinating story of the establishment of the first department of chemistry in this country. However, many of the details—such as the dimensions of Yale's new outhouses—might well have been omitted permitting the author to give space to some of these more general problems connected with Timothy Dwight.

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Desert Saints. By NELS ANDERSON. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, xx + 459 pp. $4.00.

This is a book about the Mormons. It is a sympathetic history of the genesis, development, struggles, and fortunes of the Mormons from the early days at Kirtland, Ohio, to the time of the achievement of statehood by Utah in 1896. The greater portion of the book, however, is devoted, as the name implies, to the Utah period, which began with the entrance of the first Mormon company into the valley of the Great Salt Lake in July 1847. The author is chiefly concerned with the "frontier" portion of that period. This he feels came to an end in the late seventies, coinciding roughly with the death of Brigham Young in 1877. Consequently, all except one chapter of this history of the "Saints" deal with pre-1880 events. The concluding historical chapter covers the period 1880-1896. The first twelve chapters are a progressive historical treatment of the subject. To these are added three chapters treating of Priesthood Government, the United Order and other attempts at co-operative economy in Utah, and with Polygamy, respectively. Finally, there is a chapter on "The Mormon Way of Life." A general bibliography of both published and unpublished materials is given at the end of the book. Footnotes are collected and placed at the end of each chapter.

Desert Saints is a very readable, well-written book. Its object clearly is not that of adding significant new materials or heretofore unknown facts to the history of the Mormons. Neither is it that of reopening for critical examination the various controversial issues in the by now often recounted doings of the Mormons. What the author has given us chiefly is a compact, documented and well-connected chronicle of the Mormon development in the intermountain region between the years 1847-1896. The history chiefly deals with what may be termed the external features of that development. The reader will not find here any extensive exploration of what by contrast may be termed the internal problems, stresses and relations in Mormon life during this period. The internal aspects of problems which became externally evident in such expressions as the "Reformation," the Morrisite incident, the attempted Godbeite reform, and the attempted revival of the United Order are in the main left unexamined. The reader has the feeling that he has not been taken behind the scenes, but has only been given a good seat out in front. This is also true of the opening chapters which deal with the pre-Utah period. Here particularly, the author seems largely content to present what may be

described as the generally orthodox Mormon account. The brief account of Joseph Smith often reads more like a testament of faith than objective history.

The reader will be grateful to Mr. Anderson for his orderly and systematic presentation of his data, and for the large number of illuminating case instances given in the special subject chapters, especially the chapter on Priesthood Government, and also for the attention and amount of detail given to the whole matter of the relations with the Indians. The problems and relations of the Mormons with the United States government are extensively dealt with. The events just preceding, during, and immediately following the "Mormon War" are carefully and well developed. It would have been helpful here if the reader had been given more of an insight into the inner councils of the Mormon leaders during this period, and also, into what really caused them to capitulate. Was it President Buchanan's proclamation of pardon? That in itself could not solve the real problem between the Mormons and the Government. Was it the eleventh hour realization by Brigham Young that, despite their fanatical determination, his people could not really hope to make a successful stand against the armed forces of the United States? Did he still hope to win by some later strategy?

The whole matter of the controversy and tension between the Mormons and their "Gentile" neighbors, and between the Mormons and the Government tends to be treated with too much of the implication that the situation was one of "sinner and sinned-against." And "Carpetbag Government" seems not a wholly fair term to apply to the government of the Utah Territory by federal appointees during the years 1858-1862. Several, at least, of the appointees during that period were able men not unsympathetic in their attitude toward the Mormons and their problems. Administration of their duties had, at best, to be attempted in the midst of an admittedly tense and difficult situation. The Mormons and their leaders were sharply antagonistic to the whole idea of having "Gentile" administrators sent into Utah. Any administrator thus sent was promptly faced with a closely-knit hostile opposition. He found that he could not function with normal authority because the Mormon leaders were determined that they alone were going to do the real governing. Though Mr. Anderson does not point this out, Brigham Young's handling of the situation leading up to the "Mormon War" incident would seem to disclose on his part a lack of vision and of fundamental

appreciation of the realities involved. Great hardship, thereby, was occasioned for many of the faithful "Saints" by his order to abandon the outlying settlements and "gather" in the valley to help defend Zion against the threatened invasion by the "Gentile" army.

The concluding historical chapter of *Desert Saints* (ch. 12) is concerned with the losing struggle of the Mormon leaders with the United States Government. This struggle is portrayed chiefly in terms of the polygamy issue. The author states that the pressing problem was polygamy. But probably the deeper problem was the continuing one of struggle for control, with the "Gentiles" using the polygamy issue as their most effective available weapon for breaking down the one-time practically complete authority of the church leaders over all secular as well as religious affairs in Utah. The deepening struggle is carefully and clearly portrayed. The climax came in May 1890, when the United States Supreme Court upheld the Edmunds-Tucker law of 1887. This law had abolished the Mormon Church as a corporation and directed the escheating of all church property except the houses of worship. The church leaders now knew that the crossroads had been reached. Either polygamy had to be given up or else the Church's political and financial power in Utah was at an end. The Church capitulated in September with the issuing of the now famous Woodruff Manifesto. Mr. Anderson also discusses polygamy in a later special chapter. He maintains that polygamy among the Mormons was "essentially a political expedient for speeding the rapid growth of Zion." However, no proof to substantiate this judgment is presented. Certainly the great body of Mormons did not thus regard polygamy. Likewise, polygamy with Mormons was not centrally a matter of sex, despite the fact that sex was made a criterion for eligibility to positions of religious leadership and authority. Such positions were reserved to the male sex. Also, the degree of spiritual "glory" to which a woman might aspire was determined by her paternal or marital relationships. A Mormon male might, by virtue of the institution of polygamy, hope to become the recognized father of more children, and thus enlarge his spiritual "kingdom," but this was an individual religious matter and not one of political expediency. The Mormon church found it necessary for political reasons to abandon the practice of polygamy, but it still remains one of its religious tenets, never having been officially denied or repudiated. If, as Mr. Anderson's judgment implies, the leaders of Mormonism in Utah publically proclaimed

the revelation concerning plural marriage for reasons of political expediency, the reader may properly feel entitled to be presented with the grounds supporting this judgment.

Mormon efforts in co-operative economy are treated in a special chapter. The author terms these ventures an "Economy of Faith and Plenty." But, as his text indicates, the modified United Order ventures in Utah did not result in "plenty," and the "faith" grew weak. Brigham Young, in 1874, launched the second Mormon effort to establish the United Order, though he himself apparently did not have faith enough in it to cause him to communalize any of his own property. Mr. Anderson says that, "Basically, the United Order was designed to integrate and implement the co-operative security program of Zion." It might have been pointed out that a more immediate reason may have been that of attempting to consolidate the authority and control of the church over its members; a control that was here and there beginning to weaken due to the increase in individual wealth of many members, and to the increasing "Gentile" population and influence.

Mr. Anderson indicates that he had wide access to extensive records of Mormon community and family life covering a score or more communities, and that what was initially contemplated was a concentrated study of Mormon community and family life. Apparently the early plan was set aside in favor of the more general study which *Desert Saints* represents. It is to be hoped that a documentary and analytical study of intimate Mormon community and family life still will be made. Such a study would be extremly helpful toward a larger understanding and appreciation of this remarkable and important segment of American life and religion.

There existed, and for that matter still exists, a quite definite Mormon "Way of Life." Undoubtedly there existed an equally definite basis for it. This the author leaves essentially untouched. This is understandable because it might well become a sufficient study itself. A few conclusions are ventured in the final chapter, however, regarding which the critical reader will feel the desire for fuller evidence. The author, for example, raises the question as to what was the difference between a Mormon family and a non-Mormon family, and concludes that, "If there was any difference, it was that the Mormon church had embarked on a systematic program for building Zion by imposing upon the family a greater devotion to the First Commandment. It was this greater emphasis that

justified polygamy." It is a bit difficult to find a convincing justification of polygamy in a mere increase in emphasis upon the commandment, "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me," or to see how such emphasis would contribute toward making a Mormon family any different from any other family that sincerely subscribed to fidelity to one God. Equally questionable is the implied suggestion in the contrasting pictures presented of the Mormon community of St. George and the "Gentile" community of Silver Reef. The suggestion seems to be that the glaring moral contrast between these two communities is a legitimate contrast between Mormon and "Gentile" morality. Without in any way questioning the fact of the general high-level average of civic-domestic morality of the Mormon communities the reader will raise the question whether or not a like contrast might not well be expected, and found, between a roaring mining town and an agricultural, settled family community both of which were completely "Gentile."

There has long existed a need for a clear, compact, and well-written history of the Mormons in the Utah period. *Desert Saints* is by far the best such history that has been published. Most other accounts of this period have either been poorly organized, lacking in documentation, or else presented from a too prominently biased (pro or con) point of view. Though the writer of this book cannot be said to have succeeded in presenting a wholly impartial account, he certainly has not erred as much as others before him. In this book the reader now has between two covers the best available secular history of the Utah Mormons.

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Millhands and Preachers: A Study of Gastonia. By Liston Pope. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942. xvi + 369 pp. $4.00.

This volume is a valuable addition to the growing body of literature on the social and economic aspects of industrialization in the South. But it is more than a purely regional study. Certain issues raised by the author's materials and his interpretation of them are universal in whatever area and time the institutions of an agricultural section are molded to fit the demands of the new production techniques and patterns of life of modern industrialism.

The author has limited his field of study to the interactions of re-

ligious and economic institutions. He has selected for intensive study of the problem a specific county in one of the most concentrated textile areas in North Carolina—Gaston County. In the old days, this area was not affected directly by the plantation economy prevalent further in the deep South. Up until 1880, it was predominantly a section of independent farmers. It is now the center of the combed yarn division of the textile industry, manufacturing 80% of the combed yarn produced in the United States, and claiming, in 1939, to have a larger number of textile plants than any other county in the world. In the words of the author, it is "a compact, managable situation in which economic institutions have undergone drastic change recently enough to allow direct observation of the part played by religious institutions in the process."

In the preface, the author suggests a series of possible relations between the two types of institutions. The relation might be *dynamic.* That is, the churches might be a source of economic change, or a product of prior economic change. The relation might be *static,* the church sanctioning the prevailing economic arrangement, or acting as an antagonist to them. The relation might be *purposive—functional,* exhibiting an indifference to the economic sphere, or actually operating in so remote an atmosphere that no contact with economic reality is established. In this generalized frame of reference, the specific materials are presented.

The book is divided into three main parts. The first deals with the development of the mills and the churches. Part of that story is purely historical. It relates the efforts of a local business community to raise capital and build mills. The activities of churchmen—a few ministers and a large number of prominent laymen—constitute a significant part of the history. The churches definitely stimulated and encouraged mill building. It describes also the development of the churches, almost exclusively Protestant, during the same span of years.

The other part of the historical story is analytical and is, perhaps, the most interesting section of the book. As the mills grew and prospered, wealth was created. New social classes were by-products of this process. In response to the emergence of social-economic classes, the churches became class churches. They tended to come more and more under the control of the dominant economic group in the towns, the mill workers receiving mostly the crumbs that fall from the church tables. Those denominations to which the bulk of the owning and managerial groups belong (Presbyterian and Lutheran) appear to have moved further

away. Others which aspire to a less high economic scale (Methodist and Baptist) maintain somewhat closer contact. The author explains the great influence of the new religious sects on the grounds that the older groups have, in their later phases, little to offer the humble cotton mill hand. Hence, the workers turn to the more simple and emotional offering of the Holy Rollers and other sects.

The second part of the book is entitled *Modes of Control.* It deals with the mechanisms which have been evolved to formalize the relations of the churches and the mills. Since the large majority of the mill workers live in company-owned villages, the churches which exist in them are dependent on the good-will of the management and, more essentially, on the financial support given by the corporations. This control is varied in its obvious manifestations, but is an ever present reality. It takes the form usually of gifts of land, buildings, hand-outs for extras, and subsidy of the minister's salary. It follows clearly that the churches are, therefore, not likely to assume an independent attitude on any social question, particularly one so pointed as the conditions of work in the mills. The uptown churches are likewise inclined to give their blessings to the industrial *status quo.*

The third part of the work describes the impact of the 1929 strike. Since that upheaval was under the leadership of Communist organizers, who challenged both the economic and religious institutions of the community, and who succeeded, for a time at least, in gaining a large following, it is presented as a clash of cultures. The most radical of political and economic philosophy impinged on a highly industrialized community, but a community in which the religious and social mores still bore the stamp of an agricultural background.

To the social scientist this range of material and the excellent presentation of it is suggestive and illuminating. It opens up many related problems which might be pursued further. To the student of religious institutions and to those who profess faith in the transforming qualities of religion, the picture is a dismal one. Although the author does not take a position of an economic determinist, most of his materials point in that direction. As he sees the issues, "the economic factors have more nearly shaped religious institutions than been shaped by them." The ministry is both uninformed and apparently unconscious of the momentous social issues surrounding them. This is as true apparently of the "educated" ministry as of the lay preachers. Some of the latter are

more close to the mill hands in economic station, so they manifest a more sympathetic attitude in some instances. When the strike leaders were tried for murder in connection with the shooting of a police officer, their religious beliefs were brought into the proceedings in establishing creditability of witnesses. This throw-back was not protested by the ministry. In summarizing the position of the ministry, the author states (though, he says, somewhat too sharply for complete accuracy) that

> in the cultural crisis of 1929, the Gastonia ministers revealed that their economic ethicways were products of the economic system in which they lived, with no serious modification by any transcendant economic or religious standard. They were willing to allow the power of religious institutions to be used against those who challenged this economic system and themselves assisted in such use. In no significant respect was their role productive of change in economic life.

In the intricate processes of social change, it would appear from the evidence that the organized forces of religion exerted a negligible influence in shaping the direction of events. Indeed, in the later phases, those forces made no concerted effort to do more than echo the objectives and methods of the dominant economic class.

In spite of the discouraging picture presented, the author is not entirely pessimistic regarding the future influence of the churches. He suggests that "the churches can become effective instruments of economic regulation only if they achieve larger structural independence and cultural transcendence from the economic institutions of the county." The reader is left with an impression that this may, in some way or another, be a possibility.

The book is a scholarly treatment, interestingly written and might well be required reading for those interested in the application of the social gospel.

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Christianity in Peril: The New Order and the Churches. By Andrew R. Osborn. New York: Oxford Universtiy Press, 1942. viii + 188 pp. $2.00.

As the title indicates, this book is a penetrating analysis of the present peril to Christianity, and a challenging appeal to the churches to meet

and overcome it by gaining a fresh and vigorous vitality. In its full implications, as the treatment shows, this means that the peril is one that threatens our entire civilization, and that the prospect of achieving a new and finer world in which to live depends upon a renewal and an expansion of basic spiritual convictions, essentially religious in their nature, to give direction to human activity and to set before men the goal. For as is increasingly recognized, the values which are now at stake, such as the worth and the rights of the individual, the belief in freedom, the supremacy of the moral law, the standard of greatness measured in terms of human service, the unity of mankind—these are all in their origin and foundation religious convictions, and unless they are strengthened, civilization can neither survive nor advance.

Thus this book by Dr. Osborn is of the first importance. What it deals with is of vital concern to every person, whether an avowed believer in Christianity, a church member, or not, though it does impress the special obligations resting on those who are adherents.

Further, it is a book which comes to grips with actualities. In the full sense of the word, it is "realistic." There is no side-stepping of facts nor reluctance to face things as they are. But it is no less realistic in pointing out the presence and the resources of spiritual forces of unlimited creative potency which, as men perceive and lay hold of them, can transform outward conditions and lead on to greater achievements. Also, the author's style is graphic and easily readable. Drawing upon a wide range of scholarly knowledge, he is able to give clear summaries, with frequent concrete illustrations taken from daily experience.

"The purpose of this book," as stated by Dr. Osborn, "is to set forth in as simple and untechnical language as possible the reasons for the decline of the church, the essential meaning and certainty of Christian faith, and the ways in which the various branches of the church must be reorganized if they are to take a position of leadership in the new order" (p. viii). The viewpoint is predominantly Protestant. While Dr. Osborn feels that the Roman Catholic Church is "too much bound by tradition" to have the place of leadership—a statement to which Roman Catholics would certainly take exception—he is appreciative of the advantage possessed by that Church in its centralized government, of the high value of some of the papal encyclicals, and of the significance of such movements as the "Sword of the Spirit," in whose aims and meetings Roman Catholics and Protestants have shared (pp. 136, 137).

In Protestantism the chief defect seen is that "it is sick and has lost initiative." As a member of that portion of Christianity, Dr. Osborn frankly says, "The fault does not lie in lack of opportunity, but in ourselves. For success in any enterprise there must be clear ideas, definite aims, imagination, driving power, and faith. These things are lacking in our modern churches. We live in a great creative era, but we have ceased to be creative" (p. 9, cf. p. 178). Various causes are examined to account for this lack of creative power. Modern science "has opened up a view of the universe and of man radically different in many respects from the concepts of former days" (p. 31). Revival methods which as one time employed were of uneven value, no longer appeal; and "an emotional drive which lacks a solid intellectual and moral basis is liable to degenerate into empty sentimentalism, and may end even in complete apathy" (p. 23, cf. p. 27). Biblical scholarship has shown the Bible to be the record of a long historical process, and not a verbally dictated book. If some of the statements in this chapter (II) seem too sweeping, particularly as to the effect of science and of biblical scholarship, they are to be balanced by what is said of the constructive bearing of these factors later (cf. pp. 87 ff., 107, 110, 122, 144).

The primary cause of apathy and ineffectiveness is doubt (pp. 27, 38, Ch. II). That is, there is the absence of a vital, creative faith. To attain this faith is therefore the imperative and essential need. For "the Christian creed is not a static formula, but a living and ever growing faith" (p. 129). "Christianity always has been and must always be the religion of a new order. It is not a formal acknowledgment of stated creeds, but a living faith in the power of God working creatively in the ways of men" (p. 124).

With a recognition of the peril to Christianity, and to civilization also, "the first step toward spiritual recovery," which it is repeatedly urged should be taken by the churches, "must be the restating of their faith in vital concepts" (p. 73). "The creed needed by the church today is one which fulfils in its living, growing faith the essential elements in the historic faith of Christendom . . ." (p. 155). The present lack of spiritual energy and purpose "will not begin to mend until members of the churches accept the task of restating their faith in the clear and vital ideas and language of our day" (p. 155). "When we consider it, every great religious reformation has been a process of reinterpretation . . ." (p. 13).

In view of this necessity, a chapter is devoted to the Christian Idea of God, (ch. v), in which Dr. Osborn shows a fine ability to do constructive thinking. "The structure of Christianity rests upon the unqualified acceptance by its members of three cardinal truths—the reality of God, a redemptive process in history with its focus in the work of Christ, and the actuality of a future life" (p. 73). These are the basic beliefs which need to be restated "in dynamic vital language."

God is the Ultimate Ground for belief in the reality of the spiritual universe, in the moral law, in the freedom of life with man's creative capacity, and in the final triumph of righteousness and peace. It is belief in God which is in direct opposition to all materialistic interpretations of life and of the universe, which lead to despair (pp. 104, 126, 127). It stands against the claims of totalitarianism which now menaces the world, which recognizes no power higher than man, with no moral law to be held sacred and inviolate, but asserts that the state or the one race is the sole end to be served, and seeks conquest and dominion by force.

In discussing what faith in God means, Dr. Osborn pertinently warns of the confusion which results from associating erroneous ideas with the word "God" (pp. 79 ff.). This is illustrated in the case of Dr. Einstein, who disavowed belief in a personal God but affirmed belief in religion, and spoke of "the grandeur of reason incarnate in existence, which in its profoundest depths is inaccessible to man" (cited, p. 91, cf. pp. 87 ff.). This is to ignore the highest conceptions of God as Spirit and Creative Reason in Both Hebrew and Christian teaching (p. 93, cf. p. 119).

The chapter on "History, Jesus, and the Future Life" is an illuminative exposition. "What the church needs is to rediscover the meaning and purpose of the power of God in history and to renew its allegiance to the Christ, who is at once the Jesus of history and the desire of all the ages" (p. 124).

Other chapters, on "Prophets and Wise Men" whose zeal for God must be according to knowledge, on "Church Union," "Religious Education," "Social Action," "Reorganizing the Church for Efficiency," are replete with stimulating insights and practical recommendations. Readers may differ as to the measures proposed, but the author's object will be attained as they awaken men to the necessity of facing the question with which the book closes: "There exists a state of unlimited spiritual emergency; what will the Christian churches do?"

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The Christian Criticism of Life. By Lynn Harold Hough. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1941. 312 pp. $2.50.

Patterns of the Mind. By Lynn Harold Hough. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942. 135 pp. $1.50.

Sainte-Beuve once said that nothing resembles a hollow as much as a swelling. In some measure this dictum describes the shift represented in Dean Hough's own point of view after the publication of his influential volume, *Evangelical Humanism,* in 1925. Beginning with a pained awareness of the provincial character of the American Protestantism of the Social Gospel era Dean Hough, early in his career, set out to enrich the American Protestant mentality by expounding and interpreting the all too little appreciated riches of traditional humanism, both ancient and modern. As a consequence he has brought to bear upon American Protestantism an urbane, cosmopolitan criticism, and he has done much to give it a broadened perspective. But this has been accomplished at a price.

Largely due to the influence upon him of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, and also of the anti-Protestant, if not non-evangelical, thought of writers like Gilson, Maritain, and Dawson, he has given a great deal of attention to the various traditions of humanism and less searching attention to the *prophetic* and evangelical traditions of Protestantism. Indeed, he seems not to have shared the revived interest in the principles of radical Protestantism, an interest so characteristic of the theological writings of the past two or three decades. Hence, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the title of Dean Hough's 1925 volume was prophetic of the later trend of his thought, in the sense that the "evangelical" element seems often to have become adjectival and the humanist—anti-humanitarian and non-prophetic—tendency seems at times to have become the substantive element. I say it is hardly an exaggeration, for it may well be that the Dean has not actually become less "evangelical" in his outlook; he may only have become more imbued with the ideas of a socially conservative humanism. But, if in his early writings he set out to broaden the cultural horizons of American Protestantism, we may say that in his later publications there is more evidence of "literary humanism" than of a profound deepening of his evangelicism and his Protestantism, especially as they affect the social implications of a "Christian criticism of life." What was originally a hollow is thus in danger of becoming a swelling. And a corollary of this

is that the "Christian criticism of life" here offered represents an attempt to merge two trends of thought which are not amenable to eclectic devices,—evangelical Christianity and "humanist" criticism. Hence, the decisive impact of the former upon the latter is not fully appreciated. Indeed, the first two-thirds of each of the volumes here under review has little directly to do with Christianity, and where *The Christian Criticism of Life* touches on Protestantism we find the material definitely superficial.

In the more recently published volume, *Patterns of the Mind,* the author discusses the defects of romanticism and of various forms of scientism as patterns for the criticism of life, and the volume concludes with an eloquent, though truncated, presentation of certain basic motifs of Christian theology.

In *The Christian Criticism of Life,* the first chapters trace the humanist movement from its flowering in ancient Athens on down through the Renaissance, and this tradition is again returned to in the later chapters on Babbitt and More. In the intervening chapters, the author sets forth his own conception of humanism and offers a criticism of modern science, of non-theistic humanism, and of certain aspects of industrialism. He defines humanism as the control of life through intelligence, and he holds that a consistent humanism will be theistic. Much is made of Babbitt's and More's rather wooden distinction between the sub-human, the human, and the divine levels of existence and meaning. All of this discussion serves as a preparation for the presentation of a doctrine of the incarnation which rounds out the picture into "a gracious completeness and a perfect harmony." "This corpus of thought," we are told, "is held in common by the Greek and Latin communions, and by the great state churches and the free churches of the Protestant world. It unites the Neo-Thomists in the Roman Catholic Church with the representatives of classic Christianity in any Protestant communion"! Thus the author overlooks the deep cleavages that exist between Thomism and radical Protestantism. (One is reminded here of Archbishop Temple's statement in his 1941 Malvern Conference address, that Maritain injects into Thomism "a large dose of what is most characteristic of the Renascence and the Reformation—appreciation of individual personality. . . . But his concern for personality is vastly greater than that of St. Thomas in the whole perspective of doctrine.")

This sort of eclectic method perverts not only much that Dr. Hough says of Christian doctrine but also much that he says of humanism. Hence, the volume is replete with vague and dubious generalizations concerning Greek thought, medieval thought, Protestantism, Neo-Thomism, and humanism (the latter being a "construct" derived from Irving Babbitt, who is here baptized into Christian humanism). Moreover, the author's penchant for purple passages and for generalities about "standards," "critical intelligence," "sound thinking," and "urbanity," as well as his apparently calm sense of security in the face of the present crisis of the Christian churches and of Western culture, yield the impression that he dwells in any ivory tower where he can maintain his *sprezzatura* and a certain patronizing attitude toward the social prophetism that takes the crisis seriously. One may concede that without urbanity religion becomes barbarous, but one should not forget (as Spengler once suggested) that urbanity can kill Christianity.

In all this the author has been influenced by certain of the literary humanists in such a way as to anesthetize the sense of the abyss of meaning symbolized in those prophetic proclamations that disturb and shatter the securities of any sort of humanism, "Christian," Catholic, or pagan. Consequently, not only modern civilization in general, but also humanism and the Christian "religion," are viewed with a complacence all too reminiscent of the superficial Arnoldian attempt to see life steadily and see it whole. God is viewed as a perfect controlling intelligence, and man who is made in His image is exhorted to achieve "vital control." As with Babbitt and More, "vital control" turns out to be a sort of ideology: it provides a smokescreen for the sin of the human creature in his idolatry before the best that has been thought and said and before the *status quo* in economic and social relations. Thus it ends in the very moralism and undisturbed security against which prophetic criticism has had to struggle in all ages. Although this humanism of "vital control" is oriented by Dr. Hough to the higher third level of the divine, and although the cross is said to be central in life, there is something here that suggests a preoccupation with urbane conversation and tooled-leather bindings. And meanwhile, the modern man and the modern Christian remain lost in the waste land, waiting for a Christian criticism of life that will not only elicit a compelling vision of the Holy and of the sins that so easily beset us, but that will also attack in a specific and

earnest fashion the social and spiritual idolatries and complacencies both of the Christian humanists and of those for whom "the Christian criticism of life" is intended.

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The Logic of Belief. By D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1942. xii + 327 pp. $2.75.

Elton Trueblood has written "an introduction to the philosophy of religion" which has value as a text book, as a general introduction for the lay reader, and as an additional statement of his own position. As a text book and general introduction, it is a clearly written presentation of the logic of belief in God, with adequate illustrations and interesting style. As an enrichment of the empirical method in religious knowledge, it has many values and a few weaknesses.

Dr. Trueblood writes that his background comes from three sources: Dean Sperry, Professor Lovejoy, and Professor Rufus Jones. To this has been added the Gifford Lectures of the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, who appears most often in the footnotes (twenty-one times).

Part I deals with "The Structure of Belief." The author makes a valued distinction between subjective and objective knowledge. The former we can know for certain, but the latter always contains the possibility of error. "The existence of God cannot be demonstrated beyond a shadow of doubt for the simple reason that religious belief refers to something objectively real" (p. 36). After an analysis of the nature of evidence and the necessity of faith, he concludes that we are faced with a choice of faiths. "All faith is suprarational, but it need not be irrational or antirational. A great part of the discipline of philosophy is concerned with discrimination between competing faiths. . . . The great question becomes, '*Which* faith?' " (p. 65). This brings up the whole question of authority, which the author answers in a well-balanced chapter on "The Authority of Disciplined Insight," reflecting his Quaker inheritance but finding resources also in established authority, and especially in the authority of Jesus Christ.

In Part II he deals with contemporary naturalism, and concludes with

a statement concerning "Theistic Realism" in which he traces in a suggestive way the development of the Hebrew-Christian tradition, touches briefly the value of other religions, and states his method for the remainder of the book.

We find in Part III an exhaustive treatment of the empirical approach to knowledge of God, through nature, moral experience, aesthetic experience, religious experience, and history. This may not convince the irreligious person, but it sheds light on and gives a basis for belief for those who are prejudiced in favor of theism to begin with. The cumulative effect of these arguments becomes well-nigh irresistible.

Dr. Trueblood finds four areas of difficulty of belief and, in Part IV, he faces honestly and bluntly the problems of natural selection, wishful thinking, natural law, and evil. Concerning evil, he compares several representative thinkers from different traditions and claims "they actually hold that God is limited, but limited in a special way, that He is limited by the conditions of goodness. This may not be the best possible world, but it is, so far as we can see, the only kind of world consistent with the Purpose we dimly glimpse" (p. 296). This at least "absolves God of the authorship of evil; it gives a rational account of why evil is necessary, and it avoids extreme finitism by showing that the limitation is inherent in God's own character, rather than in some intractable area outside God's power" (p. 300). But this only explains moral evil, and natural evil remains a much harder problem which can be explained only by reference to God's purposes which we do not understand, to immortality, and to the practical task of overcoming natural evil. This leads to what is almost an appendix to the main argument, to the problem of the survival of personal individuality, which is based on faith in God as one who will not destroy what is fundamentally precious to him.

The one serious defect of this book is its one-sided treatment of naturalism. He refers briefly to James Bissett Pratt's use of the term, and then goes on to describe the naïve naturalism of some scientists as the basis for his criticism. While this avoids any misunderstanding of his purpose in these two chapters, it eliminates entirely the treatment of modern naturalistic theism represented by such empiricists as Pratt, Henry Nelson Wieman, Bernard Eugene Meland, and Harold A. Bosley. While the word, "naturalism," may not be adequate and may prove confusing to those who think of naturalism in more naïve terms, its use has become widespread among a group of "naturalistic theists."

Dr. Trueblood's appeal to leading empiricists is limited by his elimination of the empirical naturalists on the one hand, and the American empiricists on the other (Douglas C. Macintosh, for example). This leads to his reliance on more mystical types of awareness which may not be entirely convincing to the modern mind. His use of the term, "scientific" (p. 138), in his empiricism may prove misleading, although he has guarded against misunderstanding by saying that we "examine theistic faith *as* [we] *examine a scientific hypothesis.*"

These are really minor criticisms of a fine book. The type of naturalism he decries is the type that many students will find in the university curriculum. His empiricism is well-rounded without appealing to the naturalistic theists and the non-mystical American empiricists. We are grateful for his discriminating use of the thought of Archbishop Temple. The volume is a worthy successor to his *The Knowledge of God* and *The Essence of Spiritual Religion.*

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An Appraisal of the Protocols of Zion. By JOHN S. CURTISS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. xi + 118 pp. $1.00.

This little volume contains a careful study of the Protocols of Zion, that strange work which has played such an important part in the stirring up of anti-Semitic feeling in the modern world, and the approval of its conclusions by a distinguished company of American historians. It is high time that the Protocols were subjected to the scrutiny of a trained historian, and we must be very grateful to the author and the sponsors of the book.

The careful analysis of Dr. Curtiss shows very definitely that there is no clear and definite road connecting the text of the Protocols as we have them with any recognized Jewish leaders at any time around the beginning of the twentieth century. Every attempt that has been made to do this has met with unqualified failure, or has been immeshed in a tissue of easily exposed lies, and we can fully accept the final statement of the sponsoring committee describing the work as "completely destructive of the historicity of the Protocols and as establishing beyond doubt the fact that they are rank and pernicious forgeries" (p. vi).

The text of the Protocols remain, and their source is still not clearly indicated. There is less general agreement as to where or when or by

whom the forgery and compilation took place, and these are subjects that are of real interest, particularly at the present time.

The world took lightly the ravings of *Mein Kampf* with all of its inaccuracies and fake science, but too large a part of the human race has swallowed the Protocols for us to dismiss them lightly, even after we have eliminated the Jewish element in them. Dr. Curtiss himself shows that Joly's *Dialogue aux enfers* was extensively but not exclusively used in their composition, and he suggests still other sources. A few comments then may be in place.

In such a work the question of the text is important, and this is wrapped in mystery. Were they originally written in French and then translated into Russian? A careful study of the two texts by Nilus and Butmi might throw some light on the original language, if there was one. It is not inconceivable that some grammatical or stylistic peculiarity might be found which would clear up this important point, particularly in view of the liberal use of material from Joly.

It is of interest also that Goedsche, in 1868, dealt with a Jewish plot to control the world in his novel, *Biarritz* (p. 64). By February 1870, after the Nechayev case, Dostoyevsky was working on *The Possessed,* in which he analyzed the principles of revolution as he saw them. It is to be noted that in this novel the revolutionary leader, Petr Stepanovich Verkhovensky, outlines plans for a revolution which was to be ended and order restored by the sending out into the world of a man-god Stavrogin, who was to be decked out in the mystical colors of a religious leader and a holy man. His technique of spreading debauchery, and his belief that large masses of liberals and conservatives alike would disintegrate the faith and allegiance of the people is, perhaps, similar to the ideas of the Protocols, and it is to be noted that apart from one or two passing references to Jews, the leaders of the movement were not of that race or religion. Whether we are dealing here with original ideas of the Russian novelist or whether we can trace these ideas to an older source which may be related to the original form of the Protocols is a subject worthy of investigation.

At all events, Dostoyevsky and Vladimir Soloviev went at least once to the Optyna Pustyn', where Du Chayla met Nilus in 1909 and saw the text of the Protocols (p. 69). It is perhaps hardly likely that Soloviev's *Three Conversations* had too much influence on the work, as his own interest was very different; he was interested in the delineation of an

ideal Christian state and the dangers of an Antichrist drawn strictly in accordance with the traditional Christian philosophy of Antichrist, with the addition of the fact that Antichrist brings about human happiness and is only revealed by his failure to recognize the truth of the Creed. Soon after Monsignor Robert Hugh Benson, in *The Lord of the World,* expressed a Western attitude toward the same story. It is interesting also that Nilus seems to have published a book on Antichrist in Russian religious thought.

We might also mention Valery Bryusov's *Republic of the Southern Cross,* which appeared in 1904, and *The Earth,* a drama of the end of the world which appeared about 1907, but which he consciously referred back to 1890 when such ideas first appeared to him. In both cases, the secret police of the Republic and the Order of Liberators are not too far removed from the Elders of Zion in their methods of action.

Dr. Curtiss makes much (pp. 41 f.) of the fact that the world condition in 1897 did not justify the language used in the Protocols. It was, however, a strange fact that Soloviev's *Three Conversations* appeared in 1900, and that the forces that were later manifested in the Religio-Philosophical meetings in St. Petersburg and emphasized an approaching chaos were already in motion, and were even at their height when the Protocols were published by Krushevan in 1903 (p. 2). World conditions had not changed too materially by that time, although a mood of mystical depression was already evident in St. Petersburg. Dr. Curtiss in a way recognizes this when he mentions the attitude of Butmi in his opposition to gold and his unorthodox theories on money (p. 68).

It is of extreme interest that none of this mass of cynical utopian material can be definitely connected with Judaism or the Jews, although Nilus and his followers were tremendously interested in Antichrist and the dangers to the then world order, which were not visible to the less mystical and more practical leaders of Russia. It is, however, probably drawn from the same mine as the philosophy of the Protocols, and a study of this material, with an analysis of the language as we find it in the Russian texts, might cast some more light upon the origin and development of this mysterious text which has had such devastating results in modern history. It might reveal much that is of general interest.

Clarence A. Manning

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Essays on Antisemitism. Edited by KOPPEL S. PINSON. New York: Conference on Jewish Relations, 1942. xi + 202 pp. $2.00.

Anti-Semitism has become one of the most fateful phenomena of our revolutionary epoch. In Europe millions of people of different social and cultural levels are constantly threatened with mental and physical destruction, after suffering unimaginable tortures, only because they are Jews or of Jewish descent. This means that anti-Semitism has assumed its most virulent and destructive form after a period of comparatively milder expression. From the standpoint of social ethics we must emphasize such unveiled savagery, for it makes the whole phenomenon obvious to all, and excludes the kind of suppression or denial of facts which has occurred in former epochs.

The Conference on Jewish Relations, by reopening the scientific discussion of anti-Semitism, has performed a useful service. The eleven essays published under their auspices make interesting reading. They treat the complicated phenomenon from different points of view, and do not attempt to give final results, but only suggestions for a deeper and more complete investigation. Characteristically enough, the major portion of the book is devoted to historical and regional studies, while the analytical section contains only four rather short essays. The calm, objective attitude of the authors, all of whom are Jews, is a welcome contrast to the partisanship usually displayed even in scientific discussions of such burning questions. Yet at the present moment it is almost impossible to keep oneself free from emotion when every day brings news of such large-scale atrocities and incredible cruelties that the imagination can scarcely grasp the actual facts.

A thorough knowledge of history is fundamental to any serious analysis of anti-Semitism. Strangely enough, knowledge of these facts is not part of the educational background of cultivated people of our time. The average Gentile who knows, perhaps, a good deal about Aztec civilization, may have only the vaguest idea of the history of the Jews. And even a good many Jewish scholars enjoying the rights of citizenship in democratic countries do not consider it worth while to devote serious study to the history of their own people. Thus it seems as if the Jewish problem were silently banned from any deeper approach by the concensus of all intelligent people. It is the same attitude which prevailed two decades ago toward the sexual question: fear and shame prevent

people from penetrating into the realm of anti-Jewish feeling, and both Jews and Gentiles seem to think that painful facts can be made to disappear by constantly ignoring them. Indeed, there are vast areas of the globe where Jews have played an important part in the life of the state which are completely, or by no means sufficiently, explored, for example, Latin America, South Africa, and India.

In this book are found some remarkable inquiries concerning the Jews in the Hellenistic world, the Middle Ages, the Islamic cultural area, Czarist Russia, and Poland before the present war, but the reader might ask why those areas were chosen and not, for instance, Rumania, Yugoslavia, France, and especially Germany. The reasons for this are incidental to the symposium form of the collection. Attention should be called to the excellent essays by Dr. Ralph Marcus, on anti-Semitism in Greco-Roman antiquity, and Dr. Samuel Rosenblatt, on the Jews and Islam. Each of these articles adds something new to the knowledge even of the better informed student of the problem. They make the point that even the most barbarous kind of anti-Semitism of the past, in theory and actual persecution appears mild and humane in comparison to the Nazi fury of today.

But no historical or regional study of anti-Semitism gives us the final answer to the crucial question of the actual origin of this bewildering attitude. The sources of anti-Semitism cannot be found in either the purely economic or the purely social sphere, for if they could, how would we explain the fact that the German Jews were persecuted because of their wealth and high social position, whereas the Polish Jews were subjected to the same hostility because of their poverty and low social status? Unfortunately the source lies deeper, for, as popular feeling among the Jews has long recognized, and as the medical psychologist, Dr. I. S. Wechsler, and the late Professor Z. Diesendruck have stressed in this book, when faced by an anti-Semite, a Jew is wrong in whatever he does, in his noble as well as in his evil actions. Whatever he may do, or be, or think, he is despised because he is a Jew. This attitude was denounced at the time of the famous "Emancipation" by one of its most passionate defenders, the German poet, Lessing. In his *Nathan der Weise,* the patriarch is always repeating: "No matter how this might be [meaning, no matter how he behaves], the Jew will be burned." We must, therefore, face the important fact that anti-Semitism is a thoroughly irrational attitude, and consequently cannot be destroyed by

logical reasoning. On the contrary, the more reasons we can find to demonstrate the absurdity, as well as the cruelty, of anti-Semitism, the more will those infected by the virus cling to it as to a *rocher de bronze*. Professor Diesendruck, a subtle philosopher, is right; you cannot convince a person with even the best of reasons, if he does not want to be convinced. (Every salesman can confirm this from his daily experience.)

The consequences of this admission are very far-reaching. If anti-Semitism is a purely irrational attitude, so is the tragic phenomenon which Diesendruck is concerned with, and which has been marvellously described by one of the first Nazi victims, Theodor Lessing, in his *Der Judische Selbsthass* (Berlin, 1930)—Jewish self-hatred, a product of introverted persecution and undissolved inferiority complexes. And we must also recognize that our twentieth-century society is under the influence of obscure superstitions no more reasonable than the totemism and taboos of so-called savages. Consequently our social science must focus its efforts on the dissolution of these irrational residua in order to produce the most rational order of society, a genuine democracy. We have urgent need of a psychological analysis of group attitudes to remove the poison of unconscious prejudices from our social life. A deeper study of the roots of anti-Semitism would help us to discover the real nature of such social-psychological "mechanisms."

I cannot completely agree with Diesendruck when he speaks of the "uniqueness" of the anti-Jewish prejudice. Contempt for the Negro and other colored races is undoubtedly a similar phenomenon, for both attitudes are based on a "failure" of birth. The fact of Negro anti-Semitism proves nothing against such a statement; it is a phenomenon easily explained as a reaction of triumph over a portion of the white "master" race, itself subjected to general contempt. (It is also an unconscious identification with the white master's point of view, similar to that of the Southern Negro's contempt for "poor white trash.") Nor can I subscribe to Diesendruck's refutation of F. Bernstein's attribution of anti-Semitism to the usual group antagonism directed against a socially inferior minority. He declares that the fact that Jews are more feared for their strength than despised for their weakness contradicts such a hypothesis. Here a fine thinker seems to be the victim of a confusion between the social inferiority of a group, on the one hand, and the more or less personal superiority of some of its members, on the other. Just the contrary might be true: group antagonism can arise from the un-

consciously felt contradiction of social contempt for a minority and the annoying fact of intellectual or financial superiority among some of its members.

Unfortunately for our society, the "irrational" and "unsubsumable" may not necessarily be unique, as Diesendruck argues. The sad fact of the strong allurement exerted on the German masses by the preposterous mixture of Nazi theories proves that man, as part of a group, can always be influenced by absurd doctrines presented in a mystical-ecstatic framework. Hitler himself cynically calls the attention of the reader of *Mein Kampf* to this strange phenomenon. In fact, we are obliged to make a radical distinction between individual intelligence and group consciousness, or even group intellect. And then we discover some amazing facts. Not only can the same individual who, in his private life, is directed by high logical and ethical standards, as a "group man" accept irrational concepts and commit criminal acts, but all of us are accustomed to take for granted certain general notions which have their origin in atavistic "force ideas" belonging to certain group complexes. We retain these ideas even when we are alone, and we think according to their pattern whenever certain group conceptions come to mind. Even if their contents are essentially false, only intimate contact with the groups or nations involved is able to dislodge them from our minds.

The mere fact of the existence of anti-Semitism, in its various degrees from more or less harmful "restrictions" to ruthless persecution, reminds us of the need for more adequate investigations in the field of social psychology. A deeper inquiry into the actual roots of this shameful phenomenon must be considered as a preliminary step in that direction, and these essays by distinguished scholars serve the purpose of providing sociology and psychology with many helpful suggestions.

HENRY WALTER BRANN

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BOOK NOTES

Ulladu Narpadu or Sad Vidya. By Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi. Published by Sri Niranjananda Swamy. Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramanasramam, 1942. 56 pp. As. 5.

This booklet, containing the gist of the doctrine of Sri Ramana Maharshi, the living Hindu sage who embodies Vedānta-Yoga enlightenment, ranks foremost among the remarkable publications of the saint's dialogues and teachings, issued by his hermitage at Tiruvannamalai (South India). In a most concentrated and vigorous form these metrical aphorisms convey in Sri Ramana's own words India's perennial Sad Vidya or "Knowledge of Truth," as it was spiritually revived through the sage's experience. In structure and expression the English translation adheres closely to the Tamil original; a synopsis gives concisely the central idea of each of the forty stanzas and serves as a conspectus of the whole treatise. A supplement of forty verses contains selections from Tamil sources and some sixteen more stanzas composed by the Maharshi himself. A sober preface by Grant Duff, dwelling briefly on some of the aphorisms, points out the characteristics of the saint's message and the particular difficulties of this quest from the Western viewpoint. The realisation of the Self, this principal pursuit of Hindu thought from the Vedas down, is expounded with a telling lucidity, with a masterly adequacy which proves these stanzas to be a document of genuine experience.

Henry R. Zimmer

Coptic Texts in the University of Michigan Collection. Edited by William H. Worrell, in collaboration with Elinor M. Husselman, Louise A. Shier, Herbert C. Youtie, Orsamus M. Pearl, Werner Vycichl; with a Study in the Popular Traditions of Coptic by William H. Worrell. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1942. xiii + 375 pp. $5.00.

This latest volume in the *University of Michigan Studies* (Humanistic Series, Vol. xlvi) contains a mixed collection of Coptic texts, some biblical and some non-biblical, some on vellum, some on papyrus, some on ostraca, and some taken down in transcription from living speakers of Coptic, with eleven plates giving specimens of Coptic hands.

The Old Testament texts on vellum, edited by Louise A. Shier, are naturally the section of widest interest, for they provide us with texts of Ruth and Canticles, a badly broken Ecclesiastes, and fragments of Genesis, Jeremiah, and Baruch, which are a welcome addition to our collection of Coptic biblical texts. With one small exception they are in the Sahidic dialect, and seem to follow the Septuagint closely, as one might expect in texts from the late sixth century. The papyrus documents consist of eighteen letters and three acknowledgments of debt, of various assigned dates from the sixth to the twelfth century. The ostraca are dated as coming from the period from the sixth to the twelfth century, and notable among them are eight bills of lading in a clumsy sprawling hand on

pieces of heavily ribbed clay pottery, evidently from the office of some wine merchant, and three little notations of a pious steward's orders for supplies to a monastery kitchen. The *Etmoulon* ostraca, so called from the phrase "to the mill" with which they all end, the seventy-two of which are given a section to themselves, supplement the collections already published by Mallon and Hengstenberg, and are records from some large estate of the seventh century, containing notations of the grain sent to the mill for grinding.

Elinor M. Husselman has an introductory chapter describing the Coptic Papyri Collection in the Library of the University of Michigan, and the final chapter, before the transcriptions of modern texts, is a discussion by the editor and W. Vycichl of the modern traditions among the Copts of Upper Egypt as to the pronunciation of the language. This discussion is in some sense a supplement to Dr. Worrell's earlier volume on *Coptic Sounds* (Ann Arbor, 1934), and a defence of the traditional pronunciation of Coptic against the so-called reform pronunciation, a Graecizing system which for close on a hundred years has had ecclesiastical favor in Egypt. Incidentally, this discussion contains a very useful list of the Coptic words, and Greek words which passed through Coptic, which are still in use in the spoken Arabic of Egypt.

The book has been carefully printed and indexed, and it is encouraging that it is still possible to public such a sumptuous volume in a field of so limited an interest as Coptic, a fact for which we are doubtless indebted to the energy and devotion of the editor of the volume.

A. J.

New Testament Studies: Critical Essays in New Testament Interpretation, with Special Reference to the Meaning and Worth of Jesus. Edited by Edwin Prince Booth. New York-Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942. 290 pp. $2.50.

This book is made up of a short Introduction by the general editor and eleven papers by New Testament teachers, representative of every section of the United States. The papers cover a wide range of subject, but are all illustrative of the modern attitude in this country to New Testament problems, and especially to those concerned with the person and life of Jesus. The book opens with a highly competent review of the Semitic background; this is followed by five papers on various aspects of Gospel criticism; the environment of early Christianity is then discussed in papers relating to Pharisaism, the Gentile mission, and the Christology of Revelation; finally there are two papers on the race consciousness of Jesus and the New Testament attitude to war. These discussions have no immediate bearing on the main subject, but are of much intrinsic interest, and deal with questions which are now uppermost in the minds of all Christians. A few more articles of the same kind might well have been included in the book, and would have added to its value.

The collection as a whole deserves a cordial welcome, not only on its own merits, but as representing the work of a number of our younger New Testa-

ment scholars. On this account it may fairly be regarded as one of the most significant volumes in recent theological literature. Whatever we may think of some of the conclusions offered, they reflect the type of instruction which now prevails in our colleges and is likely to influence the mind of the Church during the next generation. From this point of view, the impression left on us is distinctly reassuring. It would be invidious to single out particular articles for special praise, and fortunately this is not necessary. All the articles are on the same high level of ability and scholarship. New Testament teaching in every part of the country is quite evidently in excellent hands. Along with positive knowledge the writers have sound and often very penetrating judgment, and while never afraid to express novel opinions, they are not allured by novelty for its own sake. One feels with them all that their thinking is sincere and reverent, and that they are honestly seeking for more light on the Christian faith. It is doubtful whether a book of similar character put together thirty years ago would have had the same constructive value.

There is ample evidence in the book of native insight and originality, but one would have liked a little more boldness in the treatment of recent German theory. This tragic war would serve at least one good purpose if it enabled English and American scholars to shake themselves free of the German obsession, especially in the field of theology. We now have had very palpable evidence that the German mind is fatally deficient in critical and historical judgment. Why should we trust ourselves, in the maze of New Testament history, to those blind guides who have missed their way so badly around their own front door? The authors of the present book have not fully thrown off the old habit of accepting German hypothesis as fact. They take the pedantries of "form-criticism" much too seriously. They are disturbed by the theory that the Gospel tradition does not correspond to any historical reality, but has its *Sitz am Leben* in the circumstances of the early Church. Of this theory it may be affirmed with some confidence that its *Sitz am Leben* is a study chair in some German university town. For the light it may throw on German academical mentality it is highly interesting, but not for any other purpose.

It seems to us a grave error to accept the later German theories as representing the modern attitude in religious thought. For the most part, they are bound up with assumptions and with a frame of mind which we have now outgrown. The whole aim of modern thinking is to get off those tracks which lead nowhere, and to seek the truth in some new direction. One would like to believe that this country is destined to take the lead in a rejuvenation of New Testament study, and there is much in the book before us which encourages such a belief. The writers are never so bewildered in the German fog as to lose their sense of reality. Their instinct is to understand the New Testament message from within outward, and not to fumble around the circumference in hopes of finding the center. No one can yet predict the course of criticism in the next half century, but we can be certain that the coming age will be a serious one. If it is not convinced of some vital interest in the New Testament, it will not go deeper into the critical inquiry, but will drop the subject altogether.

E. F. Scott

New Testament Literature in 1941. A Bibliography prepared by the New Testament Club of the University of Chicago. 79 pp.

The high standard set by the 1940 issue of this Bibliography is fully maintained by the present volume; in fact, the fulness with which Continental monographs are listed is under present circumstances little less than a miracle. None the less, an important omission is that of the completion of Rudolf Bultmann's monumental commentary on John, a few copies of which somehow reached this country last summer. As before, the brief critical notes supply in a minimum of words exactly what the New Testment student wishes to know about the more important titles listed.

B. S. Easton

The Message of the Lord's Prayer. By Igor I. Sikorsky. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. 68 pp. $1.25.

This book is a timely discussion of the Lord's Prayer, not by dint of making some contemporary applications of its petitions, but by rising into its timeless meanings; is the eternal not always pertinent? For a long time the author's mind had been dwelling on the Prayer, and out of a meditation of years, he had made his own some of the manifold thought in it. This he has set down in clear and honest words. "I thought about the great Prayer until I began to realize that besides the direct meaning of the few outwardly simple sentences, the Prayer included indirectly a very extensive and profound message." If one were to call the book an amazingly condensed synthesis of religion, philosophy, and science in interpretation of the Prayer (indeed, it is that), an intending reader might have a forbidding vision of technical language and academic treatment—but these are delightfully absent. It is wise and rich reflection on one of the simplest and most profound of utterances.

True, there is one form of timeliness about the discussion. Mr. Sikorsky utilizes various suggestions from present-day science in bringing out the message of the Prayer. "The meaning of certain expressions of the Lord's Prayer," he says (p. 5), "is greatly widened by modern scientific information." He wins suggestions or carefully limited analogies from what is known of heat and cold, and light and darkness, and from the coexistence of freedom and order in the physical universe, to illuminate what he has to say about good and evil and about that persisting problem, the blending of free choice and established order in human life. All this is fascinatingly done. It lends to the substance of the thought a refreshingly new context.

Mr. Sikorsky finds a decisive qualifier of the message of the Prayer in the clause "as it is in heaven" (p. 20). Some one has called the book "a statement by an engineer why the universe is not to be regarded as 'mechanistic.'" Mr. Sikorsky is earnest about an unseen order, an "order next above the visible material universe" (p. 33), a "Divine heaven-universe" (p. 16), where the goals of life and history are, and which therefore matters mightily in the happiness or

tragedy of the "temporal existence" on this earth or on "any other similar planets." Without such high reference how can one pray the petitions as they are meant? One prays, not that a kingdom not now existing may spring up, but that one existing in a higher realm may be more fully ushered into the life on earth than it has been. As he can best explain this outlook in connection with one or another petition of the Prayer, the author dwells on that petition. There is little more than a page on the prayer for the daily bread. The main concept is already there to give that petition its context in it, having been stated at length in the chapter on "Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done," which is the longest chapter.

Only as one gets a footing in the higher order, says Mr. Sikorsky, with which the first three petitions have to do, does a man see or participate in the dramatic transaction with which the last three positions have to do. Essentially they have to do with "our spiritual birth." And the second longest chapter in the book is the one on the petition relative to temptation and evil. It deals forthrightly with the possibilities and the tragedies of life on earth.

Many a professional commentator has missed much in analysis of the structure of the Prayer which this intuitive lay mind acutely observes. Have you ever reflected that the word *love*—so prominent in the Gospels—does not occur in the Prayer? Incidentally that leads Mr. Sikorsky to a solid redefinition of that word. Again, "in the Lord's Prayer we find all important words and sentences chosen in such a way as to preserve the meaning irrespective of the influence of time and translations into other languages" (p. 5). Here is a book you can ponder long, just as it is itself not a "made" book but the ripened fruit of long pondering.

WILLIAM F. WUNSCH

The Disciple. By T. R. GLOVER. Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. 62 pp. $1.00.

This little book attempts to tell what discipleship meant to the early Christian, and by implication what it can mean today. It is the product of wide learning, lightly carried, written in a distinguished literary style. Nevertheless, it is an echo of the past, not a tract for the times. Its New Testament criticism is antiquated. Textual criticism is subjective (p. 9). American scholars are referred to twice, only to serve as the butt for ridicule (pp. 11, 44). Its sole reference to the labor problem is incredibly naïve (p. 33). It was apparently written before the war (p. 61).

From it we get a much better idea of what it would have meant to a cultured Briton of the late nineteenth century to have been a disciple than what it meant to run-of-the-mill Corinthians, Ephesians, Alexandrians, or Romans. On what it should mean to men in the troubled times in which we now find ourselves, the book has little light to shed.

FREDERIC R. CROWNFIELD

Cyrus Adler: A Biographical Sketch. By ABRAHAM A. NEWMAN. New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1942. viii + 233 pp.

A. A. Newman's biography of Dr. Cyrus Adler is a valuable contribution to the understanding of one of the most colorful personalities in American Jewish life. Adler was born in the heart of the Middle West, in Van Buren, Arkansas, to a family of German Jewish immigrants. He was trained to be a technical scholar in the field of Assyriology, and his doctoral thesis, the first to be accepted in Semitics at the American University, was on the subject, "The Annals of Sardanapalus: a double transliteration, translation, commentary and concordance of the cuneiform text." His Alma Mater, Johns Hopkins, rewarded him with an instructorship which involved teaching Hebrew, Ethiopic, and Arabic, and he became an associate professor in 1890, three years after his graduation. But Adler had other talents because of which he was sought out for other than academic tasks. He was named librarian and, subsequently, assistant secretary of the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, D. C. In 1892, he was appointed special commissioner of the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago, which celebrated the 400th anniversary of the discovery of America. His assignment was to arrange for the participation in the exhibit by Turkey, Egypt, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco, a highly delicate mission in diplomacy which he carried through with brilliant success.

Dr. Adler's interest in Judaism was, however, the most fundamental concern of his life, thanks to the profound influences exerted upon him principally by two men, his uncle, David Sulzberger, and Dr. Sabato Morais, rabbi of the Mikveh Israel Synagogue in Philadelphia, where Adler worshiped as a youth. When Dr. Morais had succeeded in founding the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, Dr. Adler volunteered his services as lecturer in biblical archeology, and during the year 1888, he commuted to New York regularly once a week to deliver his lectures. His interests in Judaism finally crowded out his other professional activities, and he came to give his full time to Jewish communal and academic work. He edited *The American Jewish Year Book, The Jewish Quarterly Review,* and *The Jewish Encyclopaedia,* to which he contributed eighty-three articles. He was president of the Jewish Theological Seminary, the Dropsie College, the American Jewish Committee, and the Jewish Publication Society. He was instrumental in the formation of the American Jewish Historical Society, the Gratz College and the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Indeed, it is safe to say that almost every activity of consequence in the American Jewish community for more than four decades owed its inspiration to his genius.

Toward one important movement in Jewish life, Dr. Adler remained critical—Zionism. He was interested in a Jewish resettlement in Palestine, and during his diplomatic mission on behalf of the Columbian Exposition, he even received the promise of Turkish officials that they would admit 5000 Jews annually to Palestine, though nothing came of the offer. But he held aloof from the Zion-

ist movement. Newman quotes two letters written by Adler to the founder of political Zionism, Dr. Herzl, in which he urges, for practical reasons, that Jewish colonization projects be centered not on Palestine, but on Mesopotamia and Syria. Dr. Adler's opposition to Zionism carried over to an opposition toward the American and World Jewish Congress, with which Zionists were closely identified.

Dr. Newman tells this story of Dr. Adler's life in all its varied details. He tells it with an emotional warmth which at times make the volume an extended eulogy. As is the case with a eulogy, it is never critical, and it nowhere probes beneath the surface of events to appraise the motives, the ideas, the basic moral values and convictions, in which Dr. Adler's career was enmeshed. There is, for example, little elucidation of his bitter conflicts with the leaders of the American Jewish Congress on a strategy of action in the face of the recent rise of a militant anti-Semitism. There is, similarly, little elucidation of his opposition to Zionism. Dr. Adler was primarily a man of action, and not a theorist, but action, too, constitutes data for the exposition of ideas. This further elucidation remains to be done in a more detached, and more critical biography.

BEN ZION BOKSER

The Cuban Church in a Sugar Economy. By J. MERLE DAVIS. New York: International Missionary Council, 1942. 144 pp. $.75.

The Church in New Jamaica. By J. MERLE DAVIS. New York: International Missionary Council, 1942. x + 100 pp. $.75.

The Church in Puerto Rico's Dilemma. By J. MERLE DAVIS. New York: International Missionary Council, 1942. viii + 80 pp. $.65.

The publication of these three books, following that of *The Economic Basis of the Evangelical Church in Mexico* (1940), by the same author, is one of the most hopeful signs in the Christian world scene. For some time the Church had been concerned over the snail-like pace at which nearly all of the younger churches of Latin America, and some other lands, have moved towards economic independence. An expert diagnostician was called, and he here reports his findings and prescribes for the patient.

Dr. John R. Mott's appraisal of the Jamaica volume, found in the foreword, is true of all, "a splendid example or pattern of what such a study should be. As such it should be recommended to special investigators as well as to deputations, commissions, and executives of missionary societies and churches sent forth to make reports on mission fields and problems." They will also be invaluable for missionaries on any field, and especially for the new ones and candidates. Even business men and high-grade tourists will find them a great aid to understanding the countries and peoples in which their interests lie.

The author brings into focus here the gist of the most reliable and scientific

economic and social studies made by governments and individuals for more than a decade past and adds his own major contribution, based on the experience and research of himself and scores of workers in the Evangelical Churches of the lands studied.

The discouraging facts which Mr. Davis has to face do not alter his basic conviction that, "The way of redemption which God has provided is essentially not too costly nor too heavy a burden to be carried by any of His children no matter how much they lack the economic and social amenities to which a European civilization has become accustomed." He believes that, "the Church of Christ possesses spiritual values which elude economic law," although "at the same time it is a human society subject to economics and is peculiarly concerned with the problem of adjusting these influences," but, "God does not intend that His way of redemption should be so complicated and expensive that it is beyond the powers of His children to support it—however simple and primitive an economy and culture they have."

The fact that in Cuba only one per cent of the 440 churches of seven leading denominations are financially independent of the mission boards which founded them is offset by another: that over ninety per cent of the churches of two denominations are self-supporting. Their secret? "Tithing by all the members will solve the problem of support of any church."

When what has happened is made clear it follows that a new strategy for missions is called for. Too often the mission aim has been to establish the Church in a given country rather than to adjust the Church to the economic standards and the peculiar culture of the country. An essentially middle-class institution has been set up in an economic and social order in which the middle class, as known in America, practically does not exist, and the inevitable result is never-ending economic dependence.

Such a tragedy as 160 different sectarian mission Churches and probably an equal number of independent groups, replicas of those of the sending country, is too great to be changed by anything less than a concerted action with the combined strength and faith of the whole Evangelical movement. It was the task of Mr. Davis to show how a united Church effort can win and in some cases is winning the fight against the network of influence destructive of life and soul: "unemployment, poverty, low earning power, inefficient use of land, undernourishment, lack of sanitation and pure water, barefeet, inadequate medical help, ignorance and inertia." He has done the task well, diagnoses the sickness and prescribes the remedy.

Stirring, optimistic news just received from the author, now in Brazil on a similar mission, gives a foretaste of his next book. It is hoped that this also may be followed in due season by important books dealing with conditions in the republics of the west coast of South America.

JAY C. FIELD

Science, Philosophy and Religion. Published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc., New York, 1942. 559 pp.

This is the new companion to Volume One, published in 1941. Lyman Bryson and Louis Finkelstein are the editors, but unfortunately the volume does not carry editorial identification beyond a modest note. (No publication should be permitted to go out without proper tagging! Moreover, it would help reviewers and librarians if the publishers would adopt an abbreviated name and state their address.)

The Conference held at Columbia University in September, 1941, convoked by over one hundred distinguished scholars, heard papers and comments on such subjects (appearing in this book) as: democracy and the scientists; faith, culture, liberal education, law, art, Thomism, Talmudic Judaism, Christianity—all supposedly in relation to each other and to the present chaotic social and political scene. As is usual, certain authors find such an occasion an opportunity to air their pet themes, betraying, in this reviewer's judgment, the high purpose of the Conference which presumably sought to discover and establish fundamental agreements and means of co-ordinated perspective. Others, writing from the field of their specialty contribute judiciously to the purpose of the whole, seeing their little field in relation to "what I have in common" with contemporaries in a realistic space-time world.

To review this book adequately would require, first, a review of widely separated themes and a portrait of widely different personalities; secondly, an appraisal of the value of such a Conference as judged by its literary product. Manifestly, this is no place to diagnose individual contributions. (The published critical comments, by their informality, in many cases outshine the major articles themselves.)

The value of such a Conference would seem to lie behind the scenes. The actual bringing together of flesh and blood with heads shorn of academic halos contributes more understanding than a thousand volumes. A few cigars, a common coffee table, and a good laugh are the really contributing factors in the success of any such symposium. This volume cannot therefore be taken as a criterion of the value or success of such a conference. A conglomeration of essays is more or less the Bergsonian droppings—cakes of academic pride and prejudice. The real unifying *élan vital* of friendships in informal gatherings does not appear here. One writer wisely suggests a pluralistic philosophy as fundamentally basic to such an endeavor. And he is right. If democracy, scientific interest, and real religious living are vital and mutually compatible, then, indeed, there must be a frank admission of the philosophical premise of the "eaches" with their endless variety: plurality as the base to whatever group endeavor.

VERGILIUS FERM

Faith for Today. By Stanley High, Frank Kingdon, Gerald G. Walsh, S.J., Louis Finkelstein, Swami Nikhilananda, with introduction and postscript by George V. Denny, Jr. Garden City, N. Y.: Town Hall Press and Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1941. x + 266 pp. $2.00.

This book of lectures, originally given in Town Hall, New York, by two Protestants, a Catholic, a Jew, and a Hindu, represents an effort to find a common denominator of faith—"unity in diversity," to use a current phrase. That little is found in doctrinal terms does not rob the book of a very considerable significance, for the reader is confronted with a demonstration of ethical unity in spite of doctrinal incompatibility. This contrast would have been sharper if the two Protestant writers, Stanley High and Frank Kingdon, were not both representatives of one wing of Protestant thought which most Protestant theologians would probably regard as a rollicking romantic liberalism. Be that as it may, they have written impressively, rather brilliantly, and with a convincing ethical robustness, though they do not wholly agree.

Mr. High is preoccupied with the present crisis, which he sees as essentially religious and revolutionary. He is rather impatient with the sackcloth-and-ashes mood of "repentance" which plays into the hands of the Nazis. Mr. Kingdon thinks we all have much to repent of in making Nazism possible. He attempts an apologetic for theistic faith in terms of personal experience, with a naturalistic, activistic, immanentist orientation.

Father Walsh writes in the quiet, expository, though dogmatic, style of the Thomist scholar that he is. He expounds in authoritative fashion the Catholic "quadrilateral": God as omnipotent creater; Christ as the unique God-man; redemption through suffering; and the "*fact* of faith" which produces in man the supernatural life. The Catholic faith is set between Protestantism and Naturalism: "We believe the will is free in a way that would not have been accepted by Luther but we likewise believe that the will is weak in a way that would not have been accepted by Rousseau."

Rabbi Finkelstein is less concerned to present an apologetic for Judaism as such than to show that the Hebrew Scriptures have made an essential contribution to modern democracy, and he writes convincingly. Science itself he sees as drawing upon this source. "The scientist," he warns, "who no longer realizes the source of this inspiration, may, like the humanitarian who believes in the equality of men, be zealous in devotion to the moral pattern developed in earlier generations, but he will find it difficult to transmit that pattern to disciples and the general public."

The reader is taken into a different world by Swami Nikhilananda, who expounds the ancient faith of India. The eternal universe, uncreated, "manifested" by God, who to the eye of matured faith is impersonal and identical with the universe, yet who is apprehended by the pure in heart under the aspect of personality, who does not even "exist" but is Existence itself; Soul as eternal, absolutely unchanging, including all individual souls; man as a "mixture of dust and deity," a pilgrim through a succession of incarnations, in no sense

equal with his fellows yet somehow capable of the experience of brotherhood, *not* "born in sin and shapen in iniquity"; religion as one and universal in a sense that makes all religions valid and useful to each other—these are some of the concepts inherent in the faith of two hundred millions of people.

Surely it is a strange combination of religious teachings that George Denny brought together on the Town Hall platform and has put into a book, yet how true his insight in finding in them inspiration for the comment, "Education's greatest failure in the modern world can be attributed to its relative omission of religion as a basis of morality among men."

F. Ernest Johnson

Religion and the Present Crisis. Edited by John Knox. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942. xii + 165 pp. $1.50.

Nine lectures by members of the faculty of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago on the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation for the Study of American Institutions, prepared prior to the attack upon Pearl Harbor. They deal with "the meaning of the present crisis of civilization for the American church."

Dean Colwell, in "Christianity Refinding Itself," suggests that Christianity denounce idolatries of race and state, strengthen the moral fibre of the individual, remind men of their divine significance, and conduct propaganda for a better democracy.

Professor Aubrey, in "Building a Better Democracy," advocates the "Christian discipline of self-sacrifice as the prerequisite for realism and progress."

Professor Holman, in "Maintaining Fellowship across Lines of Conflict," contends that the church may become a "powerful instrument for creating a co-operative human fellowship, for maintaining fellowship across all lines of conflict in times of stress, and for providing a pattern and dynamic for the integration of mankind into a true brotherhood."

Professor Wieman, in "Achieving Personal Stability," beholds Russia, China, and America as the survivors in the titanic war and adds a sixth element to the usual five for stability (established order, self-confidence, idealism, faith, clever adaptation), namely, "that creativity which makes us mutually aware of one another's interests, which enables the thought and feeling, hope and fear, of each to become creative in others."

Dean Gilkey, in "Anticipating the Post-War Mind," sums up in the prayer of a little English girl: "Please, God, take care of Mummy and Daddy, and take care of Michael and Joan, and take care of Uncle Arthur. And above all, God, take care of yourself, or we shall all be sunk."

Professor McNeill, in "Preparing for Durable Peace," proposes a nine-point program: (1) Subordination of national to regional and of regional to general government in international matters; (2) Formation of a federal world-government on a representative basis; (3) Repudiation of superior-race theories; (4) Guarantees of freedom of religion, teaching, and "dissemination of *trustworthy news*"; (5) Immediate international relief; (6) Gradual reduction of

armaments; (7) Scientific exploitation and distribution of economic resources and raw materials "under a board responsible to a representative assembly of the world-state"; (8) Universal international education; (9) Ecumenical Christianity.

Professor Bowen, in "Educating for a New World Order," notices that the problem of the relation of religion to education must be studied anew "in the light of a century and a half of American experience, and of the urgent demands created by the present crisis."

Professor Pauck, in "Redeeming Culture Through Crisis," points out that Christianity has been not only an agent of criticism but also an agent of redemption, and therefore must face the two principal contemporary problems of personal freedom and the community of free men, and of national freedom and community of all nations and races in a technological age, and proceed to solve them by the reformation of its life and its creed.

The article by Professor John Knox, entitled "Re-examining Pacifism," deals with a very distressing personal and ecclesiastical issue in so fair a way that it should appear in tract form immediately. It rests contemporary pacifism upon: (1) Incompatibility between the ethical teachings of Jesus and war; (2) The Hebrew-Christian idea of God; (3) Confrontation with brutality and destructiveness of modern war; (4) Disillusionment with outcome of wars; (5) Modern wars largely selfish struggles for power; (6) "Faith in the power of active good will to produce social change." Professor Knox next summarizes the case for the nonpacifist: (1) Brutality of modern tyranny; (2) Failure to prevent war does not cancel the duty of stopping war; (3) Degrees of national guilt; (4) Aid of the better cause; (5) Military action has destroyed evil; (6) Choice is between war and tyranny not between war and peace.

The framework of the ethic of Jesus was "eschatological." God was to bring in the kingdom by miracle. Then the Christian was not of this world, merely a pilgrim on his way to the celestial city. God would take vengeance in due time. There would be plenty of violence at the grand assize. "Coercion would be needed, but it would be God's coercion, not man's." Now it is A.D. 1942, and the world has not passed away, and Christians believe in process not cataclysm. Christianity is very much in and of this world. Hence, "the ethic of non-resistance" cannot now create the new world all Christians long for. Pacifism is not the only Christian position. "To regard Christian pacifism as a possible political strategy" in the contemporary world "is only to deceive ourselves." The church cannot "identify herself absolutely with the soldier, neither will she with the pacifist."

The faculty of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago has been boldly heroic in thus speaking very plainly on the disturbing problems confronting American Christianity today. Which theological faculty will now take the torch and carry on the discussion?

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

Faith Under Fire. By MICHAEL COLEMAN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. x + 160 pp. $1.50.

Here is a book by a great pastor who knows his faith and knows his people. His opening chapter is rich with a tone of quiet determination, and the reader immediately feels something of the spirit of the men and women of All Hallows Church, London, quickened by adversity to a new and wider service. There is something of the thrill of the Book of Acts in the picture of this ancient place of worship going into all the community round about with its message of comfort and faith and hope.

Mr. Coleman claims to be "no theologian, merely an ordinary individual with a certain amount of intelligence" (p. 7). It is quickly apparent that he has, particularly through the trial of the recent months, come to feel intensely the compelling truth of the faith he professes. The doctrine of the Church has become a real and vital part of his own experience, and he has found sane and upholding answers to the questions framed in blitz and blackout by putting all he believes to the test in a great adventure of faith.

The book thus becomes a challenge to that same adventure of faith. The great fundamentals of the Christian religion are explained as only the man who lives them can—in the simple and clear language of one who really *knows*. The tone for each chapter is set by a sketch of the meeting in one or another of the shelters the author visited weekly, and the ensuing discussion has an air of reality and simplicity. Each section shows the marks of the hammering of those who most earnestly long to know.

Without becoming involved or complicated, Mr. Coleman explains his answers to basic questions as those answers have become clear to him under fire. He is able to pass from point to point with a clear and logical continuity, though his brevity makes the book one to ponder rather than skim. Especially fine are his use of analogies (particularly in connection with the question of God's existence) and of the ideas of the pledge and divine-human co-operation.

The first part of the book is rather more compelling and vivid, since it deals with the great themes of the existence and nature of God, sin, the Bible, and the Incarnation. The second part opens with a realistic and sympathetic reconstruction of Jesus' childhood and youth, and a skilful and well-rounded résumé of the Gospel accounts of His ministry. Then follows a vivid chapter on the birth of the Church, and one on the beginning and development of its creed. The present writer found the chapter on "The Church and Its Sacraments" lacking in the life and challenge that distinguish the earlier chapters, but the high level was reached again in the closing chapters on "Prayer," and "The Church in Action."

Altogether, a challenging book, to be reread and pondered if one would compare his own faith with that of a man who has staked everything on the verity of Christianity and found it gloriously true in his own experience.

HOLT GRAHAM

What Man Can Make of Man. By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. vii + 62 pp. $1.00.

Many of us, I expect, are getting rather weary of hearing repeated the important thesis that the world today needs to return (in some sense or other) to Christianity (in some sense or other). Professor Hocking's little book presents once more this thesis—but in so characteristically fresh and original a fashion that the most weary reader will find the old thesis interesting and new.

The book begins by referring to the fact that man alone "attempts to revise his natural pattern." Unfortunately man does not know what new pattern to aim at. He does not know where he is going, but is very glad to be on his way. All through the last 400 years—that is, through "Modern Times"—he has used "Liberty" as his slogan, but when you ask him what it means he can only tell you that it is liberty *from*. And he is at least learning that "the headless man cannot be free." Certainly we men have made progress in the negative sense of getting free from many a superstition and from the older static world. But this has landed us in a state of pragmatic and naturalistic doubt concerning most of the great human hopes and values. And "if progress has brought us to pragmatism, it has brought us to the insight which puts an end to belief in progress."

To be sure, the desire for improving the conditions of human life, for doing away with old hardships and old prejudices, for clearer and more personal thought, has characterized the Western world for the last 400 years, and it is this urge to negative freedom and to practical advance that has made possible such progress as we find. But where did this eager desire and this widening outlook originate? The answer to this question constitutes the central suggestion of the book. For Professor Hocking asks whether it be not significant that this liberating attitude of "Modern Times" originated in and has steadily characterized Europe and the West but not the old and very wise Orient.

> There is a deep-reaching historical puzzle here, when one stops to think of it. Why is it that science achieved this marvelous new growth, pulling itself into a self-developing system having a momentum of its own which nobody can stop—why was this stage reached *only in Europe*?

Professor Hocking thinks the answer is to be found in the fact that Christianity had prepared the soil.

> To see what is there is not easy: to make a technique of seeing what is there, this is one of the immense moral achievements of the race. Thus at the very threshold of the new science lay a profound act of humility: "in order to master, we must first obey." And has this maxim a resemblance—no, I will say kinship—to that other maxim familiar to Christendom, "In order to find our lives we must lose them"—the immortal paradox which condemns self-assertion as the way to mastery in anything having to do with truth? Are they not the same maxim? And if so, is it not clear that back of science there lies a profound ethical impulse: and that back of this ethical impulse there stands a revolutionary religious discovery, kneaded for a thousand years into the moral fabric of Europe? . . . And one also understands that if this new and

fertile concern for physical nature were to repudiate its metaphysical source, it contains the possibility of making us into a race of monsters through our inability to make truly human use of unlimited power.

This is the heart of the book. The application of this thought to various present situations and dangers is carried out in interesting fashion. But the reader, doubtless, will be able to guess how this is done, and if he cannot guess he will do very well to read Professor Hocking's own words. So let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. "It is the truth that the world, like the human self, has its unity in a living purpose. It is the truth of the existence of God."

J. B. P.

No Sign Shall Be Given. By HUGH S. TIGNER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. 198 pp. $1.75.

Written by a minister of the Universalist Church, author, and Associate Editor of the Journal of Liberal Religion, this book, based on personal experience and reflection, is an appeal to consider the present task of the Church and the necessity for vital religion. It is a graphic diagnosis, provocative of discussion, with constructive recommendations for concerted action among Christian bodies, and made by a man who is alert to the signs of the times.

R. C. K.

Christianity and War. By CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN. Berne, Indiana, 1942. 47 pp.

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